

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

WITH OTHER LECTURES AND ESSAYS

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

PART I.

OCCASIONAL ADDRESSES AND ESSAYS.

I.		PAGE
INAUGURAL ADDRESS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW		3
II.		
GIORDANO BRUNO		23
III.		
PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY		45
IV.		
KANT'S VIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY		66
V.		
PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM		78
VI.		
THE BASIS OF MORALITY		97
VII.		
THE REGENERATION OF GERMANY		117

PART II.

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.

A. GENERAL ANALYSIS.

CHAPTER I.—THE PROVINCE OF PSYCHOLOGY.

Difficulties involved in the definition of psychology	
as the science of mind,	161
as the science of the phenomena of consciousness	161
A terminus in the defining process marked by the latter term	162
Consciousness as all that of which one is aware at any given moment, or as the total series of such momentary states .	163
Twofold distinction required	
(a) between the objective facts and the modification of the subject's existence which constitutes his perception of them (= distinction between outer and inner)	164
(b) the same distinction as holding good for the subject himself, between the state of consciousness and its reference to something other than itself	164
Question as to the primary character of this distinction	164
Resultant suggestion as to the peculiarity of the psychological treatment of facts	165
The material of psychology—	
(a) the immediate experiences	165
(b) the process by which the distinction between subject and object is developed	165
Consequent distinction between psychology and epistemology	165
Definition of psychology	166

CHAPTER II.—PRESENTATIONISM, AND THE
SUBJECT-REFERENCE.

General analysis of the inner life : three important conceptions	
The doctrine of faculties	167
Psychical atomism	167
The conception of development	167

The first conception without significance for modern psychology	168
The second conception	168
(1) the doctrine of Herbart	168
(a) its metaphysical presuppositions	168
(b) its explanation of mental process	169
(2) The association psychology	171
its inadequate explanation	
of the apprehension of relations	171
and of the special character of the emotions	171
Ward's criticism of 'presentationism' and counter-theory of subjective reference	172
The rôle assigned to Attention	172
The description of presentations as 'objects'	173
Objective character of sense-presentations an after-growth	174
The distinction of feelings from presentations in primitive consciousness	175
Criticism of Ward's view	176
(a) whether feelings can be attended to, revived, and associated, that is, have the general characteristics of presentations	177
(b) whether facts justify the distinction of presentations (as objective) from attention and feeling (as subjective)	179
Brentano's distinction of presentation from judgment and from feeling	180
The criterion of the subjective according to Kant	180
The distinction of subjective and objective not applicable, with any definite meaning, to the primitive consciousness	181
Inadequacy of the second main conception	183

CHAPTER III.—MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

The third main conception : that psychology has to trace the development of mind	185
Hegel's conception of the development of mind as tending to an end fixed from the outset	185
fundamentally identical with the Aristotelian doctrine	185
The notion of End : two possible views—	
(a) the transcendental : that the notion of end is absolutely valid, and efficient in the production of its own manifestations	186
(b) the critical or empirical : that the notion is of subjective	

validity only and limited in application to our practical experience	188
The laws of change or development	188
(a) merely descriptive	189
(β) the doctrine of an ultimate end known beforehand not included in them	189
Mental life a development	190
Cause of development not predetermined	190
The notion 'implicit'	190
What is specific in the notion of end not implied in development	191
Application to mental life of the notion of development thus freed from the implication of end or purpose	192

CHAPTER IV.—THE PRIMARY FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

I. General character of the content	195
The inquiry as guided by the conception of development	195
The difficulty—that the series of states of consciousness cannot be regarded either as making up a self or as existing without a self—a result of the false objectification of 'states of mind'	197
The distinguishable features in immediate experience	198
Qualitative differences	198
Our names for these derived from mature experience	199
Qualitative distinctness and variation of intensity possessed by both sensations and feelings	199
Sensations distinguished	
(a) by their origin being connected with stimulation of some part of the body	200
Inadequacy of this method	200
(β) by their function in the subsequent development of mind	200
II. Feeling	201
The distinction of feelings as subjective from sense-presentations as objective a derivative distinction	201
View of feeling as a secondary fact dependent on other components of consciousness	202
This dependence found in developed experience	202
But bodily pain—if not also bodily pleasure—primary in character	202
And the observed dependence not a simple relation	202

Feelings (i.e., pleasure-pain) independent in nature and only explicable by reference to some independent organic process	202
Insufficiency of Wundt's reasons for holding that pleasure-pain does not exhaust the qualitative characteristics of feeling as primary experience	203
Theories of feeling : two main types—	
(1) Pleasure and pain connected with their conditions in conscious experience : the teleological theory	205
The theory which connects pleasure with unimpeded exercise of attention, and pain with its restriction	207
The theory which connects pleasure and pain with expansion and repression of the self	208
(2) Pleasure and pain connected with physiological processes distinct from, though perhaps related to, those underlying sense-presentations	208
the changes which determine feeling being probably diffused in character, perhaps due to the state of nutrition of the organs directly connected with sensation	209
The formal feelings	210
Connexion of feeling and action	211
III. Willing	212
The essential elements of a voluntary action, according to Wundt	212
Factors involved in the process of willing—	
(a) the series of sensations involved in movement	216
(b) the movement not prefigured in the primitive sense-impulse	216
(c) regular series in the changes in our experience	217
Influence of the feelings on this mechanism	217
The inner effects of the process	218
in attention	218
in association	219
Gradual growth of the process of willing	220
The 'feeling of activity'	221

B. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING.

CHAPTER I.—THINKING AS A MENTAL FACULTY.

View of thought as a distinct faculty connected with the difference of notion, judgment, and reasoning, from the simpler materials of knowledge	222
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Statement of this view by Hamilton and Mansel crossed by a different view	223
Mansel's 'psychological judgment'	224
Hamilton's statement that comparison is involved in the simplest act of mind	225
Similar view of the process of knowledge as being of the nature of analysis	
in the Leibnizian School	227
and in Condillac	228
The objective reference of the logical products disregarded by both	229

CHAPTER II.—LOTZE'S DOCTRINE OF THINKING.

Lotze's doctrine : that thinking is a specific activity of the soul of a higher grade than that called forth in sensation or in perception	231
The specific functions of thinking—	
(1) reference to the objective—exhibited at a stage of thinking prior to the notion proper	231
(2) as exhibited in the logical products—imposing form on the given material	232
Distinction of thinking from lower mental processes—	
(1) activity of thinking described as the process of relating as contrasted with the isolated impressions and ideas	232
(2) more general description of thought as the seeking for grounds or reasons as contrasted with the mechanical nexus of fact	232
Reconciliation of these diverse representations perhaps sought by consideration of the processes intermediate between mechanism and thought ; namely	
(a) mere identity of the perceiving subject	234
(b) unity of the subject in association and reproduction	235
(c) unity of the subject in the translation of sense-impressions into intuitions of space and time	235
Pre-logical processes of thought	237
(a) first grade : objectification	238
Objectivity and Universality	239
(b) second grade (relatively passive)	242
(a) Position	242
(β) Distinction	242
(Ground for the antithesis between these and the mechanism of sense and idea)	243

(γ) Comparison	245
The 'first universal' and the concept	245
Implication of subjective activity in Lotze's account of comparison	246
Criticism of the isolation of these processes from the mechanism of sense and idea	247

CHAPTER III.—THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE.

Kant's doctrine (in the main unpsychological) : that the func- tion of thought is the formation of the conception of 'object'	251
The question for psychology : whether the distinction between subjective and objective is due to a unique activity of mind	251
Reasons for a negative answer—	
(a) the view not required for Kant's philosophical theory .	252
(b) its inconsistency with experience	252
Two sides of Kant's doctrine ultimately identical—	
(1) objective reference of thought	252
Kant's criticism of Leibniz	252
Criticism of Kant's view	253
complexity of the notion of object	254
relation of this developed notion to the simpler modes of representation of objective reference	254
(2) relation of thought to self-consciousness	255
Self-consciousness dependent upon thought, but itself neither simple nor primitive	255

CHAPTER IV.—SURVEY OF DEVELOPED THINKING.

Developed functions of thought shown in .	
(1) distinctions running through mature experience	257
thinking distinguished from presentations as (a) subjective activity, (b) purposive, (c) relating given material	257
(2) the characteristic products of thinking : notion, judgment, reasoning	258
Lines of consideration to be followed	259

CHAPTER V.—ANALYSIS OF THINKING.

Reasoning in its various forms	260
The disjunctive syllogism	260
Primitive and developed forms of the disjunctive proposition	261
Complexity of the disjunctive judgment even in its least developed form	261
The hypothetical judgment	262
The connexion in idea of antecedent and consequent only relatively distinct from the more concrete representations of connexions in time and space	263
The hypothetical judgment and reasoning	263
The categorical judgment	264
Distinction of universal and individual judgments of fundamental importance from the psychological point of view	264
Attitude of mind involved in the universal judgment	265
The simplest type of judgment without qualitative distinction	266
Reference in the universal judgment to objective fact	266
The common distinction between idea and judgment	267
View of this distinction as resting on a fundamental difference in the attitude of consciousness towards the content apprehended	268
The function of judging being the reference of a given content to objective reality	269
The question as to the justification for assuming that objective reality is in any way a primitive element in experience	269
The cognate distinction between the parts of speech and the sentence	271
The apprehension of the objective	272
The various forms of the judgment based on this consciousness at its different stages	272
What combination of experiences in the inner life gives the primitive distinction between subjective and objective	273
The difference between sensuous perceptions and idea the simplest form of that distinction	273
The rudimentary form of judgment thereby rendered possible indicated in the interpretation of any portion of sentient experience as a sign	275
this involving	
(a) distinction of ideas and actual facts	275
(b) a certain sense of continuity	275

The apprehension of the real world of perception as a common point of reference for the experiences of a number of percipient subjects	275
involving	
(a) contrast between immediate sense-perception and the reality apprehended thereby	276
(b) recognition by the individual subject of other existences generically identical with his own	276
New aspect thus given to perceived reality, and larger significance acquired by the interpretation of signs	276
Origin of language	277
Psychological consequences of philological inquiry	279
Psychological condition under which the use of verbal signs may have originated	280
Objective reference not peculiar to thinking	281
Limitations of Kant's view	281
(a) the separation of the formal from the material elements of nature impossible	282
(b) the representation of nature as a systematic whole a gradual development from the primitive distinction between the sentient subject and an order of fact distinct from his perceiving	282
Summary view of the nature of thinking	282

CHAPTER VI.—PROBLEMS IN THE THEORY OF THINKING.

I. Inter-relation of the products of thinking	283
The notion judgment and reasoning not in an ascending series of complexity, but different developments from a common origin	283
II. Objectivity and universality	284
Objectivity in the sense of independence of the individual act of thinking necessarily possessed by the universal	285
Aspects involved in the recognition of the objective in perception—	
(1) independence of the particular act of apprehending	285
(2) generality (being common to all percipient minds)	285
Objectivity of fact and objectivity of truth	285
Divergence of thinking from perception	286
The transition as consisting in a re-arrangement of data, and dependent on the supply of concrete material	286
(Distinction of self and not-self)	287

Appearance of thinking due to the separation of relations from related contents	288
The common opposition of perceiving and thinking in re- spect to Time	288
III. Thinking and self-consciousness	289
Development of thought dependent upon	
(1) distinction of ideas from sense-perceptions	290
(2) unification of each series	290
Thinking objective as regards its content, but pre-eminently subjective as a process	290
Relation of the reflective to the primitive form of self- consciousness	291
IV. The Categories	292
General attitude to Kant's analysis	292
The distinction between category and Idea not ultimate	293
Thought as reflective consciousness	293
Abstraction from condition of time to be found in the simplest acts of thought	294
Analysis and synthesis as correlative aspects of thought	295
The category of Causality and the principle of the Adapta- tion of nature to the human mind	296
Objections to the distinction between them drawn by Kant	296
The conception of the Uniformity of nature	297
Its variable content illustrated by the difficulties in the logical treatment of reasoning	298
Uniformity not susceptible of discursive proof, because involved in the structure of our intelligence	299
These ultimate conditions characteristics of the concrete material of experience	300
V. Thought and Reality	300
Thinking not identical with the structure of reality, but one form in which reality is manifested	300
The question as to the complete intelligibility of reality	300
The Aristotelian doctrine of the individual	301
The distinction between the That and the What no ground for limiting the interpretative function of thought	301
VI. The notion of Development	302
The view of development as the unfolding of what is already contained (Aristotle and Hegel)	302
Contradiction in this view of development when applied to the practical sphere	303
Same difficulty on the theoretical side	304
Special difficulty in the notion of development: the fusion of identity and difference	305

Question whether the same notion of development is applicable to all concrete forms of existence	306
The conception of a pre-existing plan	307
A type of agency other than the mechanism of nature not required for the notion of development	307
VII. The Positivist view of Thought	307
The limitation of knowledge to co-existences and sequences (Comte)	308
a type of knowledge which is	
extremely abstract	308
and specially (if not exclusively) applicable to external perception	308
The method adopted in Comte's later work for dealing with the facts of the inner life	309
VIII. Form and matter	310
General result : impossibility of severing form from matter	310
This general position a deduction from Kant's work	310
No ultimate justification for Kant's antithesis between pure generality of thought and indeterminate particularity of perception	311

CHAPTER VII.—CONCLUSION.

Importance of the practical type among our primary notions	312
Primitive thinking (or the natural order of thinking)	313
The complex individual its starting-point	313
Agency conceived through muscular effort, and as purposive	313
The reverse order put forward by developed thinking	314
No incompatibility between the two representations	315
Gradual alteration in content of the primitive categories of practice through increase of perceptive experience and of analytic power	315
Experience itself the sole criterion of the worth of the notions by which it is interpreted	316
INDEX	319

PART I.

OCCASIONAL ADDRESSES AND ESSAYS

I.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.¹

EVERY teacher to whom is entrusted some special branch of University work must feel a deep sense of responsibility as regards the relation he holds both to his subject and to those whose studies in it he is to direct. It devolves upon him, by his own activity as a teacher and as a learner, to maintain as a vital influence in the microcosm of letters the branch of human culture entrusted to him. It is his privilege, a privilege not without its heavy burdens, to share in giving to others what Plato wisely calls "the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have," education of the soul.

In the latter respect, in the relation in which he stands to his students, he who undertakes, I will not say to teach philosophy but to aid in drawing forth and stimulating the power of thinking philosophically, seems to me to have very special responsibilities. No other subject in the academical curriculum touches so many of the deepest interests of humanity, or touches them so intimately; no other subject is adapted to produce so fundamental a change in the culture of the individual mind. It may be deemed by us a pious exaggeration of the good Bishop

¹ [On entering upon the professorship of Logic and Rhetoric, 21st October 1895.]

Berkeley when he declared that "whatever the world thinks, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the *summum bonum*, may possibly make a thriving earth-worm, but will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman"; but the more temperate conclusion can hardly be avoided that the difficulties and perplexities with which reflexion on human life in any of its aspects is confronted, lead back when thoroughly followed to questions of the ultimate kind we call 'philosophical,' and that so, for good or for evil, he who has once breathed the free, if rarefied, atmosphere of speculation must have his views on all the permanent interests of humanity profoundly affected.

While, then, I feel keenly the responsibility resting on me, I take comfort in two reflexions. The one, of minor and merely personal significance, that the auditors in whose company I shall have to 'wade through the ocean of words' constituting the medium of philosophical analysis will assuredly extend their cordial sympathy to a single-minded effort to reach the truth, and so far as possible to express it. The other, that he who has the privilege of lecturing on philosophy in a Scottish University may reckon upon the lively interest in the subject and the predisposition to prosecute inquiries in it which seem to be the natural heritage of the Scottish mind.

With these considerations in mind, I have thought not only that I might venture, but that it was in a measure incumbent upon me to devote this opening lecture of the course to a general treatment such as might indicate, broadly, the method and principles by which the main topics of theoretical philosophy may be fruitfully handled. A general treatment of the kind has its own difficulties and dangers, and it is with great diffidence that I venture to connect it with a survey of the present position of philosophical questions.

It has often been, and it is likely still to be, a reproach to philosophy that its problems exhibit in the course of history a suspicious uniformity. The modern thinker seems still to be placing before himself the same ultimate questions that pressed upon the earliest adventurers on the ocean of being. Nor do the advantages of the modern thinker's later position seem to bear fruit in a proportionate completeness of the solutions reached. A final philosophy, by which I suppose is meant a connected body of answers to all the issues involved in the general questions raised by reflective thinking, seems as far off as ever. If point be wanted for the reproach, it is added by reference to the history of philosophy as the record of never-ending strife among rival views.

Now, it is no doubt possible to say, and there is a certain truth in saying, that the apparent sameness of the philosophical problem depends mainly on the arbitrary insistence that it shall be at all times conceived and expressed in all its width and generality, no regard being paid to the considerations that a generality has significance only in the concrete details it sums up, and that the stringent rule applied to philosophy might have much the same consequence if applied to spheres of research in which admittedly change and advance have taken place. Even the developed and detailed researches of the specialised natural sciences show a tendency to return to the larger cosmical inquiries from which they took their start, and their special problems might, without undue straining, be brought within the limits of the vague and broad questions which first suggested themselves to the keen perceptions of the Greek mind.

With such an answer, however, no one is and no one ought to be contented. There is beyond doubt a sense in which the philosophic problem is and must be the same, a

sense moreover, in which sameness is so far from identical with uniformity, with want of change, that it demands variation as its very condition. Philosophy has always taken as the goal at which it aimed, to find the principle of ultimate intelligibility, the principle by which and through which the manifold of experience can be understood; and, in respect to such aim, its distinction from the special sciences has consisted in the more general, more comprehensive character of the principle it sought. This is not a point of view, as I shall try to show, with which we can altogether rest content, although it fairly expresses the historic character of speculative philosophy. But, even from this point of view, it follows of necessity that philosophy as realised at any time, as expressed by any thinker, must depend on the nature of that manifold of experience for which explanatory principle was sought, on the vividness and completeness with which the individual thinker was able to place before himself the discordant elements of experience which serve as primary occasions for speculative effort to reconcile them, on the conception which the thinker had formed of the ultimate character of 'intelligibility,' and, lastly, on the measure of success attending his effort to pursue that roundabout path through all things, *τὴν διὰ πάντων διέξοδον*, whereby the adequacy of a principle is tested.

The apparently uniform fashion in which the most general problem of philosophy comes forward is mainly due to the obvious fact that the ultimate lines of division in experience as a whole, from reflexion on which arises the first sense of a difficulty to be overcome, the division, separation, even opposition between the subjective life of self-conscious mind on the one hand, and what we call relatively the objective world of nature on the other, appear to remain in a certain abstract sense the same. But this identity

in the abstract is the least important feature of the division, and is fatally apt to mislead us. Much of the perplexity we feel in our effort to understand things springs directly from the ease with which we identify our abstract and lifeless representations of them with the fulness of the concrete reality. Nothing is gained for thought by dropping the particularising features which form too often the essence rather than the accidents of the reality we are striving to understand. A philosophic principle which seeks to render intelligible the conjunction in real experience of such apparently antithetical factors as mind and nature, self-consciousness and the world of objective fact and event, will have small success if it remains satisfied with the abstract representations of these opposites, such as are familiar to ordinary thinking. From that point of view, as the history of speculation, particularly of modern speculation, abundantly shows, some barren solution will be sought, either by referring the conjunction of the two, allowed to remain in all their abstract difference, to some equally abstract third, which may be called God or what we please, or by arbitrary expression of one in terms of the other, or by equally arbitrary submersion of both in some inconceivable third. It is only by retaining the full particularity of the concrete facts that we can hope to reach some mode of expressing their union which shall satisfy us, and which shall prove itself adequate to the task of following out the details of experience. In truth, it would not be quite a paradox to say that philosophy has not so much to find a uniting principle as to make clear to us in what the reconciliation we seek consists.

Psychology, Hegel used to complain, was too shy of the facts of mind, by which he meant, I take it, whatever may have been the justice of his reproach, that psychology was too much inclined to busy itself with wholly abstract

thoughts about mind and its ways (if, indeed, the attenuated pictures with which psychology has often been delighted deserve to be called thoughts), and that in so doing it lost sight of the real character of the experience to which these pointed. The unity, substantiality, immateriality of mind, its various powers and capacities, these are terms which have a meaning only through pictorial representations, imperfect abstractions that are more likely to mislead than to refer us to the full life of mind from which they have been derived. What Hegel said of Psychology may be said, and with as much justice, of Philosophy at large. It has too often been shy of the facts of experience and inclined to wheel in endless circles round the imperfect pictures which the dividing faculty of thought readily supplies. The perplexities in which we thus involve ourselves are most often of our own creation. 'We make a dust, and then complain we cannot see.' I do not say that we can dispense with these pictorial representations, these half-thoughts; they are necessary material, the first stage of reflexion, and more often than not a heritage from the past. But there is great need that we should not take them for more than they are worth. It was not an injudicious prayer of the philosopher, to be delivered from the evil one and from metaphors.

Philosophy, then, must keep close to experience and draw its sustenance therefrom. Just as the philosophy of an individual, if he have one, is the condensed expression of the way in which he views the elements of his experience as put together, so philosophy in general is at any time the abstract mode of expressing what is vaguely described as the culture of the age, the thoughts and feelings of humanity at large, so far as these have a definite character, regarding its surroundings in nature and in practical life. When philosophy is so regarded, change or advance in it is readily seen to resemble

in general fashion the change and advance that come about in the individual mind with increase of experience and increased faculty of reflectively handling it. Experience, whether in the way of new knowledge or in the way of new forms of activity, does not merely accumulate isolated materials in the individual mind. Each new item modifies what has gone before, and is itself received into a contexture of acquired notions that powerfully affects it. The first partial views are modified and expanded, and an increased power is gained of dealing with what is still to be added to the stock. So, in the history of philosophy at large, the wider and more exact knowledge of nature and man which constitutes increase of experience, compels a modification of the general conceptions in which reflexion had embodied itself, while the new thoughts do not lie in simple isolation or in antagonism to their antecedents. Mainly by the aid of these antecedents is thought able to supply what in them is wanting, to correct their one-sidedness or imperfection, and to carry out through the richer detail of new experience the fuller conception at which it has arrived.

I do not desire to press the analogy further. Perhaps if one cared to pursue the fancy, one might maintain that in the genesis of a philosophical conception there is something resembling what has been called 'recapitulation' in the realm of organic life. In working out a new conception, our thought will be found to be passing through, in modified stages, no doubt, the forms of earlier philosophical ideas, which in the larger page of history stand, each with an independence of its own, as so many past systems. The final ideas of the earlier doctrines find a place, and a necessary place, in the larger apprehension of reality, through which, moreover, their essential meaning is more fully and adequately expressed.

Now, when one turns to the special case to which these

general reflexions are intended to apply, to the present position in which philosophy stands, one can hardly fail to discern the signs of a condition such as one commonly and fairly enough describes by the term 'transition.' The apologetic attitude which is often and necessarily adopted by the exponent of philosophy seems at present peculiarly appropriate. Of confidence in the constructive work of philosophy, of conviction that thought is in a position to work out a satisfactory solution of the problems it must set before itself, there cannot be said to be at present much. Such a condition of things indicates now, as it has indicated in the past, that the leading ideas with the aid of which we are seeking to master and make intelligible the experience before us are felt to be inadequate to their task.

Moreover, it is not difficult to define in a general fashion the unreconciled factors which have determined the present somewhat unsatisfactory position of philosophy. I have no hesitation in regarding these as, on the one hand, the fundamental conceptions which animated the great idealist systems of the early part of the century, and, on the other hand, the accumulation of detailed particular knowledge both of nature and of the history of man which has specially characterised the last fifty years. I by no means intend to say that these factors are in simple antagonism to one another; for that, it would be requisite that the latter of them should satisfactorily express itself in the form of a principle, which it has not yet done and is not likely to do. Nor do I suppose that reconciliation is to be effected by simple substitution of the one for the other. But it does appear to me that the idealist systems were wrought out with the help of concrete representations of reality which increased experience has shown to be insufficient, that the new knowledge specialised research has given us of man, his development and surroundings, forces

upon us a considerable modification of the idealist conception, and that the idealist conception itself, in the elaboration of it by its main exponents in the great philosophic movement initiated by Kant, encountered obstacles such as in themselves indicate the need for a revision of its principle and method.

I make no attempt in this general treatment to embrace in any summary description the rich material furnished by the systems of idealist philosophy that connect themselves historically with Kant. The precise character of the perplexity in which I conceive these systems found themselves, the kind of new light thrown upon it by our extended experience, and the resulting modification of principle and method; will be much more easily understood looked at in the more simple fashion in which it presents itself in the Kantian system.

There is a reason other than that of mere convenience for selecting the Kantian position as typical. In reviewing the Kantian doctrine, one has the rare satisfaction of being able to define precisely the concrete representation of natural fact which served as background to his speculative discussions. It is to be regretted, but it is not from the circumstances of the time unnatural, that we are not able to define with equal precision the picture of human life and progress which doubtless was there too and operative, but which was certainly for Kant relatively vague and incomplete. These backgrounds, as one calls them for brevity's sake, are truly the most important factors in determining the philosophic conception that appears at first sight quite distinct from them. Much of our difficulty in understanding a past philosophy rests on the fact that we know not the background, or at all events are unable to realise it with sufficient fullness.

Now, on the other hand, in the case of the idealist systems that sprang directly from the Kantian, and in particular in the case of the most imposing of them, that of Hegel, one has

not the same satisfaction. I do not envy the task of any one who tries to reconstruct the picture of natural fact which plays its part in the formation of the Hegelian system. I must myself confess that I am wholly unable to understand the place assigned to Nature in Hegel's constructive philosophy, and that I regard his philosophy of nature as being in the mass and in detail a needless excrescence and a blunder. It would carry me beyond the question I design to put before you to refer to the not less interesting side of that system where the picture of man's practical life has the same important place for ethics as that of nature has for theoretical philosophy. But I may be permitted to say that I doubt whether on this side either one's satisfaction can be complete. I am not myself able to regard the constitutional system of Germany as the ideal in which the practical life of man has reached its consummation.

Those who are familiar with the main currents of the philosophic movement during this century may probably wonder why in this connexion I do not refer more specially to the work of Lotze. Lotze's historical position, in relation both to the earlier idealist philosophy and to the later specialised researches in nature and history, seems to render him peculiarly significant as illustrating the struggle I have referred to. But though it would be impossible to estimate too highly the value of much of Lotze's work in detail, though the ingenuity, subtlety, and tenacity of his genius will always secure him the highest rank as a thinker, I cannot say of his philosophical views as a whole other than what a distinguished critic has said of Malebranche, that his is after all only a half-philosophy. Lotze was undoubtedly keenly alive to the discrepancy between the large conceptions of the idealist systems and the detail of experience which special science had to bring forward, and undoubtedly strove to effect some modification and reconciliation. But

the net result of his long-continued labours was, so far as I can understand, a kind of half-hearted admission that reconciliation was impossible. For that cannot be called a reconciliation which is effected only by passing beyond the limits of knowledge.

It is, then, I believe, with good reason that, in order to make discussion of our present position in speculative inquiries at once clear and precise, we revert to the Kantian doctrine and to that germinal principle in it from which the more systematic philosophies sprang. In connexion with that principle we shall see most definitely what effect has been wrought upon our general conceptions by the increased knowledge we have to utilise.

Of the Kantian doctrine as a whole, the foundation was the analysis of knowledge, and of that analysis of knowledge the central idea was the function assigned to the unity of mind. Experience as Kant conceived it, experience so far as theoretical cognition was concerned, came about only in and through the correlation of passively received impressions with the uniting activity of mind. A finite subject, a mind, could be only in so far as it was self-conscious, aware of its own unity. The conditions under which it becomes aware of its own unity cannot be given in the merely contingent whirl of sense-impression; they spring from and express the nature of the uniting consciousness of self whereby experience is thus constituted. Through these forms of unity in application to given sense-material the subject knows himself as opposed to and yet in most intimate conjunction with a world of determinately related objects, the mechanism of things in space and time.

It would be a long task to trace out the historic factors which determined the general character of the view here briefly summarised, and though in this way it would be possible and it would be right to explain much that is

peculiar to it, I do not purpose making the attempt. Moreover, if in dealing so briefly with a great conception I seem unsympathetic and even unfair, I must plead the exigencies of the special occasion, and protect myself by saying that elaborate statements of the Kantian doctrine exist in abundance, and that in this University in particular we hold in well-deserved honour an exposition which in its sympathetic appreciation does full justice to what is of permanent worth in Kant's conception while measuring out justice likewise to its obvious defects.

That the central idea in Kant's view of knowledge was in some way at fault became obtrusively manifest even in his own attempt to apply it within the compass of cognitive experience. The pieces of the mechanism of knowledge as conceived by him had a suspicious tendency to fall asunder, and were only patched together by a variety of ingenious but artificial devices. It was, in the first place, impossible for Kant to bring directly within the scope of his main idea the equally important part of his general doctrine, that only in the forms of space and time were the perceived contents of knowledge possible material of cognition. Only in the scattered utterances of his posthumous work—somewhat melancholy reading—do we come in sight of an attempt on his part to fill up this hiatus in his view.

It was further impossible for Kant to offer from the basis of his central conception any reasonable explanation of the altogether remarkable doctrine that only in and through the representation of sensuous experience ordered according to universal laws, only in and through the apprehension of the mechanism of external nature, did mind become aware of its own unity and continued identity. In truth, the notion of unity of mind was far too thin and unsubstantial to stand the weight imposed upon it by Kant.

And, finally, the whole exposition deepened the impression

which is made by Kant's general mode of approaching the problem of knowledge, that the orderly system of apprehended facts constituting knowledge stands in some mysterious fashion mid-way between two incognisables, two unknowable realities, the pure self or ultimate core of mind and the realm of things in themselves. I doubt if it is at all possible to free the Kantian doctrine, as it stands in his work, from the subjectivism which certainly he seems anxious to repudiate.

I do not think it necessary to add to this summary view the criticism which one would have to pass if one tried to follow out the Kantian doctrine on two of its most interesting lines of development: the one bearing on the functions of Reason, in which we should find a new but equally unsatisfactory meaning attached to the ambiguous term Unity; the other connected with Kant's peculiar view of the province and method of empirical psychology, wherein our doubts as to the justification for the distinction between the pure and the empirical self, to which his central doctrine led, would be strengthened and enlightened. It is sufficient to have enumerated the more obvious defects in order to make clear where the fundamental error lies. The unity of mind is put in an altogether false relation to experience. From Kant's mode of approaching the question and stating the solution, the conclusion is inevitable that it is because of the unity of mind that subjective facts of sense-impression are organised into the orderly form of determined knowledge. But in truth, as it appears to me, the emphasis might, with more justice, be laid on the other side of the antithesis. It is in and through the organisation of experience in the form of knowledge of objective fact that mind becomes self-conscious, aware of its own unity; nor has its unity any significance other than what it obtains in and through the contrast with objective fact which is given in knowledge.

The conditions of the possibility of experience are not forms imposed by the activity of mind upon the chaotic material with which it is furnished from without, but the general characters of the experience wherein and whereby mind becomes possible at all. In the synthesis of mind and its objects, the determining factor is not the activity of mind standing, so to speak, equipped with its armoury of weapons for mastering given fact; rather we are bound to conceive of the two correlative sides, subjective life of the self-conscious mind and objective fact apprehended, as developing side by side.

It has long been seen how hard it is to reconcile Kant's mode of stating his doctrine with the admitted and patent facts which we sum up under the title development of knowledge. Many of the hard-and-fast distinctions in which he delighted, the antitheses between sense and understanding, between *a priori* and *a posteriori*, between necessary and contingent, lose their point when looked at in the light of development of knowledge. The difficulty of reconciling amounts, in my judgment, to impossibility, and indicates not merely an imperfection in the fundamental idea but a radical error.

It is no unimportant feature of the Kantian doctrine that is thus to be considered. It constitutes not only the keystone of his structure, so far as that is a systematic representation of knowledge, but the point from which to a large extent the immediately following idealist philosophies took their start. I am convinced that it is doing these systems no substantial injustice to say that, following out the central conception of Kant's doctrine of knowledge, they represented the principle of experience in the form of a connected content of abstract thoughts, and regarded the method of philosophy as essentially the following out of the inner relations, the self-development of these thoughts. There is much that may be

said in explanation of their procedure, much that seems at times to be an explaining away of what is most peculiar to it, but I do not think it affects greatly the general impression left upon the mind of an unprejudiced critic.

Now the view pressed upon one by the failure of Kant's method, the view that the emphasis is wrongly placed on mind, is precisely that which is pressed upon us by the accumulated mass of increased knowledge of man's relations to nature and of his slow historic development.

Specialised research into nature has not only deepened and strengthened our ideas as to the systematic interconnectedness and interdependence of all parts of reality, but in particular, by extension to what comes closest to the life of man, has enforced a conclusion one would feel inclined to advance from purely philosophical grounds, that the antithesis we make between the abstract mechanism of nature and the subjective life of mind is falsely conceived when taken to mean absolute severance in concrete existence. That the antithesis, the opposition, is a necessary condition in consciousness for the very being of consciousness, that mind, in other words, only realises itself in the form of that which is contrasted with nature, ought not to lead us to confer a wholly fictitious and unwarranted independence upon the opposites themselves. It is true that self-consciousness implies a contradistinction from nature, that mind only knows itself in knowing a nature that is distinct from itself. But the very implication of this truth is that neither mind nor nature as thus contrasted in consciousness is possessed of independent being, that mind knows nature only in so far as it is a part of nature, and that its knowledge of nature, its apprehension of fact other than itself, is the living link which binds it to nature and to the sum-total of reality. Ideas, as one may put it, are not so much in mind as of

mind; they are the actual modes of our participation in that reality of which external nature is a part.

Nor is the lesson thus enforced less readily learned from the researches which have already opened to us much of the long process whereby man's mind has expressed itself in varying institutions and beliefs. Not only does what we thus positively know or reasonably conjecture compel the thought of mind in its entirety as gradually developing, but it constrains us to interpret the conditions of our experience in such a fashion as not to exclude the humblest manifestations of mental life. Our imagination here readily misleads us. We talk of mind expressing itself in various ways, of the mind of man forming in gradual succession more and more elaborated representations, for example, of the divine, of supernatural powers. We forget that mind is not an abstraction, that it lives only in and through its concrete expression, and that what we thus represent as the product of mind might just as fairly be said to be the very making of mind.

On the whole, then, as it appears to me, the recognised inadequacy of the central thought on which the earlier idealist systems were based, and the lesson of concrete experience, combine to compel an important transition in the point of view from which the philosophical question must be contemplated. Short titles are always misleading, and I doubt not that it would give rise to some misapprehension if I described the change as that from idealism to realism, from rationalism to empiricism or naturalism. The designation is of much less importance than the thing itself, which means, in brief, that in our attempt to unfold the nature of knowledge and the general connecting links of what is known, we must turn rather to the concrete experience of mind than to the abstract conceptions into which that experience is condensed. There is no royal road to

philosophic truth ; the only route that can be followed is the long and difficult path of facts.

I may be permitted a remark or two on certain aspects of the change which I have briefly indicated.

1. When the opposition is defined, as has just been done, when the contrast is drawn between the principle of the idealist systems and what I have called Naturalism, it appears as though mind were relegated to a secondary position, were made dependent upon and a product of nature. On this it must be said, in the first place, that our imagination, representing real existence in the ambiguous form of a series in time, will always deceive us somewhat. We are impelled by the easily recognised deficiencies of that mode of representation to conceive of real existence as enjoying a kind of timeless mode of being, in contrast with which that which comes into being in time is relatively inferior. The contrast is valueless. The timelessness of real being is in no way exclusive of change, and indicates no more than the mode in which the law of change must be represented in consciousness. Timelessness in no way intensifies existence. It is a vulgar error to think that truth or goodness or beauty are enhanced in value by having the predicate of eternal affixed to them, or that they are thus qualitatively distinguished from the temporal. A real interconnected system, which undergoes change, has in it no other relation of superior and inferior among its parts than depends on the actual character of these parts. If we possess a standard whereby to measure such a relation, a point on which I express no opinion, we should certainly find that it applied without regard to temporal order or dependence.

2. Moreover, it would be to misconceive all I have said to regard nature, in the sense of the external mechanism of objects in space and time, as equivalent to the sum-total of

reality. On the contrary, I have desired to insist on the view that the life of mind is an integral part of that reality. I am aware of the perplexities attaching to the term 'part of reality.' They are too numerous to be adequately handled in a sentence. I shall only say that, according to the view I take, reality is the interconnected system of which the cor-relatives, mind and the apprehended world of fact, are the partial manifestations. In this sense, mind is not less necessary to the completeness of the whole than nature, and to neither can be accorded the absolute independence which our imagination demands.

To say of mind, then, that *it comes into being* settles in no way its place in the scheme of things, as a secondary and inferior fact. As Lotze puts it, in reference to a somewhat similar problem, "Man esteems himself according to *what* he is, and not according to *whence* he arose. It is enough for us to feel now that we are not apes. It is of no consequence to us that our remote and unremembered ancestors should have belonged to this inferior grade of life. The only painful thought would be that we were destined to turn into apes again, and that it was likely to happen soon."

3. The last remark I make concerns the most notable feature in recent work within the range of philosophy, the vast increase of interest in psychology. Hegel used to say that it was only in a period of decline in philosophy that there came an outburst of empirical psychology; and I believe there are many observers of the course of modern philosophical work disposed to apply his remark to the present condition of things. I think there is another side to the matter. Even the empirical psychology which Hegel had in view, abstract and unsatisfactory as it was, had at least the merit that it strove to get near to the actual life of mind. Psychology, as it is conceived at present, has certainly lost the abstractness of its earlier form, and though no

doubt pursued by many minds with great diversity of interest, may claim a genuinely philosophical character. To trace out the history of the mental life, to determine the natural conditions on which it depends, and to follow the several stages of its development from the lowest to the highest, keeping ever before us the concrete character of the whole, is impossible except as part of and in the light of a general philosophical view. The problem which Psychology has before it cannot be arbitrarily severed from the general questions of philosophy, and it cannot be satisfactorily solved except as part of the more general treatment which by long tradition and common consent is called philosophical. It is with the nature of knowledge that theoretical philosophy has to deal; and its three main branches—Logic, the description of the form of knowledge, Psychology, the account of the mode in which knowledge is realised in mind, and Metaphysics, the systematic statement of the thoughts which express the nature of reality and the relation of mind thereto—are so interdependent that the problems of any one lead on inevitably to the problems of the others.

I cannot but fear that in attempting to indicate what appears to me the character of the important change passing over the spirit and method of philosophy, I may have fallen into the very error I have been condemning. An abstract conception or a general description has little significance when divested of the detail of concrete illustration. A new methodical principle in philosophy can only be understood, as it can only be tested, by the resolute endeavour to apply it to the whole round of questions which have long exercised human reason. So to think out a philosophical idea is no easy matter; not like the spinning of an oyster-shell, but a revolution of the whole soul. "The eye," says Berkeley, "by long use comes to see even in the darkest cavern:

and there is no subject so obscure but we may discern some glimpse of truth by long poring on it. Truth is the cry of all, but the game of a few. Certainly when it is the chief passion, it doth not give way to vulgar cares and views; nor is it contented with a little ardour in the early time of life; active, perhaps, to pursue, but not so fit to weigh and revise. He that would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as youth, the later growth as well as the first fruits, at the altar of Truth."

II.

GIORDANO BRUNO.¹

GIORDANO BRUNO, "a man of impure and abandoned life: a double renegade, a heretic formally condemned, whose obstinacy against the Church endured unbroken even to his last breath. He possessed no remarkable scientific knowledge, for his own writings condemn him of pantheism and of a degraded materialism, and show that he was entangled in commonplace errors and not unfrequently utterly inconsistent. He had no splendid adornments of virtue, for as evidence against his moral character there stand those extravagances of wickedness and corruption into which all men are driven by passions unrestrained. He was the hero of no famous exploits, and did no signal service to the State; his familiar accomplishments were insincerity, lying and perfect selfishness, intolerance of all who disagreed with him, abject meanness, and perverted ingenuity in adulation."

This testimonial to character comes from no vigorous polemic of Bruno's time, an age yet unskilled in the delicate art of vituperation. It is an extract from an allocution addressed by the Pope in 1889 to the Sacred College in Consistory, and ordered by the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars to be read in the various Roman Catholic Churches. The spirit in which it is conceived has

¹ [Read 4th February 1895, at the Owens College, Manchester, as one of a series of popular evening lectures.]

for long proved successful in surrounding the life-history and the ideas of Bruno with a veil of obscurity through which only very recent researches have penetrated, and which even yet is not wholly removed. But the more enlightened historic conscience of our generation, aided perhaps by a certain fondness for rehabilitating damaged reputations, has worked to good purpose in Bruno's case. His writings, formerly hard to procure and evidently little known or appreciated, have been collected in handsome and fairly complete form, and are thus at least accessible. All the new data for a narrative of his career, so far as they have yet been obtained, are collected in the life of Bruno by his countryman, Domenico Berti. From the sources thus opened up, and under the impulse given by the erection of a statue to Bruno in Rome, quite a little flood of larger treatises and smaller pamphlets has been poured forth.

Prior to the discovery of the new materials relating to the life of Bruno, a discovery initiated by the researches of Foncard into the archives of the Savii sopra l'Eresia in Venice, there existed only one foundation for a sketch of Bruno's career. That foundation, however, is in itself remarkable and interesting. It is in the form of a letter by an eyewitness of the burning of Bruno at Rome in February 1600. The letter seems first to have appeared in print in 1620 or 1621, and was again printed, apparently from another MS. copy, in 1701. On the authenticity of the document, and consequently on the historic credibility of the event it narrates, quite unnecessary doubts have more than once been cast. Mr Chancellor Christie, on the occasion of a recent revival of these doubts, brought to bear upon the matter his great and minute knowledge of the contemporary literature, and had no difficulty in showing that there was satisfactory independent evidence for the event narrated, and that there was as strong evidence as can reasonably be de-

manded for the authenticity of the document.¹ The writer of the letter, a certain Gaspar Schoppe or Scioppius, a highly ambiguous character who played an ambiguous part in the learned warfare of the time, was in Rome and in intimate relations with the authorities of the Church and Inquisition. It pleased him then to be a devoted convert to Roman Catholicism, and it is not unfair to conjecture that he was being used, with his own eager consent, to whiten the face of the Holy Church before the recalcitrant Protestants. Schoppe's letter is the last of a series despatched by him to his correspondent, Conrad Rittershusius, rector of the University of Altdorf. As it furnishes at once an interesting commentary on the allocution already referred to and a statement of the long-current story of Bruno's life, I extract the relevant portion of it, before proceeding to the more detailed narrative.²

Now you must know, my dear Rittershusius, that the Italians here are quite incapable of drawing distinctions among heresies. They call any heretic a Lutheran. I pray God that they may retain this simplicity of judgment and never come to know how one heresy differs from another. I fear that the power of discrimination may cost them dear. But I am most anxious that you should learn this from me, and I do assure you, on my honour, that no Lutheran or Calvinist, unless he be a pervert or the cause of public scandal, runs any risk at Rome, least of all the risk of punishment by death. It is the earnest desire of our most Holy Father that Lutherans should be free to come to Rome, and that they should be treated by cardinal and prelate with every mark of courtesy and kindness. Would to heaven that you were here! I am perfectly certain that you would give the lie to their false calumnies. Why, only last month there was a Saxon gentle-

¹ [Macmillan's Magazine, October 1885; reprinted in *Selected Essays and Papers* of R. C. Christie (1902), p. 161 ff.]

² [The Latin text of the letter of Scioppius is printed in full in the Appendix to Frith's *Life of Bruno*, 1887.]

man here who had come from a year's residence in the house of Beza. Many Catholics had acquaintance with him : among others even Cardinal Baronius, the Pope's confessor, who treated him with the utmost politeness and never so much as referred to his religion, except occasionally to exhort him to seek out the truth. Moreover, he expressly said to this gentleman that he had nothing to fear so long as he caused no public scandal. Beyond a doubt he would have remained here longer if he had not been terrified by a rumour that some Englishmen had been arrested and taken to the palace of the Inquisition. But these English were not at all such as are called here Lutherans ; they were Puritans. They were suspected of that brutal insult to the Holy Sacrament which is an English custom.

Now, I too should perhaps have shared the common opinion that Bruno was burned on account of his Lutheranism, had I not been present at the Holy Office when the sentence of death was pronounced on him. Thus I came to know exactly the heresy of which he was guilty. This Bruno was a native of Nola, in the kingdom of Naples, and had been a Dominican monk. When he was eighteen years old, he began to have doubts about the doctrine of transubstantiation (a doctrine, as your Chrysostom says, very repugnant to reason). Soon his doubts grew to denial. As at the same time he dared to call in question the virginity of the Blessed Virgin (who, as the same Chrysostom says, surpasses in purity cherub or seraph), he fled to Geneva, where he remained two years. Not being able to accommodate himself entirely to Calvinism, he was expelled from Geneva, and went first to Lyons, then to Toulouse, and lastly to Paris. There he was Professor, but *extra-ordinarius*, for he knew that *ordinary* professors had to take part in the service of the Mass. In London, whither he soon after went, he published a work called *The Triumphant Beast*—that is, the Pope, to whom you Lutherans are in the habit of giving the title *Beast, honoris causâ*. Thence to Wittenberg, where, if I am not wrong, he taught as professor for two years. At Prague, where he was next found, he published the books *de Immenso et Infinito*, and *de Innumerabilibus* (if I remember the titles rightly: I saw the books themselves at Prague); also a book *de Umbris et de Ideis*. In these writings he teaches the most

horrible and absurd doctrines—for example, that there are innumerable worlds; that the soul can pass from one body into another, nay, even into another world; that one soul may be in two bodies; that magic is a good thing and perfectly legitimate; that the Holy Ghost is nothing but the *anima mundi*, and that that is the meaning of the words used by Moses, “the spirit of God brooded upon the waters”; that the world is eternal; that Moses worked his miracles by magic, in which he was a greater adept than the other Egyptians; that Moses invented the laws he gave; that the sacred Scriptures are just a dream; that the devils will be saved; that only the Jews are descended from Adam and Eve, all others being descended from a pair created by God the day before; that Christ was not God, but a great magician who deluded men and was therefore justly punished, by hanging, not crucifixion; that the prophets and apostles were worthless men, wonder-working magicians, and that the most of them were hanged. But I really should never come to an end if I tried to detail to you all the monstrosities he has uttered, in his writings or *viva voce*. In one word, there is not an error of pagan philosopher or of heretic, ancient or modern, that he has not maintained.

From Prague he went to Brunswick and Helmstädt, and is there said to have taught for some time. Afterwards he was at Frankfurt, publishing a book, and at last came into the hands of the Inquisition at Venice. There he was for some considerable time (*diu satis*), and was then sent to Rome. At Rome, being repeatedly examined by the Holy Office and refuted by the foremost theologians, he at first obtained a respite of forty days for deliberation; then he promised to retract, but presently betook himself again to his foolish defences and procured a further delay of forty days. But his only object was to play with the Pope and the Inquisition; wherefore, after he had been some two years in the custody of the Holy Office, he was brought on the 9th of this month, February, to the palace of the Grand Inquisitor. There, in presence of the most illustrious cardinals of the Holy Office (men who surpass all others of the time in gravity of years, experience of affairs, and knowledge of theology and law), in presence of professional theologians, *amici curiæ*, and in presence of the secular magistrate, the governor of the city,

Bruno was brought forward, and on his knees had sentence pronounced upon him. The sentence recounted his life, his studies, his opinions; pointed out the patient zeal and brotherly kindness with which the Inquisition had striven to convert him; and dwelt on the stubborn impiety with which he had resisted exhortation; then proceeded to *degrade* him (as the term is), to excommunicate him, and to hand him over to the secular power for punishment, requesting that he should be punished *quam clementissime et sine sanguinis profusione*. To this he only responded with a threatening air, "Perchance you give your sentence on me with more fear than I receive it." The guards of the city governor then took him to prison, where a period of eight days was allowed him as a last opportunity for abjuration of his errors. But all in vain. To-day, then, he was taken to the stake, and there, when on the point of death, the image of the crucified Saviour was shown to him, and he turned from it with a scowl of disdain. Thus was he burned and miserably perished, and I daresay he has gone to tell in those other worlds of which he dreamed how impious blasphemers are handled by Romans.

There, my dear Rittershusius, you see the way we deal with men, or rather monsters, of this kind. Now, I should very much like to know whether you approve this mode of dealing, or prefer that every one should be free to believe and say exactly what he pleases. For my own part, I cannot think you would not approve. But, perhaps you will say, Lutherans do not teach or believe anything of such a kind, and therefore ought not to be treated in such a manner. I grant it you; and you see we don't burn Lutherans. We should perhaps have acted differently in the case of that prophet of yours, Luther. What would you say if I undertook to prove to you that Luther, not indeed teaching the same as Bruno, has nevertheless uttered even more horrible absurdities, not, I mean, in his Table-talk, but in books published during his lifetime, and that he maintained these absurdities as though they were dogmas and oracles? You have only to say the word, and if you do not already know this fellow who, on your behalf, has revived truth buried for so many centuries, I will show you the exact places in which you may find the juice of this fifth gospel. If Luther, then, is no better than Bruno, what fate do you think should

be his? You will allow that he should be handed over to the limping-footed god and to his fatal flames. Aye, and what would you like done with those who take him for an evangelist, a prophet, a third Elias? I leave you to answer, and desire only that you will believe me when I say that the Romans do not act towards heretics with the severity ascribed to them; perhaps not with the severity that is the due of those who perish only because they wish to perish.

This letter, sufficiently interesting in a general respect, has special importance for the biography of Bruno. It conveys a vivid idea of the last, the crowning event in his somewhat stormy career. It may be accepted as containing the account which it was sought to make public of the grounds for the severe penalty inflicted on him. In his statement of the various 'horrid heresies' of which Bruno was accused, Scioppius was no doubt as accurate as his essentially untruthful nature allowed. Most, if not all, of the articles of accusation could readily support themselves on passages in known works of Bruno. Others may have had for them the evidence of hearsay, of reported conversation, for Bruno had a fatal facility of expression. Indeed, one's wonder is that the lynx eyes of the Inquisition did not discover more heinous matter in the Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, and the Cabala of Pegasus, than is laid out in the accusation. He must have been gifted with more than normal simplicity who could misinterpret Bruno's wild jests on the enigmatical nature of the Centaur.

Apart from the articles of accusation, however, Scioppius' narrative has only approximate accuracy. He was evidently under the belief, doubtless from the information conveyed to him, that Bruno had passed only two years in the cells of the Inquisition at Rome. He appears to have been possessed only of a summary, not of a detailed account, of the examination of Bruno at Venice; and he certainly shared the

ignorance of his contemporaries and successors regarding that curious book of Bruno's which he refers to as the *Triumphant Beast*. In the detailed account of the investigations at Venice, which we now possess, Bruno, in response to certain interrogations, gives a full narrative of his life up to that time, and a list of his writings, both published and unpublished. The narrative has some inaccuracies in it, naturally enough, with regard to the length of time spent in the various towns to which his wandering career led him. These, for the most part, we are able to correct, and so to construct a history, fairly accurate and, up to a certain point, complete, of his life.

Filippo Bruno, for such was his baptismal name, was born in the month of May 1548 at Nola, in Campania, not far from Naples. The pleasant and fertile country, to which Bruno often refers in his Latin poems, was said even then to retain among its inhabitants more than usual traces of the earlier Greek colonists of southern Italy; and Nola itself, though no longer what it had been, was still not without fame in the annals of Italian literature. The family of Bruno, not of high rank, seems to have been in comfortable circumstances. His mother, it has been conjectured, from her peculiar, un-Italian name, *Fraulissa*, was of German descent: the constant wars render very explicable such wanderings of offshoots from a foreign stock. The boy, after some training in the ordinary staple of education, grammar and dialectics, entered at the age of fourteen or fifteen the Dominican order, and took then the name *Giordano*. He proceeded through the usual stages to the priesthood in 1572, spending his time mainly in the monastery of St Dominic at Naples, famous as the scene of the labours of Thomas Aquinas.

There is nothing surprising in this selection of a career. The time had not yet come when it was possible to lead, without special protection, the life of a scholar or man of

learning. The Church afforded the readiest means to one whose inclinations led him in that direction, and within the Church the exercise of some little reticence and prudence sufficed to secure no small measure of peaceful liberty. Of such reticence and prudence Bruno was wholly incapable. There is no mistaking the evidence of his disposition, which his later writings and all the events of his career afford. He was superabundantly endowed with the Southern vivacity of nature: quick, ardent, impetuous, and passionate. Devoted to the things of mind, he had a singularly unselfish disregard for what ordinary humanity takes to be the solid interests of life. With the eye of a poet or dramatist for the peculiarities, the foibles of character, he displayed throughout his dealings with men a sanguine *naïveté* of belief in their honesty and good feeling which brought him many a mishap. While he combined, as perhaps only a philosopher can do, a genuine philanthropy, love of humanity, with profound contempt for the mass of mankind with their petty aims, their stupidity, and enormous capacity for accepting the inane, he seems always to have acted under the conviction that his own simplicity of nature would meet as simple and hearty a response. No better illustration of this can be given than the first act in his literary career. He wrote a little work entitled the Ark of Noah, which he either sent, or designed to present, to the Pope, Pius V. The work is lost, and its contents are only known by a general reference in a later writing. It was an allegory, based on the idea of a contest among the animals in the ark for precedence. The animal most perturbed in mind and excited at the thought of not securing the first place, the seat in the poop of the ark, was the Ass. Now the 'poop of the ark' was a common expression then for the seat of Reason in the Soul, and the Ass, as we know from Bruno's later works, possessed peculiar attractions for him as the symbol of human

stupidity and pedantry. He hymns the ass in prose and verse, and reserves for it a most notable place in his new celestial hierarchy, as the companion and coadjutor of wisdom. It is altogether significant of the man that he should have selected such a peace-offering for the Head of the Church.

During the relatively undisturbed years of his cloister career, Bruno must have laid the foundations of the extensive knowledge his later writings display of earlier philosophy and literature. In particular he seems to have drunk deep from the well-spring of human culture then recently opened up, the Platonic and Neo-platonic philosophies. It is to this time, too, that we must refer his acquaintance with the new movement in science which was destined to affect his life so profoundly. The great work of Copernicus had appeared in 1543, and though it is impossible to date precisely Bruno's knowledge of it, there is no reason to doubt that it goes back to his cloister years. The Copernican system has long since traversed the stages of relation to theological belief through which each great scientific conception seems destined to pass. The new thought is first attacked as wholly irreconcilable with the faith, then coldly accepted as at least compatible with the faith, and last, eagerly championed as the very foundation of the faith. Copernicanism in Bruno's time had barely entered on its first stage, and its further advance was in no small measure due to the impetus which Bruno communicated to it. In his mind the new scientific conception of the heavenly system formed the natural complement to a wider philosophical idea; and both scientific conception and philosophical idea brought him into sharp conflict with views which unfortunately the Church had so incorporated with its theological dogmas as to make inseparable from them. Not indeed that Bruno troubled himself much about the theological dogmas. There is no feature of his mind more remarkable than its entire freedom from genuine in-

terest in theological questions. His language is saturated, as is natural, with Scriptural phraseology; he knows much of Church fathers and the like; but that wonderful picture of the scheme of things which forms the very essence of theology as then understood, possessed no vital significance for him. It was an interesting fact for him that men did so believe, a fact for which he inclines at times to attempt, very inadequately, a kind of historical explanation, but his mental attitude towards the whole is that expressed in a characterisation of him by a worthy Protestant rector who knew him later: a man of great capacity, with infinite knowledge, but not a trace of religion.

It is not impossible that in this period of his life Bruno also began to exercise his literary gift. The comedy *Il Candelajo*, the candle-bearer, which was published later, in 1582, at Paris, was in all probability sketched or partly written at Naples. It is a somewhat wild work, in which as he elsewhere puts it, everything is called by its own name; good of its kind, though the kind is not particularly good; and containing one typical character, the Pedant, which is certainly suggestive of, if not historically connected with, the Holofernes of *Love's Labour's Lost*. Bruno throughout is as much the poet as the philosopher. His best philosophical works are written in the freer form of the dialogue, and are interspersed with sonnets, on the poetical merits of which, it must be added, not the most favourable verdict is pronounced by Italian literary critics. Perhaps there is justice in the double judgment—of the philosophers, that his philosophy is written in too poetic a style; of the men of letters, that his poetry is too much of philosophy in verse. The combination has nevertheless a certain human attractiveness.

The cloister years were not altogether undisturbed. First one and then another process was directed against him. The

first, a trumpery affair, originated in a rumour that he had objected to all images, and had stripped his cell of everything but the crucifix. To this it was added that he had dissuaded a fellow-novice from reading the Seven Joys of the Madonna, saying that he had better read something of the Church Fathers. The second, much more serious, arose out of doubts he had early begun to express about the fundamental dogmas of the Church, the Trinity, and the divine personality of Christ. No fewer than 130 heads of indictment were prepared against him by the Provincial of the Order; and Bruno, dreading so formidable an array, fled from Naples to Rome in 1575 or in the beginning of 1576. In Rome he had hoped to find protection still within the Order, but the news followed him that the process begun at Naples was to be carried on in Rome, and that the gravity of the accusation had been increased by his luckless error of leaving behind him in his cell certain works of Hieronymus and Chrysostom with scholia by Erasmus. Resolving no longer to submit himself to a tyranny that would, as he said, reduce his reason to a slave, he put off his monk's gown (retaining, however, the scapulary), reassumed his name Filippo, and, leaving Rome, began the wandering life which was to lead him back, after many years and many changes of fortune, to the cells of the Inquisition and to the last fatal scene in the Campo di Fiore.

Of many details of his knight-errant wanderings there is but an imperfect record. Some three years passed among the cities of Northern Italy, the staff of life being gained by varied teaching, of the sphere, of grammar, and the like. In 1579 we find traces of him in Geneva. With what object he selected the stronghold of Calvinism as a place of refuge is still matter of doubt. Perhaps the inducement was the presence there of a considerable Italian section of the

Reformed Church, driven beyond the Alps by the vigour of the Catholic rulers of Lucca. Assuredly Bruno had no ground for expecting great toleration there. Protestantism, the noble daughter of a still more noble mother, has often shown herself a most ungrateful child, and never more than when in Calvinist disguise. Calvin, says a contemporary, could not endure that there should be in his city one individual who dissented from him in matters of faith. Nor was Calvinism more enlightened in matters of philosophy and science. "The Genevese have decreed," says Beza, "once and for ever that they will never, either in logic or in any other branch of learning, desert the teaching of Aristotle."

Little chance of peace for Bruno in such surroundings, even had he been of a placable and prudent turn of mind. As it was, he had not been there many months before there happened the little event which we find chronicled in the proceedings of the consistory of 1579.

6th Aug. Philippe Jordan, called Brunus, an Italian, detained for having caused to be printed certain replies and invectives against M. de la Faye, counting up 20 errors in one of his lectures. Resolved that he shall be examined before the learned Council and Mr Secretary Chevalier. *10th Aug.* Philippe Brunet, an Italian, having responded in person respecting the calumnies which he caused to be printed against M. Antoine de la Faye, having acknowledged his fault, resolved that he must ask pardon of God, of the law, and of the said de la Faye, and that he shall be again sent to acknowledge his fault before the consistory, and he shall, moreover, be sentenced to tear the said defamatory libel to pieces.

13th Aug. Philippe Brun appeared before the consistory to acknowledge his fault, inasmuch as he had erred in the doctrine and had called the ministers of the Church of Geneva *pedagogues*, alleging that in that matter he would neither excuse himself nor would he plead guilty, for the truth was not told of him, since he was of opinion that the story was had on the report of one M. de

works by which he will be remembered, The Ash-Wednesday Supper; The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast; On the Cause, the Principle, and the One; On the Infinite, the Universe, and the Worlds; The Cabala, that is, the intricate allegory of the horse Pegasus and his appendage the Cyprian Ass; The Intellectual Enthusiasms: are fruits ripened under the sun of temporary prosperity. Not that he found England altogether to his taste. The climate disgusted him; he disliked the language, of which he would not learn a word; but he thought the women charming, the custom of kissing adorable, and the queen a very goddess. Moreover, he found much and intelligent interest in Italian letters, and made some noble friends. With Philip Sidney and Fulke Greville he was on intimate terms, and lived much in their company, meeting and knowing their literary associates. To Sidney are dedicated the curious allegory, the *Spaccio della Bestia*, and *Degli Eroi Furori*, the writings in which he expresses his views on morals. In Fulke Greville's house was held the conversation embodied in the Ash-Wednesday Supper, an exposition for the most part of Bruno's extended Copernicanism.

Conjecture has naturally been busy with this portion of Bruno's life. It would be interesting to know more in detail with whom he was thrown in contact, how he impressed them, and what effect, if any, his forcibly uttered ideas produced. We are left, unfortunately, entirely to conjecture. Francis Bacon might have known him personally, but makes no direct reference to him. Fulke Greville, with whom, indeed, he had some slight difference, of what nature we know not, mentions him nowhere, not even in his life of Sidney. Shakespeare could not have known him, and there is no direct evidence that he knew his works. At the same time, while certain coincidences of phrase and sentiment between Shakespeare and Bruno have had undue weight attached to

them, and while the foolish expectation of finding somewhere incorporated in Shakespeare the astronomical and metaphysical ideas of Bruno has met its deserved fate, there seems reasonable ground for assuming that some fragments of knowledge relating to Bruno, some of his characteristic sayings, reached Shakespeare. There is no difficulty in understanding how that should be possible. Florio was intimate with Bruno, and through him alone something may have been transmitted. I have already hinted at a somewhat more direct connexion in the case of Bruno's drama and Love's Labour's Lost. But beyond a doubt, Bruno's philosophically conceived dialogues cannot be said to have exercised a living influence on the English mind either then or in the succeeding generations. Were a proof of that desired, it would be found in the curious fact that a certain rather elaborate masque, the *Cœlum Britannicum*, by a tolerably well-known Jacobean poet, Thomas Carew, was represented before their Majesties in 1633, and that neither then nor afterwards was it recognised to have borrowed not merely its general idea but its whole structure and detail from the *Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast*.¹

Bruno's English experience was not unruffled by the academic storms which his impetuosity generally excited. The University of Oxford made high festival (10th-13th June 1583) on the occasion of a visit from the Polish magnate, Albert a Lasco. Thither went Bruno. He had already announced himself in an address which exhibits the weaker

¹ [The fact is mentioned in the short article on Thomas Carew in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (1876), but seems to have remained otherwise unnoticed until drawn attention to by a writer in the *Quarterly Review* for October 1902 (p. 507). The recent editors of Carew's *Poems and Masque* (London, 1893; New York and London, 1899) and the writer of the article on Carew in the *Dictionary of National Biography* betray no knowledge of his indebtedness to Bruno. Dr Sutherland Black has been good enough to verify the present editor's conjecture that the *Britannica* article on Carew was written by Professor Adamson.]

side of his nature, but is too characteristic to be omitted. Thus it runs:—

Philotheus Jordanus Brunus, the Nolan, Doctor of a more perfect theology, Professor of a purer and more blameless philosophy, a philosopher known, recognised, and honoured in the foremost academies of Europe, nowhere a foreigner save to the barbarian and the vulgar, an awakener of sleeping souls, a tamer of presumptuous and refractory ignorance, who in all his acts displays love to all men, to the Italian not more than to the Briton, to the man not more than to the woman, to the wearer of mitre and the wearer of crown, to the toga and to the sword, to the frocked and the unfrocked, but above all to him whose ways are peaceful, enlightened, true, and fruitful; who looks not to the anointed head or consecrated brow, but there where man's true countenance is to be seen, the heart and cultivated mind, he whom the preachers of foolishness and the hypocrites abhor, whom the upright and sincere love, whom noble souls receive with acclamation; To the noble and honoured Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford, and to his Fellows, Greeting.

With some of the select spirits so greeted Bruno held a lively disputation on the Copernican system; fifteen times confuted, as he tells us, his pig of an antagonist; gained a complete victory and an absolute prohibition against further lectures at the University of Oxford. The Ash-Wednesday Supper, a continuation of this disputation, contains many a sally at the expense of the Oxonian pedants.

The stay in England was all too brief. The return to Paris, signalised by a disputation judged to offend indirectly against the Catholic faith, was followed by a rapid journey through Mainz, Wiesbaden, and by Marburg (where a longer halt was prevented by a fierce skirmish with the rector of the university) to Wittenberg. Here another respite of two years was gained, closed only by the gradual swing of the pendulum from Lutheran to Calvinist domination. A six

months' residence, with some recognition at Prague, was succeeded by eighteen months at the young University of Helmstädt, from which again the unfortunate philosopher was driven with a sentence of excommunication by the triumphant Calvinist party. At Frankfort, where he next took refuge, he was refused residence within the city, and barely permitted to put up beyond the walls at the house of his publisher, with whom he was preparing for the press his longer, more elaborate Latin works. Here Bruno, who seems to have been fascinated by the fatal idea of a reconciliation to the Church with freedom from the bondage of his Order, received an invitation to Venice, and in an evil hour accepted it. The invitation came from one Giovanni Mocenigo, scion of a distinguished family in Venice, who had purchased a book of Bruno's, made inquiries about the writer, and wrote to offer him maintenance in exchange for his instruction. Bruno, after a brief visit to Zurich, reached Venice in September or October 1591. What he came to think of his pupil we may readily guess. Mocenigo was a narrow superstitious soul, with a timorous belief in magic and a conviction that from Bruno he might learn some magic art. When his expectations were disappointed he broke into threats against Bruno, and, having already pressed at the open door of his confessor's conscience by asking whether he ought not to denounce so irreligious a character, he forcibly detained his friend, when he proposed to leave Venice for Frankfort, and handed him over to the Inquisition with a series of denunciatory letters.

On the 23rd May the luckless philosopher was lodged in the cells of the Inquisition at Venice, and for nearly a year the protracted examination of the accused himself, his accusers, his books, his booksellers, all his acquaintances in Venice, went on. Bruno had spoken with characteristic incaution to Mocenigo, whose letters of denunciation supplied

ample material for beginning an investigation which gradually worked backwards over the whole career of the accused. Perhaps we shall never make quite clear to ourselves the conditions of a trial so far off and under such strange conditions. It appears evident that Bruno at first and for long endeavoured to shelter himself under the broad shield which had but recently served to protect Pomponazzi, Cremonini and many another against whom the Church had moved—the shield of the distinction between the twofold kinds of truth, the one of natural reason, the other of faith. But, unluckily for him, he had thrown himself into the power of his adversaries at a time and under conditions when he had but the worst to expect. The Roman Church was then passing through a period of renovation and reformation. The most potent of her ecclesiastic directors was the severe Cardinal Sanseverina, who had given a foretaste of his quality in Spain; the foremost of her theologians was the ardent polemic, Robert Bellarmine. Little grace was there for a heretic, least of all for a renegade from his Order. Although Bruno, then, under the pressure of the inquiry at Venice, made in words a more ample retractation than one would have wished to think possible, expressing himself indeed in terms that are not reconcilable with his real opinions, no final judgment was given at Venice. The articles of process were sent to Rome, and speedily a papal nuncio requested his extradition. Such requests had often before been made to the Venetian State, and as often proudly refused; on this occasion the circumstances made acquiescence desirable, and the procurator of the republic soon found a legal reason for assenting to the demand of the Holy Office. The process, he said, was, rightly considered, but the continuation of that long ago begun and yet unfinished at Rome; the accused was not a Venetian, and had besides declared his desire to go before Cæsar. To Cæsar let him

go. On the 27th February 1593 he was lodged in the cells of the Inquisition at Rome.

From this time to the beginning of the trial which Scioppius describes to us, in the early part of 1599, there is an absolute blank in our information. Scioppius believed, and was probably given to understand, that the imprisonment, terminating in the *auto da fè* of February 17, 1600, had lasted only about two years. It is but recently that the record has been discovered which discloses to us that it lasted for seven years. Why there was so unusual a delay and what took place during it are matters for conjecture, and empty conjecture. Not impossibly the delay was due to the keen desire to avoid the scandal of disclosing to the world such grave heresies as professed by one who had been in the Order of St Dominic; perhaps there was hope of even more than such a retractation as had been uttered at Venice. Failure of negotiations seems fairly inferrible from the rather dogged character of the response which is ascribed to Bruno in the scanty original records of the Roman trial. "He declared that he should not retract, that he would not retract, that he had no reason to retract, and that he knew of nothing which he had to retract." Of the trial itself, its incidents, and its melancholy termination, a sufficiently vivid impression is conveyed by the well-informed letter of Scioppius.

The tragic fate of Bruno may have been in part determined by special circumstances, but the conflict leading to it was the inevitable result of the opposition between quite general forces. I have made no endeavour to present even an outline of the philosophical and scientific views which Bruno expounds in eloquent prose and enthusiastic verse; there attaches to the details of them too much of the earlier forms of thought to make them readily accessible to the

modern reader. But there is no difficulty in understanding at once the general idea of which Bruno was the impassioned representative and the way in which that idea conflicted with the then accepted interpretation of human life and its surroundings. On the whole, the idea may be most aptly designated by the modern term Naturalism; and it has, as its negative mark, rejection of any such distinction as is indicated by the title supernatural, while, positively, it regards the consummation of knowledge as being the intellectual contemplation of one systematically connected world of reality, and the full perfection of action as the purification and elevation of the life of man in this one world of his experience. No conception could run more violently counter to the very essence and soul of the beliefs embodied in popular theology, beliefs which the erudite or learned theology of the time not only accepted but presented in rationalised form as at once a system of dogma, a philosophy of existence, and an ultimate standard of conduct. Presented in this fashion, these beliefs formed an absolute barrier to the free movement of the human mind; and it is the struggle of human reason to emancipate itself that gives its special colour and its perennial interest to the close of the sixteenth century. Nowhere did that effort of reason find a more eloquent, forcible, and enthusiastic exponent than in Bruno. The impressive statue which now marks his death-scene in the Campo di Fiore is a recognition by his countrymen at once of the merits of one of their foremost thinkers and of their sense of the important contribution which Italy made through him to the cause of the development of truth.

III.

PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY.¹

It is an often-quoted remark of Kant's, "that the sciences are not promoted but confused when their boundaries are allowed to run into one another." The maxim has its utility and at the same time its dangers. When it has been possible to determine from a comprehensive point of view the relations which certain groups of problems or certain methods of inquiry bear to one another, then the maxim is applicable but hardly requires application. When, on the other hand, the special sciences, as they may be called, have grown up in a kind of vague independence only of one another, when they have severally acquired a unity that is little more than accidental, then the attempt prematurely to refer problems exclusively to one or the other may stifle legitimate inquiry and confuse rather than facilitate thinking. If the maxim be applied to philosophy in particular, then, by reason of the intimate relation in which all its questions stand to one another, a further danger is incurred, that of isolating and giving a quite fictitious independence to what has meaning only in connexion with the whole.

Kant's general remark was no doubt determined, as is the case with most general remarks, by reference to a particular case—to the distinction running through all his work between the critical theory of the conditions of experience and the

¹ [Read to the Glasgow University Philosophical Society, 7th March 1894.]

special investigation of any one group of facts of experience. In the light of this distinction, it served for him and for his followers as a methodical precept, justifying the total separation of the critical or transcendental theory of knowledge and action from the special treatment of concrete fact, whether in the natural sciences or in psychology or in what may be called moral anthropology. With some (at times with a fundamental) change of significance, the same distinction has been drawn between the general inquiry into the validity of knowledge and the more special researches into the nature and laws of connexion of the facts of mind. The contrasted doctrines of Epistemology and Psychology need not be defined as Kant defined them, but the general conception of a distinction in kind between them comes directly from the Kantian system.

Apart from the special form of the distinction between these doctrines, which is an essential feature of the Critical Philosophy, and to which I purpose returning, there is no difficulty in finding general grounds for a contrast between the problems and methods of Epistemology and Psychology. The broadly marked difference between the existence in an individual mind of the state or act of knowing and the significance or import of what is contained therein—the difference between knowing as a psychical fact and knowledge as the represented relations obtaining in the material known—presses itself upon our attention, and perhaps at no time in the history of thinking has failed to receive some recognition, however inadequate. The existence of an idea as a mental fact, and its meaning as an item of cognition, seem wholly distinct and even antithetic. Whatever portion of knowledge we select, whether perceiving or thinking, we seem able in regard to it to put two wholly distinct questions. We may ask how it comes about in the individual mind, of what simpler facts

it is composed, if it should be deemed complex, and how, in that case, the combination has been brought about, and under what conditions its various appearances are presented. We may ask, on the other hand, what validity its content possesses as an apprehension, which it professes to be, of some object or objective relation, and how it is possible that the content of a subjective act or state of mind should inform us in regard to what, *ex hypothesi*, is distinct both from the act and from the mind itself. On the one hand seems to stand the inner life, with its successive states or processes, of which we are in some way aware, but whose nature as known to us is emphatically and simply that of existing fact. On the other hand, in and through this mental life, we seem to become aware both of the inner states themselves and of much that is essentially different from it. No distinction can well appear more sharp and precise; and it costs us little to dwell so on it that the antithesis shall appear absolute, and, somewhat to our astonishment, we may find reappearing from a new quarter and with a new force of meaning the familiar formula of the Kantian work, How is knowledge at all possible?

Fact, even if qualified as psychical, and import or meaning; existence and validity; individual mind and apprehension of general truth extending to what is not-mind: these come forward in such opposition that we are readily induced to sharpen the distinction to the utmost verge. The inner life appears as concentrated in itself, as an exclusive unity, a monad without windows, as Leibniz would say. What is known, on the other hand, appears as distinct from mind and in an altogether indeterminable relation thereto. If the inner life, the life of mind, be called subjective, that which is known must be called, at least in its most important part if not wholly, trans-subjective. It is by no means unnatural that, in presence of this sharp distinction, the question should

arise, In what possible relation to one another are the two contrasted aspects of knowledge, the two contrasted inquiries or sciences? . As a distinguished American writer expressed it some years ago in 'Mind,' "How can the consciousness which in its primary aspect exists in time as a series of psychical events or states be the consciousness for which a permanent world of spatially related objects, in which all sentient beings participate, exists?"¹

The series of somewhat easy reflexions which have just been referred to may be expressed in a variety of ways; but it rests in the long run on recognition of the total difference between knowing as a fact forming part of the complex we call a mind and knowledge as the apprehension of objective fact. It leads to the establishment of a complete distinction between the problem and method of Psychology and Epistemology. There may be differences, particularly in regard to the latter doctrine, in the way of formulating the problems and methods of the two distinct doctrines; but in general the one is conceived of after the fashion of a natural science, having for its aim the complete account, descriptive, genetic or what not, of the facts of mind, and pursuing the ordinary scientific method; the other, in a somewhat unique fashion, as having for its aim the determination of the validity of the information seemingly given in and through the facts of mind, and for its method something of whose nature I can form no clear idea.

It is impossible that these reflexions should contain nothing of real significance. The contrast from the recognition of which they take their rise is, in some form, real; and one can trace the recognition of it, or, perhaps, even the unrecognised presence of it, far back in the history of philosophic thought. That it affected the speculations of Plato and of Aristotle might easily be made out; that it made its appear-

¹ [J. Dewey, *Mind*, xi. (1886) 13.]

ance as of quite decisive importance in the Stoic theory of knowledge is one of the results we owe to recent researches in that unduly neglected quarter of the history of philosophy. The greater scholastic writers abound in fine distinctions, some of which might with advantage be utilised by us, all of them due to a more or less obscure appreciation of the distinction. Some of the most interesting discussions of modern pre-Kantian philosophy—for example, that which I would cite as specially relevant, between Malebranche and Arnauld—turn upon the distinction; and it has been the consistent reproach of the later Kantian writers to Locke, that he habitually ignores the broad difference between mere factual existence of knowing and the import or content of knowledge.

But, however real the distinction may be in some sense, it is in itself so ultimate and so penetrating that one may fairly expect to find no small difficulty in formulating it and in basing on it a satisfactory account of the relation between the two contrasted doctrines, epistemology and psychology. When one attempts to express in definite terms a distinction of great generality and of far-reaching importance, one is apt to be misled by the influence of side-thoughts, of glances towards well-worn problems known to be affected by our decision, which accompany all our reflexions and too often determine their direction and scope. A single question, like that which has presented itself as the epistemological, the question of the validity of that pronouncement in respect to objective fact which knowledge, whether in the form of perceiving or of thinking, seems to contain, comes to us weighted with the memories of many a past controversy; and it is under the influence of these memories, exercised consciously or unconsciously, that we proceed afresh to the task of formulating the problem. To this it may be added, that ultimate distinctions are like edged tools: they

are apt to cut the fingers of the user. It may happen, as I have already hinted, that the distinction here dwelt upon between psychical fact and import of the fact, between knowledge as subjective activity or state and knowledge as apprehension of the 'trans-subjective,' is expressed in such a way as to render the problems of both psychology and epistemology insoluble, if not inconceivable, and the doctrines (sciences) themselves incapable of further development.

At first sight, indeed, nothing seems simpler than the general line of distinction between the psychological and the epistemological points of view. It seems to find application in so many special cases, that its general nature might even be abstracted without difficulty. For example, we may ask in regard to the total act called perception of space, what is its nature as a process occurring in the inner life? If it be deemed simple and irreducible, in what relation does it stand to those concomitants which serve at least as occasions for calling forth its exercise? If it be deemed complex, out of what simpler facts of mind is it formed, and how are these combined into the strict unity of the apparently simple act? In trying to answer such queries, we should be occupying what is generally described as the psychological point of view; our analysis would be psychological. On the other hand, starting from the same basis of fact, the supposed perception of space, and to all appearance without needing to refer to the kind of answer given by the psychological analysis of the fact, we might raise a very peculiar question in regard to the nature of that representation of objective reality which seems to be contained in our perception. The real is represented as having a special relation among its parts, a relation so general and simple that we are perhaps able to define its nature only by terms that suggest the several aspects of the whole without exhausting its meaning.

We are entitled to ask, how far is such a representation of the nature of the real to be accepted as valid, what does such a relation of the real signify, and how does it harmonise with such other qualifications as we think ourselves entitled to assert of it? And here I must point out that inevitably, and almost involuntarily, there has come forward a curious ambiguity in the form of our question. The *validity*, worth, significance of the representation of the real may mean one of two things. It may mean, how far are we entitled to regard as a characteristic of the real what is, after all, only the content of our subjective act of apprehension? How do we effect what may be metaphorically called the transition from the content of our perception to the nature of the real? Or it may mean, as was expressed above, how far is it possible to interpret the character represented as belonging to perceived reality in harmony with such other qualifications as we deem ourselves on similar grounds entitled to attach to it? I am inclined to think that only the former of these alternative modes of putting the question would be described as epistemological by those who have insisted most strenuously on the basis of distinction between fact of mind and reference to trans-subjective reality, and that, if any designation be allowed for the latter mode of putting the question, it would be described as metaphysical. And it appears to me desirable to separate the two, for not impossibly it may be thought after further consideration that the former question, if expressed, as is usually done, in all its generality, implies a mode of looking at knowledge which would render any answer to it impossible.

On the basis, then, of this general distinction between the fact of mind and its value as a representation of trans-subjective reality, there is rested the broad distinction between psychology as a treatment of the facts of mind and epistemology, the consideration of the relation between the

contents of these facts of mind and the characteristics of ulterior reality which they seem to represent. In scope and in method the two seem distinct from one another, and, if I understand rightly the attempts that have recently been made to secure a definite place for epistemology, that doctrine is held to be independent of psychology, and indeed devoid of any presupposition. Even if it be necessary in the epistemological investigation to take for granted the fact of knowing as it presents itself in the inner life, the inquiry does not proceed on or by the help of the features of knowing which psychological analysis may disclose. In its general nature, if not in its special method, the epistemological investigation resembles that aspect of the Kantian treatment of knowledge which is most often described by means of an antithesis between it and the psychological analysis of mind.

I am convinced that no further advance is to be gained in clearing up our ideas regarding the distinction here expressed in its broadest fashion, so long as we content ourselves with the abstract difference between the notions 'fact of mind' and 'validity,' 'trans-subjective reference,' or whatever else we may call it. If the distinction be real and important, capable of serving us in laying out the general problem of philosophy, it must be expressed in terms of a more rigorous determination of the elements opposed to one another in it. It seems to me far from satisfactory to work with the vague and ill-defined term 'facts of mind.' Psychology may certainly be defined, in a rough-and-ready fashion, as the science of the facts of mind; but in so defining it we are apt, on the one hand, to forget what is implied by the qualification of these facts as facts *of mind*, and, on the other, to take much for granted that calls imperatively for consideration. I question whether we can ever come to an understanding in regard to the real character and value of the distinction which no doubt obtains in some way between the psycho-

logical and the epistemological points of view, unless we undertake the somewhat ungrateful task of defining what we mean by facts of mind.

Now on this point, and keeping in view the special problem before us, there seem to me to be two main conceptions running through our ordinary modes of expression, each of which, fortunately, has had an exponent in the past history of philosophy. According to one of these views, facts of mind, taken in the mass, are objects of knowledge, apprehended by processes essentially the same in kind as those applied to the knowledge of so-called external things, and forming, therefore, the material of a science which holds to mind the same position as physics, in the widest sense, holds to external nature. According to the other, facts of mind and external things stand by no means on the same level in respect to experience or knowledge. Facts of mind are taken to be at once the instruments of knowing and the only objects directly known. Of what is mental fact we are directly aware, and we are directly aware of no other fact. The first of these views I shall call the Kantian, for a very precise statement of it is to be found in Kant, and, on the whole, I think it expresses the essential feature in his conception of psychology; the other I shall call the Cartesian, for though Descartes himself can hardly be said to have formulated it with great definiteness, it is implied in his general position, is a leading idea among his immediate followers, and is naturally adopted by any who approach the general philosophical question in the Cartesian fashion.

Now, in regard to the first of these, it is fortunately quite unnecessary that I should try to unravel the tangled skein of questions that has gathered round the critical method. How far it is the case that the critical analysis of experience is dependent on psychological assumptions, and that the

results are expressed in terms of psychology, need not at present concern us. What is certain, and of sufficient interest to repay separate consideration, is that Kant imagined himself to have drawn a sharp distinction between the psychological and the transcendental analyses of experience, and that, in accordance with this, he thought it possible to contrast the two doctrines, psychology and theory of knowledge. It is quite possible that we may come to the conclusion that his distinction was erroneous, and that the assumption of it lies at the root of much of the ambiguity always attaching to his epistemology. But we cannot refuse to admit the existence of the distinction for him, and, consequently, that he intended the two lines of inquiry to be thoroughly independent. Moreover, this view of psychology, even if freed from the peculiarities of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, is one that naturally presents itself, and that finds abundant statement in the literature of the subject. The sole superiority of the Kantian statement, that which renders it available for my purpose, is that it does not rest content with the bare generality. It condescends to particulars, and enables us to appreciate the doctrine in its details.

Psychology, in the Kantian view, is the portion of experience constituted by knowledge of the facts of the inner life. Such knowledge, so far as it is given, has the form of knowledge in general. The material is presented to the receptive faculty of inner sense, is apprehended as event in time, and ought, in order to be fully known, to be systematically connected by these pure forms of thought, the categories. I hardly require to say that in regard to this last point Kant wavered in his view, and exhibited so much indecision and hesitation as to show how great was the difficulty involved in his conception of psychology. I think that the hesitation increased upon him, and that, though it would be foolish to

try to extract much from the extraordinary medley of jottings contained in his posthumous work, yet without much trouble one might find there many expressions throwing light on the line into which his reflexions were leading him. I am particularly struck by the fact that in it the expression 'making of myself the object' is invariably used, not as it would be in the Critique, to indicate the empirical apprehension of inner states through the inner sense, but to indicate the process of perceiving, intuiting the object in space.

Without, however, pursuing this, which has only historical interest, I return to the general conception of facts of mind as the isolated objects of inner sense, apprehended as events in time, and making up that empirical self which Kant so strenuously contrasts with the so-called Pure Ego. There is not a point in that conception which is not the cause of endless trouble to Kant; the whole conception is irreconcilable with his theory of knowledge, and is in itself untenable. The notion of an inner sense drives him into the difficulty of allowing to knowledge itself a kind of twofold existence. The thought of time as the form of the inner sense, and of the inner sense only, brings him within measurable distance of the crudest form of subjective idealism; and the idea of an empirical ego which has no inner connexion, but only the purely external relation of sequence of its states in time, is in fact a contradiction. The very antithesis which is made between the empirical and the pure ego gives to the latter that ambiguous place in the Kantian system from which, even if we admit that our natural interpretations exaggerate the perplexity, no ingenuity can altogether rescue it. I do not myself believe that in the term 'pure ego' we have more than Kant's peculiar and unhappy way of naming the fundamental characteristic of experience, that it is expressible only in terms of consciousness, of mind; but undoubtedly the way of naming it conveys the impression that the pure ego is in

some kind of external relation to experience, and exercises upon it the function of uniting what would otherwise be incoherent multiplicity.

But I by no means rest the case against the description of psychology as the knowledge of facts presented to the inner sense and having the characteristic of events in time on the difficulty of reconciling that with Kant's general doctrine of knowledge. I wholly doubt its truth, and incline to think that our general conception of psychology can never be satisfactory until we have once for all got rid of it.

It is not merely that on reflexion I find no evidence of the presence anywhere in experience of the process which is called the inner sense (and, if one had no further grounds for doubting the existence of such an organ of knowledge, one might find reasons enough in the absolute want of agreement among psychologists as to its nature and conditions), but that I cannot convince myself that mental facts as such could ever be presented in the fashion of objects to any sense or perception, even if it be of the peculiar kind called 'inner.' To me it seems as if their very nature prevented the possibility of such presentation, and that just what is specifically characteristic of them must needs evade presentation in the fashion of object, known or perceived. If it be urged that psychical states are surely facts and can be known as facts, the reply seems obvious that they are, at all events, facts *of mind*, and that this qualification is exactly what prevents their appearance as objects.

What seems to me to lie at the foundation of all the confusion on this point is the peculiar character which belongs to each and every so-called fact of mind, and which emphatically distinguishes it from fact of any other kind. Wherever there is a 'fact of mind,' as we shall call it for the moment, there is a mode of what, for want of a better expression, I term 'being for self.' There is implied, therefore, a duality

of nature, which is not, however, to be conceived as a combination of two isolated or independent existences. The simplest phase of inner life, the first dim obscure stirrings of feeling, are ways in which there is apprehension, awareness of a certain content. The content may be as indefinite as one pleases, it is probably (almost certainly) never simple, but it is there as defining the phase of mind or fact of consciousness. And the general character of facts of mind remains the same, however complicated or developed they may be. It is a totally false abstraction, based on the analogy of our conception of external things, to give to the contents of these modes of apprehension a fictitious independence, and to identify the act of apprehending which makes them with a kind of inner vision directed upon them.

I am aware that in taking this view of what is peculiar to psychical fact I run counter to much accepted psychology, and in particular to the opinions of one for whose work in psychology I entertain the deepest respect. Dr James Ward has consistently urged the necessity of severing the act or mode of apprehension, the act of being aware or conscious of, from that which is apprehended, that of which we are aware or conscious; and he appears to identify the counter-view with the conception of facts of mind as independent objects. *Presentationism*, as he describes this counter-view, he regards as erring in method just by reason of ignoring the relation to self inseparable from any fact of mind. If I understand him rightly, and the matter is so subtle that it is easy to misunderstand, he regards as the only alternative to his own conception that which gives to the contents apprehended independent existence, and seeks to show how mind as a whole is built up by their coming together. But this is by no means the only alternative, and, so far as it is concerned, I am heartily in agreement with Dr Ward in regarding it as

a wholly inadequate conception. It is possible, and I think it is necessary, to insist that there shall be no distinction of existence drawn between the act, state, or mode of being conscious and the content of which we are conscious. I am quite aware of the difficulties attaching to this mode of conceiving of mental facts, and in particular I recognise the awkwardness of the question which will doubtless be pressed upon it, What, then, is this self for whom the mental fact is? Our natural tendency is to interpret in accordance with the distinctions of that matured experience to which the inner life has reached, and it is only by analogies based on such matured self-consciousness that even a partial answer can be given. But I am prepared to say, on the one hand, that the matured self-consciousness would be impossible if the primitive and simple facts of mind had not as part of their very nature this obscure self-reference, and, on the other hand, that neither the primitive nor the matured self-consciousness indicates a factor distinct from the inner states themselves. It is, to my thinking, the fundamental error in the Kantian doctrine of experience that it appears to give a kind of abstracted being to the 'pure ego' or self, and yet there is much in that very doctrine to cause us to hesitate in ascribing so impracticable a view to Kant. Even the pure ego is not without its content, a content that it attains to, and does not, in some incomprehensible way, possess from the first.

Facts of mind, psychical states, so conceived can never be directly presented as objects. Just as little can they be apprehended as merely events in time. Time is, after all, a relation in what is apprehended, a relation in the content of which we are aware; and reflexion will convince us that in the complex state of mind we commonly describe as the remembrance of our past mental states, the presence of a conception of the external world of objects is an integral element, and that we

are in truth reproducing or reviving contents that have the time-relation in them.

When we describe the facts of mind as a series of events in time, we are vainly trying to regard them from the point of view of an outside observer. We are not describing them as they are for the consciousness they compose. There they are not objects *of* which the subject is aware, but ways *in* which he is aware. And nothing whatsoever is gained by introducing the perfectly empty conception of the subject as distinct from these and as affording a bond of union among them. It seems to me more true to say that the subject *is* his mental states than that he *has* them. The unity which attaches to the conceived subject depends upon the content of his consciousness rather than constitutes its form.

From this point of view there is no real difficulty in replying to the question which was quoted from Professor Dewey, and which re-echoes much that has been made familiar in recent English writing through T. H. Green: How can consciousness, which in its primary aspect is a series of psychical events, be the consciousness for which a permanent world of objects exists? The content of consciousness by no means remains for ever in the crude condition of its earliest stage. That which is apprehended need not and cannot retain for ever the rich but confused detail of immediate perception. Why should the content apprehended not have the mark of permanence? It has it, in every case of thought as contrasted with intuition, and I see no reason for supposing that in thought we have more than a higher development of the same psychical functions of apprehending that are exemplified in crude intuition. The Kantian distinction of sense and understanding was probably in its original conception connected with a difference in kind between the psychical acts supposed to be involved, but it needs only a reference to all recent work on

Kant to assure us that what is of importance and significance in the distinction depends in no way on the psychological basis given it by Kant.

If, now, there be resigned as imperfect the mode of viewing psychical facts as so many objects to be known, and with it the conception of psychology as a kind of natural science, there must likewise be resigned the distinction which Kant seemed to draw between psychology and epistemology. It is quite true that Kant did not assign to epistemology the problem which springs naturally from the Cartesian mode of treating facts of mind. He did not think that it was the business of epistemology to determine whether it was at all possible by subjective process of knowing to reach cognition of objective or trans-subjective fact. It is to his credit, I think, that when he is expressing himself most carefully in regard to knowledge he does not intrude ideas as mediating between the conscious self and objects. But, on the other hand, it seems to me impossible to follow out consistently the general method which he applied to knowledge, or to accept as fairly expressing the philosophical problem his well-worn question, How is experience possible? However successful his analysis is in laying out the connective links of an experience in which the subject is conscious of himself as confronted by a world of objective fact, there is not to be altogether excluded from it the intrusive and baffling conception of this as a result due to the formative action of mind on what is supplied to it. From this conception the critical account of knowledge is not to be freed. It goes along with too many of the occasioning causes of the whole Kantian work to be regarded as merely accidental. Distinctions of form and matter, of *a priori* and *a posteriori*, of necessary and contingent, presented themselves to Kant as absolute, as distinctions of kind calling for explanation by reference to heterogeneous sources, and compelling thus the

analysis of knowledge to assume the more familiar aspect of an account of the way in which knowing comes about.

It is from what I have ventured to call the Cartesian position in regard to facts of mind that a certain mode of formulating the epistemological question comes forward most readily, and in most precise fashion. Fortunately the Cartesian position is relatively simple in its statement. According to it facts of mind are known directly, and direct knowledge is confined to such facts of mind. The human mind has its own states of consciousness, has knowledge of them, and directly, immediately, knows nothing except them. From this point of view the process of knowing and what is known are primarily subjective. If, then, all that is other than the inner facts of the subject's consciousness (and indeed in strictness, perhaps, all that lies beyond the momentary act of knowing) be termed trans-subjective, it is not possible to affirm without qualification that the trans-subjective is known. It obviously *is* not in consciousness, and only in regard to what is *there* can there be immediate certainty, self-evidencing conviction. Apprehension of the trans-subjective must be mediate, and in whatever process we conceive it to consist, however far we may think it extends, it must suggest the problem, How is it possible that what is not in the subject, in consciousness, should nevertheless be apprehended by what is, and is directly known as, a fact in consciousness?

Although the position is capable of a tolerably simple statement, it is not always clear how far we may proceed in interpretation of the metaphors with which it abounds. *In* and *out of* consciousness, for example, are phrases in use habitually, without much appreciation of the very curious implications they involve. The boundaries of what is immediately certain are not always drawn with the same strictness; and while I admit that I think the rigour of the

argument would compel the restriction of the immediately cognised to the momentary, atomic, unconnected psychical state, if state it can be called, I do not think it necessary to thrust this interpretation on the view as a whole. Nor can I attach any great importance to certain qualifications with which the statement of it is sometimes accompanied. Volkelt, whose exposition of it in his important work '*Erfahrung und Denken*' seems to me the most complete and developed, after saying that for philosophy no opposition is so fundamental as that between process of consciousness and the trans-subjective, remarks, "The opposition, it is true, is not metaphysical but epistemological. It determines nothing in respect to difference in the mode of existence of the two; it concerns only the relation in which the two stand severally to the attempt to have knowledge of them."¹ That is to say, what lies beyond my consciousness may be in its existential nature either corporeal or spiritual, either matter or another conscious life with my own; in any case it presents the same problem for knowledge; it is not in mind; it is not itself a process of consciousness, and cannot be cognised with simple indefeasible certainty. It has the stamp of the trans-subjective. But this qualification has importance only if the position be granted, only if we maintain that there are really two questions involved: one, how it is possible to know the trans-subjective at all; the other, how we are able to determine the nature of that which is in any case apprehended as trans-subjective. For my own part, I am unable to attach significance to the first of these suggested questions, and the latter hardly seems to me to require the special designation 'metaphysical.'

I have never been able to divest myself of the conviction that the general argument just presented rests on a confusion of thought, and screens the true order of development of the

¹ [*Erfahrung und Denken* (1886), p. 103.]

inner process of knowledge. No doubt it is not easy to ensure that, when one discusses the simple rudiments of experience, the terms employed shall have a significance on which we are in agreement. Still, allowing for the danger so arising, it seems possible to disentangle the confusion into which we seem to me to be led by this absolute antithesis between subjective process of consciousness and the trans-subjective. An isolated act of mind is evidently the hypothesis from which the argument starts; and it is maintained that such an act of mind, say, for example, a state of sense-apprehension, may be, and must be known as *mine*, as *subjective*. As I have already said, the rigour of the argument would cast doubt upon this term *mine*, the meaning of which can hardly be supposed to be given in the sense which would make it identical with *subjective* in the isolated process. But apart from that, I am prepared to say that I see no evidence for the assertion that the act of mind is originally apprehended as a process of my consciousness, and further, that any meaning the designation 'subjective' comes to possess, it acquires as part of the larger complex notion of the inner life as distinct from the space-extended not-self. If we are attempting to trace the development in us of the recognised distinction between subjective and trans-subjective, we do wrong, it seems to me, in extending too rapidly the scope of the latter term. It appears to me obvious that the type of trans-subjective indicated by the term *other conscious minds* is dependent and derivative. I am far from saying that the only meaning of 'subjective' is what it gains in and through the opposition between the act of perceiving and the space-extended that is perceived; and, above all things, I do not imply that the recognition of this opposition is a simple primitive fact of mind. But I feel inclined to say that all further determination the subjective receives in the course of the development of experience depends upon this initial dis-

tion, and that it is only when that distinction is apprehended, dimly or clearly, that there comes to be possible any signifi-
cance at all in the designation 'subjective.'

There is no doubt that to some extent this mode of viewing the question returns to the lines of a well-known portion of the Kantian work; but it approaches it from a wholly different standpoint, and is free from certain dangers which Kant's statement did not succeed in evading. The general idea of the correlation of inner and outer experience, which underlies the Kantian position, seems to me true and fruitful, capable of application far beyond the limits of the use to which, in this special case, it was put by Kant.

The Cartesian method, as I said, seems to me to reverse the true order of development of experience. It assumes that we begin with the knowledge of subjective states, and then, by some mode of reflexion on or about them, are led to the conception of a trans-subjective, to which must always cling something problematical. Perhaps reversal is too strong a term to apply to this account, for I do not think that the initial step in the development of knowledge is the position of the trans-subjective or objective. Perhaps we deceive ourselves here a little by using too freely the term 'knowledge,' which can hardly fail to carry with it the counter-implication—subjective existence of the act of knowing, trans-subjective existence of that which is known. In this sense of the term knowledge, it cannot be maintained for a moment that with it our experience begins; and I cannot see more than an equivocal in that most astonishing opinion with which Mr Herbert Spencer must have startled the student of his Psychology, "I see no alternative but to affirm that the thing primarily known is not that a sensation has been experienced, but that there exists an outer object."¹ I am perfectly

¹ [Principles of Psychology, § 404, vol. ii. p. 369.]

aware that Mr Spencer does not regard this act of knowing as itself primary, but I am not able to reconcile the two points of view from which he evidently regards the question. For my own part, I am content with the simpler and, as it appears to me, more correct view, that the discrimination of subjective and trans-subjective is one act or process, however complicated, that it comes about in consciousness, and that neither element is given without the other.

IV.

KANT'S VIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY.¹

MANY lines of investigation, historical and critical, converge in the general question of the relation of the main Kantian doctrine to psychology. It is of some importance to be able to trace the obligations of Kant to preceding writers on psychology, and to determine the extent to which, in the formulation of his own views, he seems to have been affected by what he borrowed from current psychology.² Again, from the earliest of the long series of discussions on and about the Kantian doctrine, there has manifested itself a deep-going difference of view as to the foundation and aim of the whole doctrine, a difference of view aptly enough designated as that between the psychological and the critical or epistemological. The penetrating influence of the opposed views so designated is to be discovered in some quarter or another in wellnigh all the interpretations that have been offered of the Kantian system. Finally, the powerful change in the general character and direction of philosophy, due to Kant, did not leave psychology itself unaffected. A new, or, at all events, a highly peculiar and definite conception of its

¹ [This paper is probably earlier in date than any of the preceding. Although only a fragment, it appears (unlike the other contents of these volumes) to have been originally written with a view to publication, per-

haps in connexion with the author's projected History of Psychology.]

² An excellent summary of much bearing on this matter is given in Hegler, *Die Psychologie in Kant's Ethik*, 1891.

scope and method was one of the results of Kant's analysis of knowledge, and has since exercised an influence on all psychological work.

These general lines of inquiry lead off into innumerable side issues. Nor is it possible, as tolerably uniform experience has shown, to deal with any one portion of the Kantian doctrine without being drawn into the discussion of some or all of them. The praiseworthy Commentary of Vaihinger has only to be consulted to make us aware, not only how multifarious are the detailed questions that surround each step of Kant's analysis of knowledge, but also how continuously there present themselves discussions unmistakably psychological in character. It was, and it is, inevitable that the statement of any view regarding the nature and validity of knowledge should be made in terms that have a certain vague fixity of meaning as parts of the nomenclature of psychology. The significance assigned to such terms in the course of the inquiry into knowledge is often either obscured by an interpretation of them in accordance with their current psychological use, or may be thought to be illegitimately reached as a consequence from the unfounded assumptions generally latent in the accepted nomenclature. The term *Begriff* as employed by Kant will furnish ample illustration of both alternatives suggested.

The general character of Kant's own conception of Psychology is not hard to state in his own terms, though the more closely the conception is investigated the more serious are the perplexities raised by it. Psychology has for its object the phenomena of the inner life, just as Physics, natural science in the widest sense, has for its object the phenomena of external nature. Inner phenomenon, like outer, involves given, presented matter, and for its cognition requires that such matter should be apprehended under the general conditions whereby a definite known object is possible. Such

conditions are (1) the general rule of all presentation as object to a subject, that the matter be in time; (2) the general rules of apprehension as object known, the pure forms of understanding. The matter presented is every modification of mind: perception, thought, feeling, desire. Such matter is presented to the inner sense; and just as outer sense has its form space and is affected by the combining act of thought in the cognition of a determined object in space, so the inner sense has its form time and is affected by the combining act of thought in the knowledge of the coexisting and successive phenomena of the inner life. Whereas, however, the outer sense-material, by reason of its form space, affords ground for the objectively valid use of the pure combining forms of understanding and yields a comprehensive conception *a priori* of the structure and relations of the unity of external phenomena as nature, inner sense-material, subject to the sole condition of time, exhibits no general *a priori* law of its structure and relations other than the formale of time itself—that it is a continuous stream—and yields no body of *a priori* determinations. Nor does inner sense-material lend itself even to the less complete theoretical form of natural science; its phenomena are non-mathematical in character; there is possible in respect to them only the descriptive treatment of classificatory science, hardly even the analytic processes of chemistry. Psychology, which is empirical only (for of the impossibility of all Rational Psychology one may be convinced by the reflexion that the inner sense contains only the given material of inner phenomena, not the substance of the soul as the unity of which these are the states), is nothing but a descriptive account of the series of facts, modes of his own existence in time, of which the subject becomes aware through inner sense. If such psychology be distinguished at all from anthropology, it is so, Kant appears to say, because in it

there is taken for granted that the capacity for feeling and thinking, 'mind' in the empirical sense, is something peculiar in man—an indwelling substance in him.¹

To this brief statement, divested so far as possible of such technicality as does not seem essential, it has to be added, first, that the empirically known contents of the inner sense are apprehended as the self, that is, as at once identical with and diverse from the pure ego; and secondly, as is here implied, that a sharp distinction is to be drawn between the empirical self of inner intuition and the pure ego. Kant notes quietly that to some the view taken of inner sense seemed to have the difficulty that it involved the conception of a duality of self in one and the same person; and, indeed, were there taken rigorously one of the most tortuous of his many tortuous expressions,² the difficulty might be presented in an exaggerated fashion. He does not, however, offer any further comment, and contents himself with reiterating that only through presence in consciousness of a determinate intuition can the bare self-consciousness of the pure ego, the correlate of all experience, be realised. How far this extends, or how far it is compatible with his general analysis of knowledge, are questions for the moment deferred.

That the empirical self is not to be confused with the pure ego, that the inner sense is not pure apperception, are such cardinal and familiar doctrines of the Critique that a mere reference to them will suffice. However true it may be that the simple form of all thought, the 'I think,' is dependent for occurrence, for existence at all, on the concrete of sense, it is not in its nature a determinable fact of intuition; it is not even a determinate notion. That which is the uniform and indispensable condition of all knowing cannot itself be an object known.

¹ Werke, R, vii. 2. 54, 55; H, vii. 473-4.

² Kritik, B, 155-6; H, 129; M, 95; Müller, i. 452.

The general statement of the field for psychology, taken without special reference to the peculiar Kantian terms in it, commends itself at first sight as containing the basis for a scientific treatment of mind, and, interpreted as it was none too closely, it for a time powerfully influenced psychological research. There was something symmetrical and attractive in the conception of the field of experience as divisible into the two broadly distinct types of phenomena—those of external and those of inner sense—of empirical science as either Physics or Psychology. A certain community of method and aim between the two types of science, giving added harmony to conceptions of the sum-total of phenomena, seemed likewise to be implied. If for the inner life there was no such fundamental doctrine as abstract mechanics extends to natural science, the cause was to be found in the peculiar character of inner phenomena, their wonderful complexity, the weakness of the inner sense, and the common confusion of ideas as to its real nature.¹

Psychology regarded from this point of view could evidently be distinguished sharply from the research into the conditions of possible experience constituting the critical theory of knowledge. Nothing could be more dissimilar than the problems of the two inquiries; nothing less possible than to apply the leading thoughts and methods of the one within the other. Psychology is at best a descriptive account of a determinate portion of experience; theory of knowledge an investigation of the conditions under which experience at all is possible. The first has to do with a determinate group of facts, objects presented in experience; the other takes for consideration the conditions under which the object as such can be presented at all. To the psychologist 'mind' is but a collective term for the series of inner states, coexistent and sequent, of which the subject is aware through inner sense;

¹ See, *e.g.*, Jakob's *Erfahrungs-seelenlehre*, § 157 ff.

to the critical investigator into the conditions of knowledge, 'mind' names no fact or group of facts, but the necessary implicate in all facts.

But, though these distinctions may possess a certain superficial value, they are too dependent on the special determination given of the field of psychology to be decisive. They ignore the real difficulties, which are only hidden under, not solved by, the conception of the nature of inner sense and the way in which the subject presents to himself his inner life. They are powerless to meet the objections urged against the critical view of knowledge, that it is only the laying out with much detail of an arbitrary psychological theory, that is, a theory of the *nature* of mind; and that in its own procedure it is at every step conditioned by assumptions psychological in character, that is, concerning the relations to one another of facts of the inner life. For there may certainly be urged as an objection to the critical theory of knowledge what has often been regarded as a sufficient representation of its outcome, that it rests on the hypothesis of a specially organised structure of mind, the thinking and perceiving principle in man, and offers as a final account of the nature and validity of knowledge nothing but the vague unsatisfactory conception of a mind which must arrange, co-ordinate, reduce to form in accordance with its own special structure, whatsoever impressions are made on it from without. It is from this point of view, one probably wholly foreign to Kant but for which his language gives ample warrant, that many of the current general objections to his theory of knowledge are directed. It is argued that the conception of mind, so organised as to impose form in general on the contents supplied to it from without, inconsistently places mind in the position of one real fact in relation of reciprocal action with others, and at the same time renders it impossible to explain how such form in

general is realised in particular modifications. The *a priori* forms of intuition or of thought are just as far removed from and as incapable of explaining the concrete particular as the Platonic idea was remote from and helpless to explain the world of generation.

Returning now to the general statement, we find that it suggests two somewhat distinct inquiries: first, how far does it offer a conception of psychology possible in itself and consistent with the Kantian theory of experience? and secondly, what light does it throw on the relation between the psychological and the transcendental methods? As regards the former question, it is tolerably evident that the statement, taken in its generality, has but superficial clearness; that it cannot simply be interpreted as an expression of the view familiar in the writings of the Scottish school, that, as our notions of mind and matter are alike relative, the proper object of investigation, for psychology as for physics, is phenomena only; but that it contains, in an involved confused fashion, a multiplicity of thoughts which require to be analysed before the full import of the general statement can be determined. As regards the second question, however clear it may be that, on Kant's own conception of the province of psychology and of the problem of theory of knowledge, no two methods could be more distinct than the psychological and the transcendental, it is possible to ask, and it may be useful to consider, how far he is successful in freeing the critical investigation into the nature of experience from presuppositions essentially psychological in kind, and in particular how far the perplexities which we shall probably discover in his treatment of psychology affect at the same time his central thought of the unity of self-consciousness. The two inquiries run into one another, but there is a certain convenience in keeping them for a time apart.

The field of psychology is a certain portion of experience, of knowledge therefore. It is to be defined more explicitly in terms of the general conditions of experience, of knowledge at all. What is known must, in the first instance, be given as matter of intuition, in order that it may be a somewhat at all, and moreover must be given in or subject to such form as renders it possible material for apprehension. It must, in the second instance, be determined as an object, that is, thought as object for the apprehending perceiving subject. Such thought has a twofold aspect. It is, on the one hand, the consciousness on the part of the thinking self of its own unity as opposed to the given material of intuition; on the other hand, it is the reference of the given material of intuition, in itself a haphazard of contingent appearance, to the conceived unity of the object,—the recognition of the universal of law in the manifold particular. These two aspects may be distinguished in our abstracting reflexion on experience; they are in essence one. The object to which the material of intuition is referred is nothing but the conception, the thought, of a determinate order, and that in turn is nothing but the consciousness of its own unity on the part of the *thinking* subject. Difficulty may be felt in consequence of the way in which we state, and must state, the act of knowing, as the reference of *Vorstellungen*, given intuitions, to the object. We inevitably tend to think of the object as distinct from and in existential relation to the given material. But the object of such reference is, *in general*, nothing but the conception of unity of itself on the part of the subject, and *in particular*, such varied conceptions of its unity as are possible for a *perceiving* subject, a subject whose unity is determined in relation to given forms of intuited material. Within the domain of particular science there is nothing to prevent us from employing the dual mode of expression in respect to objects known; and if we choose to designate the

empirically given material as phenomenon and refer it to the conceived object as that of which it is the phenomenon, no greater inconvenience would follow from the reflexion that the object so conceived is itself the phenomenon than the necessity of using the awkward phrase *phenomenon of phenomenon*, a mode of expression which makes its appearance in the fragments of Kant's posthumous work.¹

With these generalities in view, we ask what is the material of intuition for the apprehension of self as an object? and to this simple question we presently discover that there is no very direct answer forthcoming. Kant himself, and the Kantian psychologists who professedly proceed on his principles, are led by the use of a term still to be considered—inner sense—to refer generally to the material as the contents of the inner life, perceptions, imaginations, thoughts, feelings, desires. But in a tolerably official passage in the Critique,² it is expressly said that the contents of inner sense are just the contents of outer sense—a statement which has sometimes been connected, though without sufficient ground, with the familiar Kantian doctrine that feeling is generically distinct from knowing or from the objective presentative element in the *cognitum*. Whatever be the merits of this doctrine (and in the vague fashion in which it is here referred to it is useless to consider them) acceptance of it here would conflict strangely with its own implication that feeling is the specifically subjective element in experience; for it would be not a little remarkable were the sub-

¹ See Altpr. Monatsch., 1882, pp. 289, 292, 295, 296, 300. This posthumous work is sufficiently hard to understand; but on the particular point referred to I am not able to agree with Vaihinger's interpretation (Strassburger Abh., pp. 156, 157), which seems to imply a more definite distinction than I can discover between

the pure and the empirical ego, and which I find hard to reconcile with the passages quoted. I do not know on what ground Vaihinger proceeds in asserting that the terms *direct* and *indirect* have got transposed on p. 300.

² Transc. Æsth., § 8. ii.; B, 67; M, 40.

jective factor to play no part in the subject's apprehension of his own existence, to form no part of what the subject apprehends as his own mode of existing.

There is obviously some ground for Kant's fluctuation of view on this important point, and we shall presently discover what that ground is. Meantime, keeping still to the generalities, we go on to ask, In what way is this material for the empirical knowledge of self received? To this the consistent Kantian answer is, By the inner sense, and subject to the condition of the inner sense, time. The notion of inner sense has an evil history, and nowhere has it been more unfortunate than in the Kantian theory. As there defined, it may fairly be regarded as a product of combined abstraction and analogy. The broad experience from which we start is vaguely expressed in the phrase that we are aware of our own temporally changing existence as contrasted with the existence of outer things. Perceptions of these outer things are themselves temporally determinable changes of our own existence. As changes in the particular of experience, they must be apprehended through a *sense*; they are *given*. As contrasted with apprehended outer things, the objects of outer sense, they must be received through an *inner* sense, which stands in the same relation to them that outer sense stands to the perceived outer objects.

It is perhaps not to be urged as a special difficulty in this mode of viewing the apprehended material of self-perception that it just fails to include the characteristic feature—the identification of the perceived with the percipient self—for Kant consistently declares that any explanation of this feature is impossible; but it is evident that it throws the whole burden on the peculiar nature assigned to the inner sense, towards elucidation of which there is singularly little in the Critique. It is only by following out the further

steps in analysis of the whole process of self-perception that we get additional light.

The form of inner sense is time, and time is form of the inner sense only. The *percepta* of outer sense are determinable as in time, only because the material element in the process of outer sense is and must be also material of inner sense. Nothing can be more explicit than Kant's repeated declarations on this perhaps the most perplexing point in his whole analysis of perceptive experience. It lies at the root of the doctrine of schematism, and it comes to the front in the discussion of the real character of the external perceived object. The first and obvious inference from it would be, not merely that, as he frequently seems to say, outer and inner sense are equally primordial, inexplicable in their characteristic features, and just side by side, but that a certain priority belongs to inner sense. Such an inference as is well known, is completely at variance with Kant's views; and it seems probable that insight into the hazardous character of the conception of inner sense came about from consideration of the third element in the process of self-perception. It is by an act of understanding that the given material of inner sense is determined as an object in experience, is cognised. Such determination concerns only the time-relations of the given matter; but for the determination of time-relations a feature of the given is required that is not furnished in the matter of inner sense. There is not possible in the field of inner experience the reference of given materials to the unity of an object as determining the order of their appearance such as we find in the case of outer experience. It is only in correlation with and dependence on outer perception that we become able to determine the empirical sequence of states of the inner life as changes in the object known. But this is to say, in other words, as has been often pointed out, that we do not cognise self or its

changes as object at all. Whatever other account we may offer of the way in which self-perception comes about, or, indeed, of the meaning of that process, we must give up the attempted parallelism of inner and outer experience, and with it the basis for that kind of psychology which Kant, or his immediate followers at least, seemed to contemplate.

A peculiar danger, indeed, attaches to any attempt, however carefully guarded, to conceive of *Vorstellungen*, the apprehended contents, as *objects*. Language, which has much to account for in popular psychology, plays its own hurtful part in reference to this fundamental point; and however fairly it may be recognised that we are dealing only with an abstract, an aspect of a concrete whole, it is almost impossible to escape from the implications of the substantival terms used. For Kant the difficulty is aggravated by the pronouncedly subjective colouring of his expressions—a colouring deepened in the posthumous work in the confused treatment of the central idea of his system. The moment we allow ourselves, as Kant does, to speak of *Vorstellungen* as the matter known, and to identify such *Vorstellungen* with the assumed objective states of the empirical self—an identification which he resists but which is inevitable on his view—we are thrown back into the weakest form of the subjective idealism, from which the Kantian theory of perception seemed at first to save itself. Such a result, no doubt, arises from a confusion between the psychological and the transcendental points of view; and there is much in Kant which shows he was well aware of the need of holding these apart, but it can hardly be maintained that in his exposition the confusion is only one of language. It seems to go deeper than that.

V.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM.¹

It is not my intention, in these rather desultory remarks, to attempt any historical account of the ways in which philosophy, in the official recognised sense, has actually connected itself with the general problems of social life. Such connexion has, indeed, never been wanting, though it has had many degrees of intimacy. From Plato to Hegel and Comte and Spencer, the great speculative thinkers have always endeavoured to include within their scheme some explanation of what are the distinctive features of social life, the economic arrangements, the code of laws or body of customs, and the form of State constitution. Even more important than such an obvious surface connexion between philosophy and social inquiries is that which turns upon the influence of general conceptions, conceptions therefore on the whole philosophical, on reflexion upon any concrete problems. Such influence is very often unconscious, even in the case of the trained thinker who is proceeding methodically to his work. He has already formed a general picture or representation of things, and his mind operates constantly under its direction and within its scope. What is true of the trained thinker is still more true of the ordinary uncritical mind. And in the latter case, as a consequence mainly of inability to lay out in even partial outlines what the general picture is, there is the

¹ [Address to the Civic Society of Glasgow, 14th April 1898.]

strongest inclination to deny its influence, and to assert the simplicity and freedom from prejudice of the plain practical mind.

It would be far more instructive to follow out the influence of these general ideas on sociological thought than to describe the various social philosophies which have formed part of the work of the systematic philosophers. But it is a more difficult task, and it is hardly possible yet to attempt it on the full scale it requires. Isolated branches have been taken up, as, for example, in Mr Bonar's excellent study on the relation between Philosophy and Political Economy, a work which shows how deep is the influence exercised on economic speculations by general ideas, often vague and untested, regarding the true end of human life and therefore by implication the natural, true, or best form of social structure. Any economical theory, be it Adam Smith's, or J. S. Mill's, or Karl Marx's, will be found on close scrutiny to rest on certain assumptions, postulates, or ultimate principles, which the economist, if he be a shrewd and practised disputant, will assert to be outside the scope of his science, and to be defended or attacked on other than economic grounds. In like manner, any practical discussion on some economical proposal, for example, the increase of the death duties, the relief of local rates, employers' liability, or the like, will be found to terminate in the long run in some ultimate differences of view or feeling with regard to what is deemed the right, the fairest, or the best arrangement of human life. I do not wish to be understood as objecting to the employment of such general ideas in thinking upon social questions. Far from it: the only method known to humanity by which it can hope to overcome a difficulty is to reason it out, to endeavour thoroughly to understand and explain it; and all explanation involves the application of general ideas. But it is necessary to test and examine the general ideas thus applied; for they are often picked up in a

haphazard way ; they are frequently vague and incomplete ; they are always based on the experience already had, which likewise may be incomplete and imperfectly known. Even when the general ideas are very abstract, and of the kind the philosopher calls formal, the same precautions are requisite in regard to them. Let me take a couple of examples to illustrate what I mean.

(1) It required some time, much advance in civilisation, before the life of society, even in the limited type of a particular nation, people, state, or city, could be selected as a single object of consideration, and the inquiry raised as to the causes which gave it a certain coherence and unity, and furnished explanation of its distinctive features and of the changes which occurred in it. When such isolation was effected, when sociological speculation took its start, explanation was naturally given first and most directly by assimilating the object of research to something relatively familiar. Primitive explanations are always of the same type, and turn upon analogies, many of which tend to become unintelligible in later times and in the light of fuller knowledge. The analogy which first pressed upon the imagination of the early sociologists was that between the society or state and the living being. That a society was in its inner or generic character an organism is one of the earliest, and has proved itself one of the most persistent, of sociological conceptions. In the body politic, as in the naturally organised individual, there seemed to be a unity embracing and depending on a multiplicity, a singleness of aim which is effected by the co-operation of subordinate parts, and a reciprocal dependence of part on part which gives to each part a special and a common character. Moreover, experience seemed to confirm the analogy, for it seemed to show in the continuing life of the body politic the same stages of growth or development as those apparent in the organised body.

It took further time to expand the idea, to apply it beyond the limits of the single body politic, and to represent humanity as the identical unity which persists throughout varied transformations, different states as the subordinate parts working towards an end which embraces all, international relations as consequences of the interdependence of the parts of a whole, and the rise and fall of nations as the stages of the growth or development of humanity. Such an expansion involves difficulties so great that no early sociologists faced them, so formidable indeed that they seem to indicate a limit to the application of the conception, supposing the conception itself to be of value and valid.

Undoubtedly no conception has more commended itself to our ordinary thinking. It was among the earliest, it is among the latest, of the general ideas brought to bear on the social life. If it has not generated, it has connected itself with, a great number of the *axiomata media* of sociology, as, for example, that constitutions are not made but grow, that there is a natural order of 'opulence,' or economic growth, or social development. Yet, I venture to say that the employment of the notion is always a sign of an unscientific stage of sociological thinking. No one would deny the historical value of the idea. It has served to mark out, compendiously, differences of real moment, and it may even be said to have had the same methodical importance that is claimed for the notion of final end in physiology: it has drawn attention to connexions which might otherwise have escaped notice. But it has to be borne in mind that the differences between the social life and that of an organised living being are far more important and go far deeper than the resemblances, which at best are but superficial, that the value of the explanation, so far as it can go, is seriously affected by the consideration that our knowledge of the exact differentia of organic life is

very imperfect, that we have no justification for assuming as the explanation leads us to do, that organic life is, so to speak, an ultimate fact, and finally, that the description, for it is no more, of social life as organic constitutes no explanation whatsoever of it, and gives us no insight into really causal connexions among its parts. I will go further, and say that nothing can be more fatal to sociological thought than the consequence easily and too often drawn from the analogy, that there is an end, a purpose, a final idea to be realised by the whole which, so far at least, is distinct from the end, purpose, or idea of the parts.

(2) As a second example I take the general conception of Progress or Development, likewise an early conception (for the facts which it brings together lie on the surface, and could hardly escape the glance of the first sociologists), but undoubtedly a far more difficult idea than that of organic life, apprehended therefore at first in an excessively vague fashion, more dependent on secret underlying thoughts for the meaning given to it, and presenting greater differences between the earlier and later modes in which it has been regarded. The analogy which I think pressed most upon the minds of those who first formulated the conception was that between the changes of an individual mind in its growth and the history of human culture as exemplified in arts and sciences and in constitutions. When the first Greek thinkers considered the broad difference between nature and culture, as exemplified in the contrast between barbarian and Greek, between the less and more advanced specimens of the Hellenic stock, between their past and present states in arts science and civic life, they explained it by appealing to the analogous differences in the natural growth of the individual mind, from its first crude embryonic condition of vague sense-perception and instinct up to reason and reflective moral conduct. The analogy

is harmless enough, but these thinkers imported into it an element which has been veritably a *damnosa hereditas* for their successors. The growth of the individual they regarded as the realisation in the concrete of the idea, of the eternal exemplar or type; and consequently they were naturally led to interpret social growth or development as in like manner the unfolding in time of an eternal pre-determined plan. Strange and far away from us now are the surrounding thoughts in which this conception of human history as the realisation of an idea, the unfolding of a plan, was first placed; but the conception itself is deeply implanted in our minds, it affects at every point our thoughts about sociological questions, and it colours the whole terminology we employ for discussion of them. A very Proteus, it presents itself in infinitely varied and bafflingly indeterminate forms: now as the Platonic conception of a world of ideal perfection, now as the medieval thought of the decrees of God, now as the eighteenth century personified nature, now as the eternal not ourselves that works for righteousness, now as the Hegelian absolute or the modern naturalist's cosmic order.

Every one will allow that a notion which has the power of incorporating itself with so many thoughts of profound human interest is not to be lightly dealt with; and indeed, were it not in so many ways operative in sociology, one would be glad to leave its consideration to the philosopher whose business it is to test and try all such abstractions. But unfortunately the notion, either in itself or in some of its numerous implications, constantly presents itself in the discussion of concrete social questions; and the way in which it is held certainly affects very deeply the different views taken of such questions. For it is quite impossible for any human mind to entertain the thought that the varied scene of human event is the partially seen development of a plan,

and not to fashion for itself some more or less detailed concrete image of *what* the plan is; equally impossible to avoid the conclusion that what constitutes the plan is, or deserves to be, accepted as the end determining conduct, the standard by which to judge the actual fact of social life or any prospective change therein.

Such being the case, it becomes necessary to say, and to say with emphasis, that whatever claims the conception of human history as the unfolding of a plan may have, it is an intruder, and a uselessly disturbing intruder, in sociological inquiries. No one is denied the liberty of adding to what he has gathered from experience and reflexion of the actual conditions of social life, and of the real causes by which social events are brought about, the further consideration that in these conditions and causes he sees the mechanism by which a plan is being evolved. Nay more, he may, if he pleases, add to the desire he entertains for producing or seeing produced an alteration in the actual, the additional interpretation that he is thus 'co-operating with the scheme of things,' is assisting to carry out the plan preordained. But he is bound to remember that the plan, if plan there be, is only known through experience and reflexion on the actual; that whatever ideal he forms is based upon the actual, is the ideal of a relatively better than the present, not of the absolutely best; and that his desire for the better is the cause of any change he may seek to bring about in the temporal order of social events: the inclusion of such change in the eternal scheme or plan is not the cause. It is of the utmost importance to expel from the region of sociological inquiry the notion of the 'absolute best,' a notion which is worthless when it remains in its abstract generality and dangerous when expressed in concrete special forms. I design to quarrel, on the one hand, with those modern exponents of primitive Christianity who delineate

their 'absolute best' in the form of a list of virtues or excellences of character, without regard to the medium of social life within which such virtues can be nurtured and attain strength, and, on the other hand, with those hasty socialists who dash off a new structure of society without the slightest regard to historic conditions or the essential correlation between character and circumstance.

The notions just commented on may serve to show how impossible it is that philosophy, which deals with ultimate questions and always with the human reference, should be without influence on our thinking about social problems. Philosophy has always endeavoured to reduce the whole of our experience to systematic intelligible order, so that it may be possible to understand human life in all its conditions. It is the treatment of experience by thought, and in the interests of thought, with a view to making the position and relations of the thinking mind intelligible. The ideas in which it sums up its efforts are therefore always ultimate, general, systematic, and conditioned by their central reference to man and his destinies. Nor are there any other features by which to characterise the philosophic method as distinguished from the scientific or artistic. But if so, then it must be observed that philosophic ideas, like our whole thinking, depend upon the experience they are employed to interpret, reflect the fulness or poverty of that experience, and undergo change in accordance with the gradual increase of our mastery over experience. Just as scientific ideas, while on the one hand they guide research into nature, are on the other hand modified by the opening up of new aspects of nature and the accumulation of new knowledge, so philosophical reflexion on social questions, while it sums up from time to time our acquired knowledge of social facts, is in its turn dependent on the

new forms of social life which are opened up or on the increased clearness of insight obtained into the character and conditions of what already exists.

The social problem in its widest extent is the explanation of the actual forces in human nature and the conditions of the surroundings under which a society grows up, is held together, and changes, and under which the members of that society are enabled to lead a common or conjoint life, to share in certain rights, to discharge certain obligations, and to enjoy in various proportion the fruits of human activity and culture. Doubtless the term 'the social problem' is often interpreted in a more limited sense, is taken to mean the inquiry into the possibility of altering conditions of social life under which a result our reflexion disapproves seems to come about. But any treatment of the narrower question is fruitless except when based upon the discussion of the larger. Zeal without knowledge is proverbially dangerous, and never more so than when exercised upon the excessively complicated facts of the social life. Though in reflecting upon the character of social events we inevitably occupy for the moment a position as it were external to them, yet in reality the feelings with which we view these events, the standard by which we criticise them, are themselves social facts, belonging to the main current, and forming, indeed, no inconsiderable element therein. If, then, in bringing together two such large generalities as Philosophy and the Social Problem, I have seemed to take the view that philosophy has somehow an independent contribution to make towards the solution of the problem, that philosophy is what Socrates used to complain his interlocutors took him to be, a bag of arguments from which one might be drawn appropriate to any given question, I desire to remove that impression. Philosophy can do no more than think out as completely as may be the experience of social life which we

possess, and it has perhaps gained more from the consideration of the concrete facts of social life than it has contributed to their elucidation. Largely through the increasing pressure of the social problem, philosophy has been driven to abandon certain lonely heights on which it was too prone to dwell and to give a much needed concreteness to its very abstract notions. Its special function in relation to the social problem is but that which it discharges in respect to any part of experience, to insist on keeping together and in their natural connexions all the elements or conditions entering into the facts, and on viewing these in relation to the interests of human thinking.

It is true that the conditions here referred to are so numerous, so complex are social facts, that the philosophic treatment of them must always remain very general, very remote from immediate practice, and that, therefore, what philosophy can offer in regard to social problems is more of the nature of a corrective to misleading and incomplete ideas than of the nature of guidance for action. It can hardly be denied, however, that a clear insight into the intricacy of the questions involved, even if it be gained from a very general analysis of them, is an aid to such thinking as ought to precede action.

Now, there are two features of social phenomena, constituting in large part their complexity, which seem to me to exercise an often unsuspected influence, and therefore to deserve particular attention. In the first place, social facts exhibit a very intimate combination of two distinguishable sets of conditions, the natural and the artificial, as they may be called; and, in the second place, social phenomena are only to be understood when viewed as parts of a continuously changing stream: they are essentially mobile, historical.

Certainly, as regards the first of these features, I must admit that it is not easy to draw a sharp line of severance

between the 'natural' and the 'artificial,' and must add that the line will be drawn at a different place in different stages of social progress. I think there falls to be included under the 'natural' not only what depends directly on external physical nature, but also all that enters into the acquired habits and customary ways of action, the 'second nature' of the human being. By the 'artificial' is meant all that is explicable only by reference to the determinate, purposeful action of individuals singly or conjointly, as, for example, all forms of legislation on whatever topic. I suppose we should be entitled to say that, historically, the second of these, the artificial, grows out of the first; at all events, it is quite clear that the definite character of the second is always determined by the first, and this is indeed the element of truth in the view before referred to, which interprets social development as organic growth. More difficulty will perhaps be felt in the proposition, which I think true, that with every advance in social evolution the share taken by the second factor, the direct interference with conditions of social life, becomes larger and more significant.

Of course social facts exhibit the combination of these elements in very varied proportions; and the difference in this respect entails important differences in the character of the result, and, on the whole, determines the ease or difficulty of finding a general explanation of them. As, for example, to take an instance from the sphere of economics, the social facts indicated by the terms Rent of Land and Method of Taxation stand almost at extremities of the scale of difference. But whatever the difference, it is imperative to recognise the truth that the character and interconnexion of social phenomena are largely dependent on the deliberate purposive interference of the society, by one instrument or another, with the so-called natural conditions of its life. I have no wish to quarrel needlessly with the political econ-

omists ; but it seems to me that in the interests of scientific method they have unduly thrown out of account this factor, and have ignored the real and indissoluble connexion between the economic structure of a society and that system of laws, positive or customary, under which possession and enjoyment of property, of civic and municipal rights, belong to the members of the society. They have tended, therefore, to regard the 'artificial' factor as an extraneous incident to be reckoned with quite independently.

The second feature of social facts to which I drew attention may be called briefly their 'historical' character ; they are events in a process ; not to be understood, therefore, without regard to what has preceded, and not to be regarded as final. I will not labour this matter further ; it has become a commonplace to insist on the necessity for applying to social phenomena the historical method ; and it is perhaps equally a commonplace, or the conclusion one has to draw, that it is not possible to point to any one form of social structure which is absolutely indispensable to the welfare of society : that, for example, as there have been economic arrangements very different from the present, so there may be changes of equal magnitude, provided that the ideas and feelings of the society have undergone a corresponding modification and find satisfaction in the new structure. All this has become familiar.

But I desire to note that the changing character of social facts holds good with respect both to the natural and to the artificial. The thoughts and feelings about social facts, the aspirations of humanity as they are sometimes called, as they are continuously affected by and moulded on the changing reality, undergo modification in their very aspect as leading to new change in the stream of social progress. I note this because it appears to me that

a remarkable oversight or underestimate of it is to be detected in the most important general conceptions of social progress which have dominated sociological speculation in the eighteenth and in the nineteenth century.

In this sphere, as perhaps generally, the thinking of the eighteenth century has received, by reason no doubt of its apparently negative character, much harsher criticism than it deserves. There is no negative that is only negation; the eighteenth-century thinkers had a sufficiently positive background for their numerous negations; and they did yeomen's service in insisting upon clearness of ideas. At the same time, it is to be admitted that the eighteenth-century thinkers, in their idea of social progress, misconceived somewhat the relation of the two elements they distinguished. Nature and culture they so contrasted on the one side that, when it became necessary on the other to exhibit their union and interdependence in the actual life of humanity, the ideas they had to apply were of an imperfect and mechanical kind. It was an age rich enough in historians—with at least one representative of the historical method—and yet fairly enough to be held as wanting in genuine historical imagination. The 'natural man,' like the 'social contract,' is the figment of an essentially unhistorical way of looking at the past. It was a consequence of the contrast, that emphasis should have been laid almost exclusively on the need for removing inequalities. Inequalities, according to Condorcet's striking examination of them, were found (*a*) among nations, (*b*) among individuals in (1) wealth (2) social status (3) instruction, and (*c*) in the application of knowledge to human conditions. Were all such inequalities removed, then it was thought there must follow from the free expansion of human nature the steadily perfecting system of social relations. But, from the way in which nature and civilisation had been pitted against one another, it was inevitable that the new

more humane culture should appear as something to be mechanically induced upon the fundamental unit, man; and thus to secure consistency of thought the new order came to be conceived of as the re-establishment of that natural system prescribed by and conformable to the constitution of the same elementary unit. Man was taken too readily as a given quantity, whose nature had just to be known, and there forthwith would appear the system of social relations involved in it, and insight would be gained into the measures required to establish them as fact. Thus, by a somewhat curious turn of thinking, the eighteenth-century sociologists tended to lay exclusive stress on knowledge, on ideas, as the condition of social progress, and on direct legislative action as the method of effecting it. They were great at the construction of constitutions, even while stoutly maintaining that the constitution framed was but the natural inherent expression of man, and only required freedom from restraint in order to come into existence.

If the eighteenth-century thinkers tended to give too exclusive a place to reason as the guide to progress, and to legislative action as the instrument, there has been an equally marked tendency in much sociological thinking of the nineteenth century to underestimate the function of reason and to minimise the scope of legislative action. Those who have utilised most freely the conceptions of biology have been led into an almost hopeless conflict of ideas by dwelling on the contrast between the 'natural' or cosmic order and the ethical order. For it seems to be implied in such a contrast that, while the cosmic order, including in it the conditions of animal life, the struggle for existence, can be matter of generalised knowledge, can be rationalised, the ethical order, involving excellences of character wholly opposed to the qualities required for the cosmic struggle, can

only be regarded as the product of some irrational feeling. From this point of view there ought to follow complete distrust of legislative action as an instrument of social progress; I will not say that the conclusion has always been drawn with express reference to the premisses on which it rests.

The contrast on which the whole rests is entirely unsatisfactory, and leads us altogether away from concrete facts into the region of abstractions. There is no ground whatever for supposing that there is an antithesis between the qualities useful in the struggle for existence and the virtues which find their scope in the moral order. Is courage, for example, exclusively the property of the animal or savage? Is it not the case that such qualities form the natural basis on which the moralising influences of social progress operate, so that they undergo an essential transformation and appear as the active principles in a life based on and inextricably connected with the natural, different from it, but not to be represented as an independent entity? Is there any abstract faculty of 'reason' which we may pit against an equally abstract 'feeling'? Or does not reason mean always a highly concrete group of ideas united in a special form, and varying with the whole character, surroundings, and stage of development of the rational being,—influenced therefore by feeling and influencing feeling, based upon natural instincts, but transcending them and able now to control and direct them?

A complete account of social phenomena, that is to say, a philosophy of the social problem, must, then, involve two somewhat distinct inquiries. The one is mainly matter of fact or scientific,—the actual knowledge obtained from reason and experience of the conditions under which a given social structure has come into existence and is maintained in existence. The other is mainly ethical or speculative,—a

treatment of the grounds for the criticism we pass upon the whole or any part of that structure as satisfying or failing to satisfy the conceptions we form of what is in the interests of social life. I do not think it possible to avoid recognition of the equal necessity of these two inquiries; the difficulties which attach to both suffice to convince us that a complete sociology is at present far beyond our reach. But exclusive insistence on either constitutes the gravest obstruction to the advance of sound sociological thinking. To deal, as political economy has too often done, with the actual facts of the economic structure without reference to the ultimate question as to how far such arrangements are in harmony with our ideas and feelings respecting the advance of human life, is to mistake abstractions for realities. It is an equal mistake to indulge in fancy pictures of an ideal state of human perfection without consideration of the actual constituents of human life and the necessary correlation between character and circumstance.

It would obviously be impossible to present in the brief compass of an address even the most abridged statement of the general conditions of a social life; equally impossible to do justice to the complicated ethical question which runs alongside of all our thoughts about society. But, without dogmatising about the ultimate ground of the distinction between good and bad, I think one might fairly assume—it has been the purport of all the preceding remarks to justify the assumption—that if it be possible at all to distinguish in the changing events of social life a better from a good, then, even if we cannot frame a detailed picture of the absolute best, and for a developing creature that seems impossible, we are yet able and entitled to criticise the existing arrangements of society from the point of view of a better that seems attainable; and our knowledge of the real conditions of change in the social life will enable us to

judge to some extent by what method such better state may be attained. To the extreme theorist, I know, such a view will appear meagre, timid, unsatisfactory. He will call it opportunism, a name I should not object to, for after all it only means in the sphere of the practical that we take enlightened experience as our guide, not any *a priori* scheme of things.

Of all such *a priori* schemes I entertain profound distrust. They assume a knowledge of human nature which I do not think any one possesses, and, generally, in what they assert about human nature, I think they are wrong. If I look, for example, to Tolstoi's ideal of human life, I find it to consist in the possession by human beings of all the Christian virtues, with entire removal of all that civilisation has succeeded in rearing upon the merely natural basis of human life. I doubt whether the virtues could flourish in such impoverished soil; I altogether refuse to admit that humanity has ever seriously desired the state of angelic barbarism. If I look to any one of the socialist schemes which is sufficiently definite to have even its outlines discerned, I find postulated a transformation of human character which I think very little probable, and not certain to be produced by the economic change suggested. I doubt whether the history of the past supplies evidence to convince one that in such a scheme humanity does find its fullest aspirations realised. Both ideals seem to me vague and illusory.

It is a long and treacherous path that lies between theory and practice; and I am painfully conscious how little one may dare to offer practical suggestions from the theoretical point of view. Yet the social problem presents aspects so closely connected with the general tenor of the theoretical view I have been expressing, that I am tempted to remark on one or two of them.

It is desirable for that purpose to express, in somewhat sharper terms than I have yet ventured to do, the general character of the idea with which, as the result of reflexion on what has worked best in the past history of society, what has contributed most potently to its development, we may approach the question of changes to be effected. Our aim, it appears to me, may be defined as the establishment of such a state of social relations that each shall have full opportunity for development, for the kind of life that gives the amplest scope to his capacities and powers, and that each shall have the fullest opportunity possible for enjoying that improvement in social conditions which is our heritage from the past.

Now, undoubtedly, the existing social structure in any state is far from corresponding even to such a humble aim. The earlier, less enlightened, types of civilisation have all of them left their traces on human character and on human institutions. The strong sense of the indebtedness of the individual to society, and admission therefore of the obligation to accept such rules as may be deemed best for the common weal, are products of modern civilisation; and it is the clearness of perception of these ideas, the strength of feeling accompanying them, not any deterioration in the condition of some classes of the community, that have given such prominence in modern times to social questions. But it would be a great error to suppose that the solution of such questions is to be had by a violent transformation of the social structure. The true solution is the utilising of the means possessed by the community in such a way as to secure, on the one hand, that the obligations which each bears to the whole—obligations generally measured by the advantage his position yields him—shall be recognised and discharged; and that, on the other hand, the resources of the community shall be employed so as to render possible for all the kind of life we accept as desirable.

Let me take rapidly one or two examples of what I mean. Inequality has long been recognised as the condition at the root of many of the most acute social questions. It is perfectly certain that no known mechanism can remove inequality, just as certain that it is not desirable to attempt to remove all inequalities. Inequalities of natural ability, acquired skill, social status, are irremovable. Inequalities of position or of advantage are equally irremovable. But it does not follow because these are irremovable that therefore we should, without modification, accept the results now following from them. I see no reason whatsoever why the benefits which are thus derived from working in the favourable medium of the community should not be made to bear their proportionate share in supplying the means for any well devised scheme of social amelioration. In principle, a graduated tax on the returns to industry (or on incomes generally) seems to me thoroughly defensible.

Health and education are equally necessary conditions for a vigorous, prosperous, and moral community. We have already accepted, with some limitations, the principle that under existing circumstances it is necessary that education, which might not attract by its inherent advantages, shall be, for the elementary stages, the concern of the community, and shall be compulsory. Not only should I desire to go further on that line, but I feel strongly that the same principle should be applied in the case of our hospitals. I do not think that these should be dependent on the contingency of private charity. It is, in the long run, for the common welfare that the conditions of health, so far as these can be secured by the maintenance of hospitals, should be satisfied, and I do not think there are insuperable difficulties in the way of carrying out such a principle.

VI.

THE BASIS OF MORALITY.¹

THE basis or principle of morality is certainly no new problem. It has been a theme of discussion since reflexion first turned upon the facts of experience in the hope and with the intention of reducing them to some kind of intelligible system. Such reflexion, the source of science and of philosophy, is obviously, as its very name implies, no primitive direct exercise of thought. There is always presupposed in it a certain material, such detailed knowledge of facts as has been acquired, and a certain formal element, those uniting ideas in which thought has found satisfaction for its attempt at explanation. The two factors which we thus distinguish are not independent of one another. With every increase in the one, nay, even with the change in our views of the one consequent on the explanations we attempt of it, there is given the possibility of an alteration in the other; and so intimately do the two work into one another that after a certain time it becomes an almost hopeless task to disentangle the facts from our theories about them, or to secure that our theories are, so to speak, disinterested, that is, are not infected by certain concrete prejudices of our own. The degree to which any portion of our reflexion attains such disinterestedness is perhaps measurable roughly

¹ [Read to the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 28th January 1900.]

by the distance of the facts involved from our practical interests, that is, by the extent to which, in treating them, abstraction can be made of the very complex factor, human life and thinking. Mathematics, for example, is and has long been free from such intrusion. Its facts can be defined; its explanations spring directly from the nature of these facts, and can be seen to express no more than the unities which bind them together. On the other hand, a theory of morality is most of all exposed to the confusion that arises from real indeterminateness of the facts themselves, and from the foreign character of the explanatory ideas brought to bear upon them. It is of all difficulties the hardest to keep the facts and the hypothetical explanations of morality apart from one another; and yet, without clearness in this respect, no scientific determination of the principle of morality can ever be achieved.

The difficulty referred to is of course that which has always presented itself in efforts at constructive philosophy. Round the vaguely known facts which constitute the material there grows up such a thicket of fanciful interpretations that any clear vision of the actual things becomes impossible. From time to time there comes forward some resolute thinker who, impatient of the obstacles, prepares to attain clear insight by sweeping away every intervening theory and getting straight to the facts. A new method is characteristic of every great advance in philosophical thinking, and the new method requires the dismissal of all prejudices that perturb the view of real fact. Such clearings-out have generally had but little success, so far at least as they have concerned the concrete and complex region of human life. The reforming thinker is too ready to suppose that his zealous cutting down gives him the power of seeing the facts and no more, too ready to forget that he least of all comes to their treatment with no bias of acquired ideas.

The history of such philosophical endeavours is itself a problem which we may seek to explain, and no one can take into consideration even the relatively simplest of its stages, say the development of early Greek speculation, without discovering how largely the general theoretical conceptions which these first thinkers employed are but the abstract expression of concrete pictorial representations drawn from sources altogether foreign to the facts they were applied to explain. It is much more in such concrete pictures, oftentimes so vague that they hardly deserve to be called more than feelings, than in the abstractions based upon them that we find the true inwardness of the philosophical view. The abstractions, indeed, may fatally deceive us, for their attenuated generality may show no points of obvious difference from the corresponding thoughts employed by us, and we may therefore expound a Plato or an Aristotle in such fashion as to give his speculations all the air of a modern view, ignoring the real and profound difference of spirit that makes him a Greek of two thousand years ago. It is not necessary, in order to do justice to the continuity of thought, that one should neglect the element of difference; on the contrary, only by giving full weight to it does the continuity become real.

These general remarks I put forward only by way of a defence *in limine* for the slenderness of such contribution as I feel able to make towards the discussion of so complicated a problem as that of the basis or principle of morality. I am far more deeply convinced of the difficulty of seeing exactly what we want as principle or basis than of any power of throwing light upon it, not to say of reaching a satisfactory answer to it. At the same time, something may be done for the substance of the question by a treatment which concerns rather the form and method of reaching a principle than the principle itself. For I incline to think there is consider-

able confusion in one's mind regarding the relation between morality, taken generally as the sum of accepted customs of right conduct *plus* aspirations after a better state, and the principle on which morality may be rested. It is easy to entertain an erroneous view, and equally easy to fall into discouragements, when the principle or basis assumed seems to lack vital power, to yield no ready solution to the many problems of detail we bring before it.

Perhaps at the present time, if I may indulge in conjectural interpretations of rather vague phenomena, one might think it possible to trace certain evidences of discouragement at the apparently small success in application to moral questions of leading ideas that have approved their worth in other fields of speculation. A certain reactionary tendency in many departments of thought one can hardly fail to recognise in this last quarter of a century. It is doubtless no more than superficial, but among its causes I incline to place the sense of disappointment at the small significance for practical morality of general speculations on its principle and basis. Such disappointment may be in whole or in part unreasonable; it implies a special conception of the relation between morality and its basis, which may be false or inadequate, but which at all events deserves to be scrutinised and estimated. It seems to me, therefore, that the problem I purpose considering, though it covers but a small portion of a wide field, has some practical importance.

One further preliminary remark may be allowed. The term *scientific*, when used in reference to the basis of morality, has only methodical significance. It implies only that the principle or explanatory ground of morality is to be viewed simply and strictly as that which finds expression in the facts of morality, and if discerned, enables them to be grouped into an intelligible whole. One might apply to it Newton's maxim that no hypotheses are to be entertained

which are not deducible from the phenomena. There is not implied in it that explanation of morality is to be sought in the results of any other scientific treatment of other facts, save in so far as indirectly all knowledge of the surroundings of morality, of the conditions determining the course of human conduct, must be of service towards understanding morality itself. Considerable harm has been done by the rash introduction into the treatment of one order of facts of the general notions serviceable in explanation of another. It is tolerably certain that a general notion has meaning only in and through its particular matter, though it is very easy to extend its application unduly. The extension may direct our thinking on sound and fruitful lines, but is just as likely to induce us to rest content with half-understanding. One is rather thankful to note an increasing tendency towards caution in the use of such notions as 'life' and 'organism' when they are taken out of their appropriate department. They are suggestive when taken as analogies, treacherous when conceived as explanations.

It will readily be allowed that an answer to the general question as to the basis or principle of morality is hardly likely to be reached by a direct attack. A certain amount of manœuvring is admissible, even necessary, in order to gain a position from which an approach may be made. There is doubtless risk in such movements, for the case is much the same in thinking as in conduct. The accomplished fact, the step taken, has its inevitable consequences, and if it be ill-judged, the result may be fatal. I purpose asking, in the first instance, what kind of answer one may reasonably expect to get to our question, in the hope that consideration of that side issue may bring us some light on the more subtle problem, What kind of relation is there between the principle or basis and morality itself?

Now, there seem to be two main ways in which such an answer as we may desire has been defined : either by formulation of a supreme law of human action or by statement of an absolute end, an ideal towards which conduct in its moral aspect is directed. It is hard to say which of these, in some one or other of the less perfect enumerations of it, has been the earlier in point of time. In the history of philosophical ethics, the second has received systematic statement both earlier and later than the other ; for end, the final good, is the dominating conception in the first ethical theories, those of the Greek thinkers, and also in the most recent doctrines, whether naturalist or idealist. The first has received its most explicit statement and its strongest defence, in modern times, in the Kantian philosophy, though in cruder fashion it presents itself in all varieties of theological ethics. There are easy links of connexion between the two conceptions ; we may pass readily from one to the other ; but they represent, nevertheless, different ways of looking at the general problem of morality.

Either conception may be regarded as a hypothesis, put forward as explaining or enabling us to understand what is peculiar in morality, and to be tested, therefore, by the ordinary process of thinking, bringing into relation the hypothesis and the facts. In either case, it hardly requires saying, the conception must be understood not as an absolute law which may somewhere or somehow hold good as an absolute end, which is, so to speak, for the universe as a whole, but as forming a part of human conscious experience. The law must be represented or thought by us ; the end must be capable of statement in terms of human experience : otherwise it is impossible to see how, for us at least, either can make intelligible what is certainly matter of experience, namely, morality.

Let it be assumed that this actual representation of ab-

absolute law or absolute end is possible (I shall reserve for the moment the doubt as to the possibility of such representation), then there arises the next question, In what way does the hypothesis work? how does either conception render morality intelligible to us? There are two rather obvious analogies, or metaphorical images they might more appropriately be called, which have always found application in the answers to this question. The one is the image of a logical or even a legal system, the other is that of an organism, a living being and its activities. The one is naturally employed in working out the conception of an absolute law; the other, in the case of a supposed absolute end. In the first case, the relation is conceived as that of general to special; morality presents itself as the specification in definite directions of an all-comprehensive rule of conduct. In the other case, the relation is less easily imaged; the end is related to the special functions as the active living principle which works itself out under varying conditions; concrete morality is therefore represented as the definite ways in which organisation of conduct is brought about by the constant effort to realise the absolute end.

It cannot be said that in either of these images we have what logicians term an 'impossible' notion. But it may very well happen that neither of them is the notion of a possible thing. Hesitation in regard to them, doubt as to whether by either of them the concrete stuff of morality is made intelligible, must inevitably arise if we give to either an interpretation which seems natural, though I am aware that it has been vehemently repudiated. Are we to understand that morality—the accepted modes of common life, our judgments and feelings about them, the institutions in which these judgments and feelings are partially embodied—did in fact come into existence by bringing to bear upon the detail of practice the representation of a universal law? Has the

ethical spirit of humanity worked only as a supreme casuist, debating and settling questions of classification, referring this or that point of practice to its appropriate wording in an all-embracing law? Or, looking to the other conception, the more fluid and more subtle, can we regard the slow changes of moral practice as just marking the imperfect struggles of the human mind to bring its conduct into harmony with an end which must represent the completed state it seeks to attain? I conceive that the answer must be an unhesitating negative, whether we take the process in the more concrete way, as historical formation, or in the more abstract way, of systematic deduction. There is no evidence for, and abundant evidence against, the hypothesis that the transitory codes of human morals have been formed by applying to details of practice the conception of an absolute law. The evidence is all in favour of the view that our notion of a final good has been developed from the changes of actual morality, not inversely, as the hypothesis seems to require. I freely admit the difficulty of drawing inferences from the imperfect and obscure materials for a history of the formation of morality. I admit that when the human mind first began to treat reflectively its code of morality, the explanation that most readily commended itself was the reference to some gods or wise lawgivers, and I allow that such a primitive type of explanation is still the most common in human thinking. But what is so admitted seems only to strengthen the inference made. The moral code was established prior to reflexion on it, and cannot be supposed to have come into existence through the thoughts afterwards used to explain it. Perhaps the same simple facts may serve to disabuse our minds of the ambiguity attaching to the term *absolute* when used in reference to the supposed law. Whatever the contents are, however little they may define for human conduct, the law is regarded as absolute.

In precisely the same way we must conclude that the gradual organisation of human conduct, the crystallising of fluid customs into established methods of action and institutions of life, did not come about in actual fact through the pressure of any represented absolute end. From the systematic point of view there may be urged considerations bearing on the necessary subordination of minor ends to some one supreme purpose, but the notion of end is far too simple practically to require such logical symmetry as a condition of existence; and one cannot doubt that the conception of a supreme end, empty or filled with definite contents, is the later, not the earlier formation. It is a travesty of history to view the relation in any other way.

But, it may be argued, the intention of either theory is misconceived if the connexion it asserts between principle and details be regarded as a statement of actual historical causation; the true relation is of the kind we may call logical: it is a relation of dependence. If so, the dependence must be either that of particulars on a universal or of subordinated ends, that is means, on a final end. Neither seems to find justification in the case with which we are dealing. Whether we represent the absolute law with some kind of definite content, as in theological ethics, or more wisely, with Kant, insist that an absolute law must from its nature be formal only, we shall find, with other difficulties, the impossibility of deriving from it the detailed particulars of morality. I doubt if we could deduce anything at all from it; I have not the smallest doubt that we cannot deduce the actual code of morality anywhere or at any time accepted. The impossibility rests on such obvious grounds, and is, indeed, so generally admitted, that I do not labour the point. But I urge that the admission constitutes a strong ground for hesitating as to the justification for the conception of an absolute law at all. The Kantian doctrine has here, I think,

worked more harm than good. Its critics are ready to point out how barren a purely formal prescript must be; they insist on a more concrete handling of the principle, and they reject the curious supplements which Kant makes in the way of bringing his abstraction into closer relation with facts; but they do not see that by so doing they remove all the grounds for what they desire to retain of the Kantian doctrine.

More success, it may be thought, will attend the attempt to exhibit the facts of morality as the necessary mechanism by which an absolute end is to be attained. The abstract relation with which we work is so easy and familiar that we are apt to be deceived, and to imagine that we have stepped into the region of the concrete and actual while in truth we have never got beyond our abstractions. Our procedure is very much that still to be found exemplified in those wonderful constructions of human fancy, theories of the state or political philosophies. The end is defined in terms absolute enough, and then specification of means follows with logical necessity, while the reader remains in a state of painful bewilderment, not knowing whether the state and state institutions described have ever existed, do now exist, or may be rationally expected to exist. The method is bad enough even when applied to a limited sphere of practice; but what can one say of a thinker who believes himself able to see that the variegated texture of morality, throughout the long course of time, is perfectly intelligible as the system of means by which an end distinct from them is wrought out? Admiration is his meed, but I think it is all one can give him; and his method will only strengthen doubt as to the possibility of forming a representation of any general end except by reflexion on the details which it is assumed to explain. Define the end as we may (and I shall not even insist on the rigorous interpretation of its qualification as absolute), it appears to me that we cannot explain

therefrom the actual concrete fashion of morality, and that the attempt to do so rests upon an inversion of the true relation between principle and detail of moral practice.

In truth, careful scrutiny of such definitions of the final end as have ever been attempted shows that their function in regard to actual conduct is much the same as can be claimed for and allowed to the representation of a supreme absolute law. It is a negative function, indispensable and more or less valuable according as the principle formulated is more or less concrete. The utilitarian conception, for example, is less abstract than the Kantian formal law; but a prudent utilitarian would neither claim that in fact moral practice has organised itself under the recognition of the end he proposes, nor insist that such practice can only be explained as means towards that end. It seems obvious, indeed, that the conception of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, apart from any other difficulties that may beset the concrete representation of it, is in essence relative and derivative. Probably that conception in its positive aspect has never been thought applicable save in reference to a limited sphere of actual fact, from which indeed it has been drawn. Such value as it has, and I think the value great, is again of the negative kind, consisting not in what it enjoins but in the practical criterion it supplies: that no course of action should be approved which sacrifices the interests of one section of the community to another. The most enthusiastic utilitarian has never maintained that the actual code of moral practice at any time conforms to or could be thought deducible from this negative or restrictive rule.

The feature so clearly exhibited in the utilitarian conception, the combination of indeterminate and varying positive contents with definite negative force, suggests inevitably the final consideration regarding these theories of absolute law or absolute

end. If they do not furnish historical explanation of morality, if they do not constitute premisses from which the details of morality may become intelligible as conclusions, have they any claim at all to a place in moral reflexion? I think it, as I said, quite unnecessary to question whether the conception of absolute law or of absolute end is possible as a mere thought, as a complex of features that can be harmonised, though I do not say that doubt of such possibility may not be entertained. I ask, only, whether such conceptions represent what could enter into the content of our experience, whether what they relate to can form part of our thinking about moral facts. I shall make the inquiry with respect only to the conception of an absolute end. The notion of an absolute law, as by admission formal only, need not concern us further. Probably it indicates nothing more than the qualitatively peculiar character involved in any judgment as to morality. Such a judgment always asserts absolutely, without reference to the relation of means to end, —a fact worth considering by those who are inclined to postulate an end in some mystic fashion outside moral practice itself. (In fact, for example, our direct judgment as to the rightfulness of truth in speech and action is far more unhesitating than a reflective judgment turning on the subordination of truthfulness to perfection or any other end we may select.) The tendency of modern ethics to treat its problem from the point of view of end rather than of law has been so pronounced as to make it reasonable to select for special treatment the question, paradoxical it may be thought, whether the notion of an absolute end corresponds to anything that can by any possibility find a place in our real thinking experience.

Notions of an absolute end have been advanced from two distinct sides—from that of naturalism, and from that of

idealism. The exponents of the former type seem hardly to have been aware of the difficulties involved in their view. The utilitarian conception, for example, has often been stated as if the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' were veritably a representation with positive and well-defined components; but this, as we have seen, is a mere mistake. 'Perfect adaptation of human action to its environment,' another mode of expression, is obviously so derivative a notion that it can have surprised no one but its author that it yielded less information regarding concrete detailed practice than was predicted for it. Both are purely formal notions, and may be said, without qualification, to mean something other than they directly name, while what they directly name constitutes no definite content of our experience.

Of the idealist conception, what shall I say? I have a friendly and companionable feeling towards it. With much in the way of its construction I have no quarrel, though I must add that oftentimes in the expression given to it I seem to detect the accents of an alien and even an unintelligible tongue. That "morality is possible at all only if the world is the expression of the divine mind" is a cryptic saying that leaves me gasping in a vain attempt to put its parts together. There seems to me neither historical nor philosophical justification for it. The workings of the principle of infinite self-consciousness in the texture of the world's morality suggests to me only the uneasy memory of that 'finger of providence' which the theologian and the theologically minded historian so readily detect. 'Self-realisation' has always impressed me as a conundrum rather than as its solution. But it is with entire satisfaction that I hail the generally admitted doctrine to which Green has given the most pointed expression, that the ideal, the representation of an absolute end, 'cannot be translated into any definite conceptions, except

such as are derived from existing usage and law'; and I do not believe I put any unjust strain upon the admission when I draw from it the conclusion that it is not from any representation of an ideal supreme end in human consciousness that we can make intelligible the concrete fact, morality. It is quite a different proposition to maintain that only for a consciousness that is capable of forming ideals is morality possible. This is merely to say, what every one would allow, that morality is possible only for a thinking, self-conscious being—a position doubtless important and rich in consequences, but never capable of supporting an inference to something which is, from its assumed nature, not a content of consciousness at all.

Philosophy has sometimes been blamed for its habitual method of proceeding by negative criticism, and it must be allowed that the business of a philosopher has seemed too often that of rending his predecessors. Yet a general defence might fairly be rested on the ground that such is the method of thought, which always advances by distinctions and limitations, and that such is the process of all organic growth and development. A negation never merely expunges. It defines, and at least points the way towards a positive. The negations, then, in which I have been freely indulging, may enable a more rapid advance than would otherwise have been possible towards some positive though general interpretation of the principle of morality.

There are two salient features of morality, as here concerned, which are, so to speak, light-giving—the one, the peculiar characteristic indicated by the term obligation; the other, the constant variation of its contents. To the moral customs and institutions at any moment accepted the individual stands in the special relation that he regards his personal determination and activity as bound by a rule. It cannot be doubted

that the total body of morality varies from age to age, from community to community, from individual to individual, even from one stage to another of the individual's development.

On the feature called obligation, I remark, in the first place, that the relation involved in it is of a very general character. I stand individually in much the same relation towards all that is, or is taken to be, objective. Perhaps it might seem to strain the analogy were I to say that I assent, but with reluctance and as constrained, to the proposition that two and two makes four; but I should have less hesitation if my assent were extorted to a conclusion which is shown to be necessitated by admissions I have made. Historically, too, it appears certain that even the peculiar feeling of moral obligation connected itself, and does indeed still connect itself, with much that lies outside the definite sphere of moral action. It deserves consideration also, that, in theoretical explanations of morality, such as those of the earlier Greek thinkers, resting on a highly developed structure of social life, the feature so prominent in modern ethics is almost conspicuous by its absence. I conclude, then, that the feature of obligatoriness does not find explanation, as Kant seems to have thought, in the formal relation between a will and a rule, but that its special colouring, what constitutes its differentia as moral, depends on and arises from the concrete character of the elements related. It would be a complete mistake to suppose that by thus interpreting the origin of the feeling and allied judgment of obligation we deprive it of its rightful place in the moral life. A feeling which arises from or expresses a complex situation or attitude of mind does not lose its concrete character or its efficiency because we are able to enumerate the components of that complex state and show how they have come together. The mental life is at any moment a living whole, not an aggregate of independent units.

In the second place, I remark that there is a distinct advantage for the general treatment of morality in assigning to the factor, obligation, a secondary, and, so to speak, derivative position. To treat morality from the point of view of obligation inevitably tends to accentuate the implication of external law which lurks in the conception of duty, and to give to virtue the character of resigned submission, of sacrifice, which is its least valuable aspect. On the other hand, to emphasise the fact that the determining element is the concrete end which morality has to realise, gives its due place to the all-important consideration that in morality we have the expression of what the human mind most earnestly and strenuously is desirous of seeing established as the organisation of life. I will add that I regard as the most important contribution made by that fair-minded thinker, T. H. Green, to the science of ethics, his recognition of the fact that in the order of development of morality, the specifically moral element, that in which *moral* obligation is involved, presupposes and rests upon an organisation of conduct in which the distinctions of natural good and evil are already involved. I do not accept his peculiar interpretation of the moral element (I think he drew inferences from it that were not justifiable), but his general statement as to the relation between natural and moral good seems to me true and of fundamental significance. Green seems inclined to regard the difference as of kind, and therefore as calling for some non-natural or extra-natural explanation; but this is quite unnecessary, and even makes the process unintelligible. The import and inner character of a mental fact, above all the part it plays in the practical life, are not at all dependent on theories as to its origin. In the same way, I may remark, it need not be doubted that the element of moral obligation, the complex of feeling with the judgment of approval or disapproval, is intimately related to self-consciousness; but self-

consciousness is not a form, nor an unchanging factor. It also depends on and varies with the concrete in human experience, and it is wholly impossible to explain the moral element by referring it to the abstract nature of self-consciousness. Perhaps it is only in this way that we can fully understand what I may call, borrowing a word from Herbart, the 'wanderings' of the notion of obligation. For it has attached itself, and does attach itself, to much that cannot justify itself when brought to the test of reason.

Only the changing requires explanation ; only the changing gives the clue that is necessary to render explanation possible. It is only from reflective treatment of the actual development of morality that we can gain precision and definiteness for our ethical notions, or can determine the ways in which any moral institution affects character and conduct. Doubtless the image we employ to describe such change—development—will always tend to an interpretation that is doubly misleading: to the view that the change is comprehensible only as the working out of a final end and absolute best, and that the representation of this end has been the motive force producing the change. We have already seen that we cannot employ the conception of an absolute end. We are not in possession of any representation of completed morality, nor is it easy to avoid the conclusion that any such representation is self-contradictory. But it does not, therefore, follow that we are without the means of distinguishing degrees of excellence, of recognising a better. Still less that we must exclude from the motive forces of moral progress the power of forming ideals that carry us beyond what has actually been achieved.

The formation of ideals is by no means special to the moral consciousness. Rather, one would say, it is the common characteristic of all exercise of reason, theoretical or practical ;

and doubtless, if one sought to determine its psychology, one would have to turn to those elementary experiences which enable the content of a thought or perception to be severed from the temporary conditions of its actual occurrence,—experiences which truly constitute a human mind as compared with the animal. We can think only in and by the formation of ideals; but on the practical side, perhaps more directly than elsewhere, we become aware of the weakness and uselessness of ideals that are not filled from the concrete wealth of actual life. All our ethical notions, the conceptions we form of special duties or excellences of character, have necessarily a certain ideality: they are isolated from the circumstances of current experience. But we can give them definiteness, and so understand their worth, only by following out the functions they severally represent in the whole complex texture of actual life. Such a realisation of them is hardly to be based on individual reflexion. It is not by psychological analysis that we can weigh and measure their significance. Two ways only are possible: the one, that of ideal concretion, as I may call it, the method of the imaginative creative writer, who brings into relief a moral problem or a moral duty by displaying its working in a fictitious setting; the other, less attractive it may be, the method of historical and sociological research, in the absence of which our moral conceptions are not only ideal, but mere abstractions. Preference for one of these methods is matter of individual temperament. For myself, if I wished to understand the moral condition of a people at a given time, I think I should trust rather to the statute-book, and such pictures as I could obtain of the day-to-day life of the ordinary man, than to the more subtle evidence of creative literature. Yet no one would urge the exclusive value of the more realistic method, for it may well be said that the existence of minds

which do adopt the idealising form of expression is itself a fact of no small interest to the sociologist.

As against the view which I am rather hinting at than working out in a way adequate to the problem, it would doubtless be urged that, after all, morality is not and cannot be merely the residuum from the past; that we cannot accept, and do not accept, the decisions of the past except on grounds of reason. True, but not to the point. The past is never merely received, passively taken in. We who receive it are constituted as our predecessors were, and actively remould what is passed on to us. Not the most impersonal of the heritages of the past, not language itself, is merely taken in. And reason, which we drag into the argument, is not other than historical: that is to say, the term 'reason' indicates no abstract power or process remaining always the same, but a living function which grows and develops in and by the material provided for it.

A theory of morality, however constructed, must always give occasion to a certain feeling of despondency; not because human practice falls so often short of its own ideals, but because of the insuperable difficulty we experience in determining the real laws of interdependence among the facts of conduct. A single action, a general rule of conduct, a permanent institution of the moral life,—what moral philosopher will assume that he knows completely how in each case they have affected the agents directly or indirectly concerned, how far the consequences are such as further or impede what he has gathered from experience and reflexion as constituting progress in morality? It is in this field that there lie the true problems of ethics, problems only to be solved by methods which, when we think over them, almost bring us back to an old position of Greek speculation, that evil is ignorance, and that the secret of all excellence of practice and of character is knowledge.

Morality, then, as I conceive it, is a product or a manifestation of human nature, exhibiting in its history, like every other such product or manifestation, traces of the constant interaction between individual minds and the forms in which it may have been embodied. There is no method of explaining it save that which is applicable in all similar cases: knowledge of its history and of the structure which represents its stationary condition at any moment. We cannot explain it from without. Just as little can we work out a theory of it from above downwards. Our constructive explanations must advance from below upwards.

VII.

THE REGENERATION OF GERMANY.¹

I.

THE disasters of the year 1806 made the leading statesmen of Prussia, however they might differ in other respects, agree that comprehensive reforms in the State were necessary.

¹ [The following pages contain the second and third of a series of three lectures delivered to popular audiences at the Owens College, Manchester, in the Lent Term of 1891. The series had been preceded by one, given by a colleague, on the decline of Prussia after Frederick the Great; and Professor Adamson's first lecture, which is not printed here, began with a summary account, connecting the two series, of the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, and of the collapse, in the terrible year 1806, of the Prussian military power. The lecturer proceeded to point out how "the two events, though closely enough connected—for the determining conditions of both were woven together in the same web of circumstance—may yet be regarded separately, for they exercised no direct influence on one another. Each, moreover, may well be contemplated from a twofold point of view. Each has an external aspect and history and an internal. The external, as in all other cases, is

the more directly perceptible; it presents to the imagination a picture more easily grasped and apparently more complete in itself, and it tends to keep in the background its less obtrusive, less demonstrative counterpart. Yet, without desiring to rob the pomp and circumstance of outward political history of its immense significance, for it is in outer act that the character of man is exhibited, one would insist that only in the slower, more secret movements of the life of a people is its history to be truly read. A State as it exists at any moment may be a noble product of human effort, potent for good in innumerable ways, but never is it to be regarded as final, as an end in itself, as other than a way in which the general spirit of humanity has expressed itself under particular conditions. And the changes of a State or system of States seem to me to have significance only when regarded in relation to the movements of human thinking and feeling from

The dramatic interest of the events that had forced on them this conviction is reflected in their plans, which were conceived and received in an enthusiastic spirit that perhaps hardly corresponded to any widespread change in the general habit of thought. At the same time, it was quite inevitable that many distinct trains of thought, many distinct purposes and aspirations, should come together in the most varied proportions and impress their shifting character on the schemes projected. Hence there is a certain difficulty, a certain risk of misrepresentation, in any over-definite statement of these inchoate plans, just as there is such in any description of a historic event, which must perforce isolate it from its natural surroundings and give a fictitious stability to what is in itself but a momentary appearance in the ever-changing.

In order, then, to arrive at a tolerably fair idea of these reforms in the public life of Germany, such as will enable us to judge their character and relative importance, it is necessary to follow them for a brief space from the first airy stage of conceived idea through the conflict with surrounding realities, into which they were inevitably thrown, down to the relatively final appearance of institution. Only so can we determine the measure of vital energy which each possessed, the contribution which each succeeded in making to the total end contemplated. For it is in the life of a State as in the life of the individual. Many a one steps forth from the abstract period of youth, confronting the future with long thoughts and high ideals, looking forward with joyous confidence to rich and fruitful realisation, and learns soon, consciously or unconsciously,

which they spring and to which in turn they communicate impulse and direction."

The remainder of the lecture was devoted to sketching the great re-

forms in the Prussian State achieved after what had seemed its catastrophe, the defects which they were designed to remedy, and the purposes which they were intended to fulfil.]

the bitter lesson of experience. The details of practice, each in itself apparently the weakest of ties, have a combined force sufficient to bind the strongest will. Rigorous counsels of perfection yield little by little under the constant pressure of the innumerable complaisances which common life seems to render necessary. The high purpose of youth becomes the conventional morality of middle age, with which one sleepily rests content, or which, alas, may be accompanied by memories that are a ceaseless source of pain rather than of satisfaction.

The shock of disaster had opened the eyes of Prussia's statesmen to the inner discord in the Prussian State. The collapse of the material power of the older governmental system seemed to demonstrate the need for such a change as should enlist in the active life of the State the best energies of all her members. How this should be achieved floated vaguely enough before the minds of many; in one mind, that of Stein, it took clear, definite, and systematic form. His ultimate aim was to create anew in Germany those invisible links of common political feeling and life through which alone a mere collection of individuals is formed into a State or nation, and which had dimly and imperfectly entered in the past into the old idea of the empire. Thoroughly familiar, by training and experience, with the actual conditions of the German States, and particularly of Prussia, he was able to lay his finger with unerring precision on the circumstances which had prevented the realisation of that idea. It was on this account mainly, only in a secondary way from reference to what may be called international considerations, that he urged the unification of Germany, a conception which, arrived at from a wholly different point of view, was finding eloquent expression in Fichte's patriotic addresses. Small States, with government based on absolute sovereignty, seemed to him a mechanism simply designed to

perpetuate the evils that had been laid bare in the recent history of Germany.

On this ground, too, was based his energetic demand for an alteration in the administrative system of the Prussian Government. Stein was no republican. I do not think it ever entered into his scheme of things to deprive the personal ruler of the large, nay, the overwhelming measure of power which the traditions of the Prussian State accorded to him. He evidently considered that the dangers incident to such a polity, dangers of which he was not oblivious, would be practically obviated if the sovereign were really in a position to rule through a well-organised well-defined ministerial system, itself in constant and vital relations with the people through their general and local representative institutions. Much of the evil in the immediate past he ascribed to the thoroughly vicious method which had slowly crept in, whereby the ruling sovereign was often little more than a puppet whose strings were pulled by a few personal friends or courtiers or cabinet secretaries, and any unity of plan among the ministerial departments was completely destroyed.

Not the less strenuously, however, did he believe that the reform of the administration would effect but little if it were not accompanied by a removal of all that prevented the free exercise of political and civic functions on the part of members of the State and the development of the material resources of the country. The motive power for animating and giving practical effect to the new system in the community itself he, with others, hoped to find in a new form of education which should quicken both the intellectual and the moral and religious life.

The whole scheme, then, aimed at securing the basis for a free constitutional government in Germany, or in Prussia in particular; and the means fall into the two groups: (1)

Measures of political and economical reform; (2) Reform of education in the widest sense.

1. Beyond a doubt, the ultimate and possibly far-distant aim was closely connected, in the minds of Stein and others, with the more immediate and pressing necessity, the liberation of Prussia and Germany from foreign domination. As is well known, the means for the more distant end, necessarily slow in coming into operation, were not the means whereby the liberation of Germany was directly achieved. The spirit which found expression in the one, which permitted some part of it to find realisation, and which left as an imperishable legacy the idea of what remained, was indeed a potent auxiliary in the other. It is with justifiable pride that the historians of Prussia can point to the rapid growth during the years of foreign oppression (1807-1813) of a strenuous spirit of patriotic devotion, to the enthusiasm of self-sacrifice with which the call to action was hailed, and to the brilliancy of achievement in which the nation recovered its position. The course of events depended on that spirit, or was determined by it in but a small degree; and the German Government afterwards all too easily forgot the warmth of enthusiastic feeling in which for a moment kings and peoples had worked in unison, in order to fall back under the sway of traditional policy, and to look with distrust and alarm on the quickening of popular life. Of such a relapse signs had appeared even before the laborious business of settling the deranged affairs of Europe, and of Germany in particular, was gone through at the Congress of Vienna, and the succeeding years furnish an instructive though melancholy commentary on the stubbornness with which existing conditions and prejudice can withstand a new idea. I instance but a few of the many events that stand out as indications of the conflicting forces.

To begin with, Stein did not again become a Prussian official. At the Congress, the smaller German kingdoms retained their sovereign rights. A representative constitution was promised, but against the protests of the King of Bavaria that his rights were indefeasible, and that he would not renounce the exercise of any one of them; while the King of Würtemberg protested against the mention of any rights of subjects. In 1815 Schmalz (brother-in-law of Scharnhorst), who had been the first rector of the University of Berlin, in a pamphlet which called forth many refutations, denounced the revolutionary tendencies and the supposed secret societies of the age. In 1822 Fichte's *Reden* were brought before an inquisitorial commission sitting at Mainz and narrowly escaped condemnation for Jacobinism and republicanism. In 1824, at Berlin, the reprinting of the same work was forbidden.

But the same process of political degeneration was apparent on a larger scale. The disturbances at Jena at the Wartburg festival, when Kotzebue's *German History* was burned by the enthusiastic students, and the murder of Kotzebue at Mannheim (23rd March 1819), were not the causes of the retrograde action, but merely served to mark its development.

From 6th to 31st August of 1819 there sat at Karlsbad a quasi-private conference of Ministers of ten German Governments, whose resolutions, either as approved when handed by it to the Bundestag or as adopted by the individual States, breathed nothing but distrust of the universities, the press, and revolutionary public opinion. The old and well-known mechanism of the censorship, the supervision of the universities, and the Central Commission for investigating disaffection against the Government were revived; while in the Vienna Final Act of 15th May 1820, originating in the same way—from a conference of Ministers and approved by the

Bundestag (June 8, 1820)—a mode was found for evading the seemingly solemn promise of a constitutional government contained in the Act of the Confederation and, among others, in the proclamation of Frederick William III. to Prussia. Article 57 of the Vienna Act asserts that "as the German Confederation, with the exception of the Free Towns, consists of sovereign princes, it follows from the principle here laid down that the entire authority of the Government must reside intact in the Head of the State, and that by a constitution on the principle of estates the sovereign can only be bound to the co-operation of the estates in the exercise of particular defined rights." And indeed only Provincial Estates were called into existence at all; in the general law for their regulation it is said, "When it will be advisable to summon the General Estates, and how they should be developed out of the Provincial Estates, are matters on which we reserve to our paternal care for the interests of the country to decide further."

It is hardly to be wondered at that Stein should have expressed his disgust at politics and resolved to devote the remains of his energy to German history, and that W. von Humboldt, a man of equal liberality of mind, though not of equal strenuousness and vigour of character, should in 1819 have quitted the Prussian service and thrown himself on literature and philology. What was precisely the part played in all this by Hardenberg, who since 1810 had as Chancellor wielded almost dictatorial power in the German State, seems still to be undetermined by historians. That he was on the whole liberal in tendency, one would not doubt; but he was entirely devoid of Stein's firmness of principle, and was, perhaps, incapable of originating a liberal idea for himself, though not incapable of taking it up if offered, and working it faithfully so long as its development in no way endangered his own tenure of power. Clever and

ingenious as a diplomatist, he never shone as an administrator. His first essays at realising his own and Stein's plan of local government were miscalculated and unsuccessful, and it will give his biographers trouble to bring his reputation as one of the reformers of the German State unsullied through the history of his closing years.

Thus it came about that no immediate result followed the efforts from which much had been hoped. The awakened political consciousness of the German people was still left without the external means by which it could maintain itself in health and vigour. It was not with the help of political institutions, the happy heritage of a moment of intense national feeling, that she was to work towards the high place she occupies among European nations. Nor can one think that the political constitution she now possesses calls for unquestioning admiration or adequately represents the high measure of her intellectual and moral advancement.

2. Much more satisfactory is the result when we turn to the second of the two great means which it was then thought would serve to purify and strengthen the national life of Germany. Far more unmistakable is the genealogical connexion between the after state of culture in Germany and the reform then undertaken of her educational system. Perhaps the simple reason for this is at the same time the truest and deepest: the reform of education had relatively less hostile forces to encounter; it started from a relatively better basis than the political.

It is not easy to obtain a fair general idea of the state of education in Germany during the preceding century. The differences among the several States reflected themselves in the diverse arrangements for schools, and I think it advisable to restrict attention to the matter as it presents itself in North Germany. There, so far as elementary and

popular education is concerned, it, beyond all doubt, presented a striking contrast to what it has become. There was at this stage no general or national system of education. Old custom and tradition still left it mainly in the hands of the Churches. Something had indeed been achieved, for the most part by those who shared the views of the significant religious revival about the beginning of the century, of which the varied phenomena are summed up in the term Pietism. August H. Francke at Halle laid the foundations of an elaborate system of elementary schools, orphanages, and burgher schools; and his influence worked powerfully on the development of elementary education in Prussia. Francke's pupil, J. J. Hecker, was the trusted adviser of Frederick William I., and more especially of Frederick the Great, among whose merits not the least is that he devoted energy and insight to the promotion of general and sound education in his State. It was under Hecker's advice that the main educational acts of Frederick the Great's reign were drawn up, and through Hecker that a demand for the training of teachers for their profession began to be made. (The first Seminar was founded under Frederick William I.) In all directions, indeed, Frederick the Great did his best to encourage the work of education. He fostered and regulated, by a liberal and wisely expressed edict, the higher education in the gymnasia; he pressed on the foundation of the real-schulen; and he allowed his like-minded minister, Baron K. A. von Zedlitz, the fullest authority in dealing with the highest institutions of culture, the universities.

Other influences in the latter part of the eighteenth century contributed towards an improvement of educational practice and to the spread of a general belief in the necessity and utility of education at large. Rousseau's appeal to nature as the sole arbitress of method found acceptance with the phil-

anthropists, Basedow and Bahrdt, who, with a grievously thin conception of nature, endeavoured to promote the general welfare.

The gymnasia were gradually in this century developing out of the Latin schools that had been bequeathed by the Reformation. Neither in general arrangements and equipment nor in popularity can they stand comparison with their successors at the present time. For the most part the teachers in these gymnasia were *candidati theologiæ*, or those who had relinquished the hope of attaining some Church position. The Latin schools were conspicuous by their inefficiency. The staple of instruction was the Latin grammar; other subjects were included or excluded according to the predilection of the teacher. Greek was rarely taught; if taught at all, there was merely Greek Testament for not more than two hours weekly. Instruction was given in history, from the Creation to Charlemagne; in geography, the globe and the four quarters. "Nullam esse, si a sacra scriptura descenderis, in historia gentium primæva exploratam veritatem," declared the rector of the Joachimsthal Gymnasium in 1742.

I note, as of special interest, that even in the gymnasia little or no interest was taken in Greek till towards the close of the century. This coincides with the parallel history of classical studies in the universities, for it would not be incorrect to say that the characteristic note of intellectual life in the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany was a revival of classical, particularly Greek, learning, comparable only to that of the earlier Renaissance. There were meritorious classical scholars of the earlier generation: Fabricius (1688-1736), Gesner, Ernesti, Christ, Reiske, Reiz, Schweighäuser, are honourable names in the history of ancient letters in Germany. But it is only in the generation inspired by Winckelmann, Heyne, and, above all, F. A. Wolf, that

one finds the genuine enthusiasm for classical culture which makes of it a real living influence. Wolf, who had entered himself at Gottingen in 1777 as *studiosus philologiæ*, had from 1783 to 1807 been the glory of the old and distinguished University of Halle. His enlarged conception of philology as the complete knowledge of antique life was the first to give consistency and definiteness to classical studies; his unbounded activity had found scope for exercise in the philological seminary (1787), from which the best equipped classical teachers in Germany issued; and his daring as a scholar had been evidenced in the stimulating *Prolegomena to Homer* (1795), with which he began the discussion of the since well-worn Homeric question. Wolf's influence extended beyond the sphere of scholars by profession. It was through him that the cultivated and accomplished W. von Humboldt was brought to unite in his person the two powerful forces of intellectual life, scholarship and philosophy; and through him mainly that there was conveyed to the contemporary literature so strong a colouring of the classical form.

Education had during the eighteenth century been but slowly escaping from the direct control of the Churches, but slowly succeeding in making itself recognised as a matter of national importance. Like all other forms of intellectual life, it had at times to submit to the cramping influence of ignorance and bigotry, whether ecclesiastical or political. Throughout the century are observable various waves of increasing and diminishing pressure, according as intellectual interests were more or less under the control of the narrow-minded, for which the institution of the censorship of the Press throughout provided such ample opportunities. The expulsion of C. W. Wolff from Halle in 1723 was a despotic act, directly due to the hasty misconceptions of Frederick William I.; but it was in all probability only the

king's death which left to his successor the credit of revoking this outrage. Unhappily, before the close of the century in Prussia, the notions of Frederick William II. and the evil influence of Wöllner, which was fully established by 1788, the year of the publication of the notorious Religious Edict, had done as much as was possible to reverse the wise and enlightened policy of Frederick the Great. Rampant religiosity had taken the place of a sincere desire to further, in such measure as seemed adapted to the conditions, the original powers of the individual. The Regulation for schoolmasters in the country and lower town schools lays down that religious teaching is the staple of instruction in the lower schools in town and country: such religious instruction to consist in adequate exercise in Luther's Shorter Catechism, which the children must learn by heart, acquaintance with the main propositions of the theory of belief and morals, and sufficient knowledge of the Bible. Ability to read, *some* dexterity in writing and ciphering, some exercise in the calculations most used in domestic affairs, were subsidiary requirements. More must not be taught. Least of all is it permitted to the teacher to set aside these and to introduce matters of natural history, geography, &c. Wöllner's control was not less adverse to academical freedom in the universities. At Halle, in 1795, there were only 844 students against 1070 in 1785. In 1794, when King Frederick William II. applied a sharp personal stimulus to his Minister's activity, the following declaration was imposed on university teachers: "I undertake in particular, that neither in nor out of my lecture hours, neither in writing nor in speech, neither directly nor indirectly, will I advance anything against the Holy Scripture, or the Christian Religion, or against the rules of the supreme authority in respect to affairs of religion and the Church; rather that in all points I shall regulate my conduct according to the

precepts of the Religious Edict of 1788." Action taken against Kant in this connexion did more than anything else to inflame the general feeling against Wöllner and his administration.

A much more healthy tone was introduced by Frederick William III., who had a genuine interest in the promotion of education, subsidised liberally the struggling universities in his kingdom, and entertained enlightened views regarding the general or national organisation of instruction. By sympathy and experience he was well prepared to look with favour on the attempt by a new and comprehensive reform of education to rekindle the life of Prussia and to strengthen her for her future trial. Stein repeatedly expressed himself in the same spirit in private communications and in public documents. "Most is to be expected," he wrote in 1808, "from the education and instruction of youth. If by a method based on the nature of the mind every power of the soul be unfolded and every crude principle of life be stirred up and nourished, if all one-sided culture be avoided, and if the impulses on which the strength and worth of man rest be carefully attended to, then we may hope to see a race physically and morally more powerful grow up, and a better future dawn upon us."

These thoughts found outward expression in the events of the year 1807. In the winter of that year, while Berlin was still in French hands, Fichte delivered on successive Sundays his Addresses to the German Nation. On the 10th August of the same year a deputation from the ancient and famous university of Halle, recently suppressed by Napoleon, expressed to the king their hope that within the Prussian dominions a place would be found where the intellectual force expelled from Halle might find scope for working towards the great end of reanimating the fallen people.

From this request sprang the conception, which had indeed

already been entertained, of the foundation of a new university in Berlin. It seems to me certain that the lively interest then taken in educational reform would not have sustained itself and yielded so much solid result had it not from well-nigh the outset been connected with the concrete business of this new foundation. Most fortunately for Prussia, too, there was ready to hand, in W. von Humboldt, a statesman possessed of all the qualifications for successfully carrying through a plan which, however enthusiastically conceived and patriotically approved in general, had yet to encounter all the hazards of a particular scheme launched amidst conflicting private interests.

On no thinking mind in Germany had the fall of Prussia produced a deeper impression than it had on Fichte. To him the events that had led to it seemed but the fatal comment of history on what the eye of reason had long discerned as the element of falsehood in modern life. The want of correspondence between the actualities of social existence on the one hand, and on the other the demands of the highest ethics and those admitting of the clearest apprehension, argued, as he thought, the slavish subjection of uncultured natures to the selfish, unsocial, and corrupt impulses of philistine morality. With truly Platonic fervour he delineated the ineradicable difference between a life in the idea, a life animated by the contemplation and love of the divine invisible order of truth, and a life buried in the transitory, shifting, and perishable things of sense, carried hither and thither by the impulses of sense, selfishness, and individual vanity. And the entirely noble, disinterested, and impetuous character of the thinker who expressed such seemingly antiquated distinctions, gave to his exhortations a weight and significance they assuredly would not otherwise have secured. His career and action presented, even in their failures, the liveliest image of the ideas which in abstract

terms he strove to implant in the minds of his hearers. Already he had given ample proof of that single-hearted devotion to the cause of truth in which he placed the fundamental excellence of man. His earliest writings, semi-political in character, and not of a style that secured for them much general attention, had thrown a species of shadow on his name which was often to prove hurtful to him. He was marked out as a Jacobin, a revolutionary, and at every critical period of his career he had had to encounter the dull hostility of those in whose turbid minds such titles in themselves rendered candid judgment impossible. At Jena, where his high character and great abilities had shed lustre on the university and raised it to an unparalleled place among the universities of Germany, he had suffered the extreme consequence of the ill-omened policy which deemed it necessary to defend the cause of religion by fettering the activity of thought. The accusation of atheism, so familiar in the history of philosophers that a philosopher ought surely to reckon on it as a certainty if he dares to think at all, might perhaps with a less strenuous and more politic man than Fichte, have passed without harmful consequence—nay, even without outward damage to his reputation. For outward fame, however, Fichte cared not at all. It was impossible for him to be untrue to himself.

In Berlin, then, where he settled, he had already in various lectures expressed his view on the state of contemporary culture, on its failures and weaknesses, and on the source from which healing might be drawn. The lectures *On the Nature of the Scholar*, *On the Characteristics of the Present Age*, and *On the Way towards a Blessed Life*, express in varied form the general view of life that underlies the *Addresses to the German Nation*.

In these *Addresses*, however, the deepest note is due to the recent events that had thrown all merely speculative

interests into the shade. A people, great in the historic achievements of its past, great by its proved devotion to the cause of religious freedom, great through the wealth of its intellectual culture, had fallen; nor could it be disguised from any one that this fall was no mere chance play of unfortunate contingencies. The causes of Germany's disaster were deep-seated in the history of her past and in the moral life of her present. She had proved herself unfaithful to the tradition of the part she was called upon to play in the great society of nations, and with that unfaithfulness, partly as its effect, partly as its cause, had come the shameful weakness of the individual moral character. To restore her to herself, it was necessary to revive and reanimate the memory of the part which as a nation she had formerly played and which she was manifestly destined to play, and by giving a new and more stimulating direction to the cultivation of individual character, to supply her with the needful energy for working out her high vocation.

Thus it is that the Reden unite, in somewhat unequal proportions, the two themes, a reform of educational method, and an appeal to the principle of German nationality. Let me indicate briefly what Fichte had to say on the latter. As to the former, after defining the ultimate aim of education as consisting of the devotion of the individual to duty, and of the formation of character in accordance with this purpose, he pointed out that such education must be *national* and *uniform*. The method which he had in view to this end was Pestalozzi's, to whose writings he at this time devoted much study.

In making his appeal to the national principle, it was characteristic of the man and of his method that he should have carefully laid out his questions: (1) whether it is true or not that there is a German nation; (2) whether it is worth while or not to preserve the German nation; (3) whether

there are any means of doing so; and that in his answers he should have developed higher conceptions of nationality and of the essence of patriotism than had yet found expression in German or perhaps in any other writers. I will not say that his idea of a nation is very practical, easily exemplified in actual fact; I will not say that the principle which he expressed in abstract terms, and which was then and afterwards to come forward in a remarkable way as a historic force in modern Europe, can bear all the weight that he imposed on it; but it expresses a great truth, and the eloquent enforcement of it contributed in no small measure to animate the flagging spirits of those who were to work under its stimulating influence for the liberation of Prussia.

The project of a university in the metropolis had for some years formed a subject of discussion in Prussia. Long before, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the idea had been started; but not till the beginning of the nineteenth was it again taken up in a more practical fashion. From 1802 onwards, in a desultory fashion, it was contemplated by the Cabinet Minister Beyme, to whose credit, not otherwise excessively high, it may well be put that he constantly took a warm and unselfish interest in it. The closing of the university of Halle in 1807, the most famous of the universities of Prussia, and its re-opening, in 1808, as one of the universities of the new kingdom of Westphalia, gave the stimulus that was needed to call the mere conception into life. Berlin seemed specially marked out as a great seat of learning. It already possessed in the Academy of Sciences the earliest foundation of the kind, dating from 1700 (with Leibniz as its first president), which would, together with the university proper, form an organically complete institution of the higher learning. The idea once started was further advanced by the preparation of general schemes for the constitution of the

new university; and for some time before a definite constitutional form was obtained, a foretaste of the work was given by lectures delivered in Berlin, among others by Fichte and Schleiermacher. I do not purpose saying anything of the complicated tangle of difficult circumstances in which the project found itself involved in its initial stages—monetary, local, professional. It is possible they might not have been overcome at all; it is certain they would not have been overcome so rapidly and satisfactorily as was the case had not the conduct of the affair fallen into the hands of a statesman pre-eminently qualified by his character and experience to bring it to a successful and fruitful issue.

In the spring of the year 1809 W. von Humboldt was placed at the head of the Section of Cultus and Public Instruction; within a few months he had matured and carried out the scheme of the new university, secured a sufficient endowment from the State, adequate buildings, and an unusually complete and brilliant equipment of teachers. The university was formally opened in the Michaelmas term of 1810, some months after Humboldt's retirement from office.

Among the many strong and varied personalities which the pressure of trial brought then to the front in Germany, there is none that gives so marked an impression of completeness and harmony as that of W. von Humboldt. "A statesman of Periclean elevation of mind," he was called by Böckh in an eloquent epitaphial address; and the expression has more justification and pertinency than is usual in such panegyrics. For in him were united, in a measure rarely equalled in modern life, high intellectual capacity and attainments, intense devotion to the things of mind, practical ability, loftiness and purity of personal character. In him, too, is observable the combination of the most powerful intellectual influences that had for some generations been quietly and invisibly moulding the general mind of Ger-

many, and which in no other individual reached such fullness and amplitude of expression,—literature and art, the humanist revival of Greek learning, and philosophy. From these rich sources he drew, and it was into no empty receptacle that they poured their treasures.

His earlier career had amply equipped him for playing a noteworthy part in the arena of public affairs. The first groundwork of intellectual life, a reflex of the better type of the *Aufklärung*, while it left always its own valuable legacy—a tendency to insist on clearness of thought and vision—had been enriched and supplemented by intercourse with the representatives of a wider, deeper, and more vigorous tone in the treatment of the problems of human interest. From the cultivated society of Berlin, from Jacobi, from Forster, the eager democrats, and from the experiences of the first stage of the French Revolution, he derived much that profoundly influenced his mode of thought, yet left him still an independent thinker. The remarkable essay, an attempt to determine the limits of the activity of the State, written in 1792, but unpublished during his life, has been hailed in later times as the most complete and temperate statement of the individualist theory in politics. So to regard it, however, is to do violence to its historic conditions and injustice to the views of Humboldt himself. From the general position on which that essay proceeds he never swerved: that it is a false, injurious, and demoralising view to assign to the rulers the care of the welfare of the subjects. With even greater width and generality than Stein, with whom on most points of practical policy he was later in agreement, he urged the counter-view, that the subjects must themselves, and actively, participate in the control of public affairs. But he did not think, either at the date of his early essay or later, that the right of individuality as such was supreme against the general control for objects of general moment.

The rather abstract character of Humboldt's turn of mind, in this first period of his intellectual development, received an important supplement or correction, through his intercourse, first, with F. A. Wolf, and then with Schiller and Goethe. If ever a man can be said to have fallen in love with Greek literature, that may be said of Humboldt. He buried himself in it, and resolved that "antiquity, and pre-eminently Greek, should thenceforth be the occupation of his life." His omnivorous intellectual appetite, however, left him abundant opportunities for benefiting by the friendship he formed with the coryphæi of German classical literature, Schiller and Goethe. He enjoyed, criticised well, and attempted, without much success, to produce.

So equipped, and with the additional intellectual fruits of a prolonged sojourn in Rome, he began his career of public activity in 1809, and by his conduct of the Ministry of Public Instruction left an ineffaceable mark on the educational policy of Prussia. I say nothing now of the eminent service which he rendered in other capacities to the Prussian State. He was a worthy coadjutor of Stein, and in general views of politics perhaps even endowed with a greater breadth of vision and a more far-seeing prudence, if inferior in practical sagacity and force of individual character. Nor can I spare time for more than mentioning the fruits of his years of retirement. Whatever may be the objective value of his own contributions to the science of language, an honourable place must always be assigned to him in the history of comparative philology. It is not by reason of his own intellectual achievements—not even on account of the exceptional richness of his intellectual acquirements and endowment—that so high a place must always be reserved for him in the history of Prussia, but because of the stimulus he gave to the educational reform then undertaken, and the breadth and liberality of the views which he conveyed to those who took up the

work after his retirement. The University of Berlin is the one definite product of his brief period of administration; but in the plan of its organisation, and in the high ideal it was designed to realise, principles of wider, of national scope, found their concentrated expression. The enthusiasm for intellectual life which animated Humboldt's whole career found the most appropriate field for its display in calling into existence a supreme institution destined to gather, as it were, into one focus the finest intellectual powers of the Prussian people; but that institution was itself only part of the far wider scheme by which it was hoped to stimulate and develop the moral and intellectual life of every individual in the nation. The spirit and principles of such a national system of education, a system formally begun in the Education Acts of 1818 and since developed with almost continuity of aim,—such was the legacy of Wilhelm von Humboldt to Prussia.

II.

We have seen how large a part was taken in encouraging the hopes of patriotic Germans, and in stimulating their reforming efforts, by the proud consciousness of the contribution made by the German mind to the intellectual culture of the world. Among the many elements that go to form the feeling of nationality, not the least important is the sense of common right of inheritance in the fruits of intellectual achievement. History has certainly shown that such participation is not by itself an adequate foundation on which an energetic national life can be based; and a cautious observer of European affairs at the beginning of this century might well have doubted whether the result hoped for could possibly have been secured by the means adopted: whether, indeed, in the absence of other conditions, the stimulus to be

applied to the national consciousness by recalling and impressing the memories of devotion to intellectual interests and the capacity for furthering them could have continued to produce the anticipated effect. Hypothetical history, however, on a large or on a small scale, is a profitless waste of ingenuity. Actual experience is always sufficiently rich and instructive to dispense with the dubious aid of so shadowy and fanciful a supplement. The fresh remembrance of the distinguished place which the German mind had asserted for itself in the varied provinces of intellectual culture served beyond all question to inspire and encourage her most thoughtful statesmen and patriots, and to nerve them for the struggle by means of which Germany was to emerge from her temporary period of eclipse.

It was not, then, without warrant that Germany was called upon to remember and be faithful to her high intellectual tradition. No depreciation of the merits of other nations is involved in the assertion that, in the mighty stirring of humanity with which the transition to a new epoch was being effected, Germany had assured to herself a place of decisive significance. The impulses which still continue to affect the later generations had found in the literature of Germany their largest, their most ample expression. A new ideal of life, bearing the freshly written promise of an abundant, an inexhaustible future, had received a rich and varied embodiment in the more spontaneous productions of her poets, and was being reduced to abstract and systematic form in the more reflective work of her philosophers. But seldom in the world's history have there been presented in so close a connexion and mutual action, and on a scale of such magnitude, those two great literary forces—the artistic creations of poetry, the reflective speculations of philosophy.

I do not suppose that we shall ever be able to detect

all the ways in which the atmosphere surrounding his spiritual life affects the individual, perhaps not even the ways in which such accompaniments affect the tone of a generation. The secret influence of the inborn disposition, the pressures and hazards of the personal career, the varied modes of social observance, the accepted fashion of civil or political institutions, the tenor of religious beliefs, combine in such distracting variety to determine not only immediate action but the more general views of life which sum up the principles of action, that he would be rash who should attempt to assign to each its weight, and to forecast the effects of some particular character in any one of them. Yet it is hard to refrain from assigning to a peculiar circumstance in the German life of the time a certain determining influence both on the more concrete representations of the new ideal in her poetry and on the abstract conceptions of her philosophy. Public life and culture had long been, and were then, widely separated from one another. The world of letters lay apart from the world of activity, and it was only by accident that any individual could hope to realise what Humboldt called the Greek ideal, the perfection of personal character through participation in general political ends.

The literary guilds and associations of former ages had led their harmless existences apart from the great currents of national interests, though one or another of them may, perhaps, especially in some of the Free Towns, have formed a department of a self-contained little municipal world. The universities had, by the very circumstances of the foundation of the large majority of them, remained intimately attached to the dynastic traditions of particular States, or had identified themselves with particular schools of theological opinion belonging to particular Churches. Men of letters had lived their lives as the dependents of Courts, or as university teachers, or in some sphere of professional

dependence, unprepared and unaccustomed to cultivate or express broad and aspiring national ideas and sentiments.

Gustav Freytag has dwelt on the practical indifference exhibited by so large a proportion of the educated class in Germany towards the national aspect of the great events which succeeded one another in the theatre of European history. He recalls how, while storm and thunder roared so appallingly in France, and blew the foam of the approaching tide every year more wildly over the German land, the educated class hung with eye and heart on a small principality in the middle of Germany, where the great poets thought and sang as if in the profoundest peace, driving away dark presentiments with verse and prose. The guillotining of the king and queen of France was followed by the publication of *Reineke Fuchs*; the Reign of Terror synchronised with that of the *Letters on the Æsthetical Education of Man*; the battles of Lodi and Arcola with the completion of *Wilhelm Meister*, the *Horen*, the *Xenien*; the annexation of Belgium with the appearance of *Hermann and Dorothea*; that of Switzerland and the States of the Church with the *Wallenstein* trilogy; that of the left bank of Rhine with *The Natural Daughter* and *The Maid of Orleans*; the occupation of Hanover with the *Bride of Messina*; the coronation of Napoleon as Emperor with the stage production of *Wilhelm Tell*. Nor can there be any doubt concerning the indifference maintained as a matter of theory, both towards the interesting changes of which their age was full and to the actual political condition to which Germany was reduced, by historians such as Johannes von Müller, by philosophers and thinkers such as Hegel and the writers on *Natur-recht*, and by the comprehensive genius of Goethe himself.

Goethe's attitude, however, as might be easily shown, was very far removed from the sickly cosmopolitanism which so widely prevailed at this time in certain classes of German

society. The greater natures among the poets and artists of the country might remain uninjured by it; for the weaker, the contrast between the enchanted palace of their imaginings and the hard realities of private life was too strong. The 'organic filaments' binding together the elements of society, as fantastically pictured by them, were too airy and unsubstantial to resist the rude pressure of individual passion, at no time more formidable than when it can succeed in clothing itself in the guise of an angel of light (or enlightenment).

It is not, I believe, solely the prejudice of the insular and practical mind if one seems to find in even the best products of the German intellect at this its period of highest activity, whether literary or philosophical, a deficiency in the sense of reality, an incapacity to hold the balance between abstract reflexion and concrete fact, which, like every other omission in one's scheme of things, takes ample vengeance for neglect.

I will not refer in detail to the historic circumstances which had given rise to the peculiar isolation of purely literary activity in Germany from the national life. There are, however, certain accessory effects of the same circumstances which deserve a special word of mention; for they serve to explain in part the unique character presented by the great change in philosophical views marking the general current of thought in Germany at the beginning of the century.

1. It would seem as though, on the whole, a country required a period of rest and recuperation, after a period of disturbance, before it can gather energy for the work of pure literature. Tranquillity and the time for accumulating and assimilating are pre-requisites for the disinterested activity of artistic creation. Germany was no exception to this rule. For wellnigh two-thirds of the eighteenth century she may

be described as only recovering, and during that time pure literature is almost wholly wanting. When it begins to show itself, the wealth of new thoughts—for neither in Germany itself, nor, much less, in other countries, had the human mind stood still—which struggled to find expression gave to the new literature the appearance of being in almost no relation of continuity with its historic antecedents.

2. The part which Germany—in particular, North Germany—had taken in the great struggle of the Reformation left an ineffaceable mark on the German mind. Whatever else the Reformation might have done, it gave to the questions of religion round which it had centred a predominating place in human interests; and the principle which had apparently been involved in the whole movement—howsoever one expresses it, whether negatively as a rejection of the mechanical intervention of Church or other external authority between the individual soul and the realities of its faith, or positively as insistence on the free and active participation of the individual soul in the appropriation of saving truth,—had come to impose a general direction on the current of reflexion on religious problems. The Reformation is a great and many-sided fact, on which one does well not to dogmatise; and its principle may be expressed to one's own satisfaction in a manner that will satisfy no one else. Here, however, I am concerned, not with the vain attempt to crush into a formula what utterly refuses to submit to such a process, but with something much simpler—the way in which the wave caused by the Reformation affected the flow of thought in Germany in the first half of the eighteenth century.

Modern Philosophy, says an able exponent of its history, is Protestantism in the sphere of speculation; and the remark is true and weighty if it be not interpreted as conveying what it may be all too easily understood to mean. Modern

Philosophy is no offshoot from Protestantism, but a manifestation of the same deep-seated invincible effort of human reason which finds partial, and at times inadequate, expression in the various historical forms of the Protestant Reformation—the effort to attain complete comprehension of itself, to form such a conception of itself and of the realities to which it is related as shall yield permanent, enduring satisfaction. We may name that impulse as we please,—and it has borne many names according to the concrete shapes in which it has found expression for itself, according to the infinite diversity of historic conditions under which it makes itself apparent, according to the character of the nutriment from which it has drawn its vital energy. But in essence it is the same, and its proper name is old and familiar: it is the impulse of philosophy.

To insist on this, however, is by no means to oppose to the essential character of the impulse of reason the historic forms in which it has clothed itself as if they were merely accidental. There are no accidents in history or in nature, nor is philosophy a uniform and indifferent instrument which may be applied with varied skill and success to this or that material. The element of difference, which seems to render it vain to speak of philosophy as one in kind, is the necessary condition of its vitality; and the broad characteristics of any one period of human thought, which might hastily be ascribed to chance surroundings, mark only the necessary conditions of its development.

It is no hard task to determine the form which theological thinking assumed at the beginning of the eighteenth century in Germany, nor the special features which its internal history brought to the front. The regular accepted orthodox Church doctrines found themselves flanked by two rather opposite methods of carrying further the principles the Church itself represented. These were, on the one hand, the

Rationalist, drawing upon such abstract philosophy as was then within reach; on the other hand, the Pietist, emphasising the fundamental ideas of the Reformation itself, the independence of the individual conscience, and the supreme value of individual conviction. Reason is an honourable title, and one would not willingly speak evil of what claims recognition as reason. But after all, it is but a formal title; and any right to respect is derived not from the empty vehicle of the name but from the content with which it is filled. And with that as our criterion, what can one say of the rationalism which in various stages of decline played its part in German intellectual history in the eighteenth century? It is a merit to have insisted on the need of clear and distinct conceptions, an insistence common both to the earlier Leibnizian rationalism and to the later stage which has had the special title of Enlightenment assigned to it, but the degree of merit depends on what the conceptions were that seemed clear and distinct. I take it that, whatever credit one allows to the speculations which in unsystematic form Leibniz left as a legacy to his successors, one can find no ground for satisfaction in the effort they made to accommodate with them the relatively large amount of theological dogma they were willing to retain, nor in their attempts at philosophical interpretation of these dogmas. Gradually and inevitably the abstract and most unhistorical method of the Leibnizian school tended to degenerate into the *caput mortuum* of a Natural Theology, from which the transition was almost insensible to the thin Deism of the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment, which for the moment I consider only in its reference to speculation and theology, has its own merits, and was indeed historically, as it is for each individual character, a necessary stage of transition. No one will understand the significance of life until he has looked

at it and its surroundings from the homely *bourgeois* point of view of the Enlightenment, until it has become possible for him to realise the inner imperfection of that view and trace wherein it fails of its own aim. For one must not understand the Enlightenment in Germany as purely negative, as consisting in a mere refusal on the part of what called itself common-sense to acknowledge any general standard, any ground of principle other than the individual judgment. Whether the Enlightenment, if trenchantly handled, might not have been reduced to such pure negation is one question; whether the Enlightenment accepted such a position is another; and the answers may be entirely different. The representatives of the Enlightenment, such, for example, as Nicolai, had a very positive scheme and a certain enthusiasm for it. No doubt it was somewhat narrow in character. They reasoned about the universe as if it were or ought to be an enlarged Berlin, with a Deity as its constitutional monarch; they had a passion for nature which they reduced to its animal basis, and talked much of the education and amelioration of that bundle of selfish desires, man. Declining to accord acceptance to any Symbolic books, refusing their assent to such doctrines as those of eternity of punishment and of original sin, they adhered steadfastly to the belief in the Immortality of the Soul.

I have called the Rationalism of the Leibnizian school abstract and *unhistorical*; and I desire for a moment to lay stress upon the latter term as marking a special feature in the philosophy of the eighteenth century, though a feature that was undergoing a gradual and steady change. To have been unhistorical is not altogether a peculiarity of eighteenth-century thought, which inherited that characteristic from its predecessor. It is perhaps difficult for us who have accustomed ourselves to the historical method, without in all

cases realising its full significance, to form a fair idea of the enormous differences to which the absence of that method gives rise; but any comparison of the constructive philosophies of the earlier epoch with those we call more specially modern forces upon us the sense of its supreme importance. Some portion of the abstractness which thence results will be found to cling even to the philosophy that was effectually to destroy the earlier by taking its place,—the philosophy of Kant; and it cannot be thought that the earliest attempts, towards the close of the century, to bring the historical into living relation with the speculative were more than preliminary to a true conception. Those of Lessing, Kant, and Herder range between the years 1780-87. To any such conception the dogmatic method in theology was naturally and rightly antagonistic. Even such dim anticipations of it, in a half-defined fashion, which we can detect among the records of heresy, excited the bitterest animosity.

It was into such surroundings that the most significant work of the eighteenth century was introduced. We may perchance think it no more than national prejudice to regard the French Revolution and the Critical Philosophy as the two most important historic forces in modern culture. Yet we may well pause before thus dismissing the estimate of their work. Assuredly neither contains in itself, not even implicitly, all to which it has given rise; but to one or the other, in the sense of its having effected a fundamental change in general conceptions, we must refer as explaining the character of all subsequent political and philosophical views. And I know not to which one should accord the palm of historic importance. To the significance of the one ungrudging justice has been done by history, nor can the place it fills in the memory of the past be ever lost. What it has achieved has lain in the full light of general recognition. The other has not fallen under general ob-

servation, and has produced little visible effect. It has operated in the secret and retired way of modifying those seemingly abstract conceptions in which we sum up our reflexions on human life and its meaning. Yet in the long run, if we must believe that the definite organisation of human life depends upon and comes to correspond with the conceptions man forms of his end, that which affects most deeply the structure of human thought is historically the greater power.

Of the way in which the seminal ideas of the new philosophy thrown into the surroundings of German life at the time bore fruit, and therewith of the general nature of the total contribution to intellectual culture which it brought, it seems to me that a fair notion may be obtained if we endeavour to follow them out in the career of an individual thinker, whose claims to recognition are not more based on the positive value of his own share in the development of the movement than on the peculiarly representative character of his life and work. Had we to select the body of views which in most complete fashion expresses the whole tendency of the reforming movement in German culture, the Hegelian system would necessarily have been our choice; but in Schleiermacher we have, I think, a less concentrated and therefore more easily accessible result of very much the same set of influences. In personal character, in the events of his career, and in his defined views, Schleiermacher offers an unusually complete representation of the forces of culture appertaining to his time. The less perfected, less final quality of the results he reached is even an additional reason why in him more than in Hegel we can appreciate the character of the new movement.

It has been said that a man's philosophy is little more than the attempt to justify by reason in later years the views adopted in youth. Even if we should not feel inclined

to do so much honour to youth as this implies, we must acknowledge the importance of the part played by early intellectual impressions in affecting the tendency of more matured thinking. In the life of no philosopher is this effect more unambiguously evident than in that of Schleiermacher. The father of modern Protestant theology, as he has been called by his admirers, received from his early surroundings and from his family traditions an overwhelming impetus in the direction of the studies to which with gradually increasing exclusiveness he gave his life.

Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher was born on November 21, 1768, in Breslau, where his father was then chaplain in the Reformed Church. His mother was a sister of Professor Habenrauch, who held a chair of theology at Halle, and who was on intimate terms with the magnates of the Reformed Church, Spalding and Sark. The family traditions were markedly of the Pietist type in all its curious variations. The grandfather, who had settled as pastor of the large reformed community at Elberfeld, and enjoyed high repute as a preacher, resigned his connexion with the Church to throw in his fate with a worthless religious enthusiast, Elias Eller, who at that time, in a clumsy manner, and with faults all his own, played a part like Edward Irving. When undeceived Schleiermacher found himself an object of deadly enmity on the part of Eller, who by dint of bribery contrived that in 1749 an action for witchcraft and magic was brought against the pastor in the Court of the Elector Palatine at Mannheim, and even that a charge of *lèse majesté* was entertained, and troops were sent to arrest him. The father, who had been brought up and at nineteen made preacher in the New Jerusalem community, and who was evidently a man of no common force of character, exhibits another curious

phase of the Pietist movement. The almost exclusive stress then laid on the spiritual and independent character of religious truths, the possibility, for example, of severing them entirely from either philosophical or historical bases, inclined many to a kind of scepticism, with which they combined the theory of accommodation. Among these was Gottlieb Schleiermacher, who later told his son that for almost a dozen years he had preached as a total unbeliever.

Schleiermacher's education, whether at home or at school, was calculated only to deepen the impression of these surroundings. His earliest feelings, he records, were religious, and were carefully fostered by his father. Before the age of fourteen he had begun to torture himself with the perplexities of eternal punishment. In the spring of 1783 he began his more systematic education in the Moravian school at Niesky, a couple of miles north of Görlitz. The Moravian community of the Herrnhuter carried out the principles of Pietism in the organisation of the Church, and emphasised to a degree almost past belief the tenets of original sin and redemption by divine grace. The education, however, at Niesky was not bad; and Schleiermacher made progress there in the classical studies he had formerly begun under a tutor who had been a student of Ernesti's. Not so, however, when in 1785 he was promoted to the seminary intended for the instruction of future pastors of the community. The Herrnhuters on principle depreciated theological or other learning, and since the formerly Pietist university of Halle had fallen increasingly under the rationalist influence of C. W. Wolff, long represented by Semler, they had instituted a seminary of their own, a mile or two from Halle, at Barby. Here Schleiermacher felt, in full measure, the intolerable pressure of their narrowing discipline, and with fear and trembling, but with firm resolution, he opened his mind to his father, laid before him his theological doubts (concern-

ing the divinity of Christ and His function as Redeemer), and sought his permission and aid to carry on studies for a time at Halle. Grudgingly, and with the bitterest recrimination of his outcast son, the father gave permission, and the entry at Halle ensued in the autumn of that year.

Halle did not then enjoy its old renown, and had not yet begun the fresh life that again raised her to the first rank among Prussian universities. The young *candidatus theologiæ*, in narrowest circumstances, with a shy, sensitive disposition, gained but little of what a university is so often able to offer. He made few friendships, and carried on his studies mainly by himself. F. A. Wolf strengthened his interest in Greek, particularly in Plato, and, like others at the time, he came under the powerful influence of the Kantian philosophy, which was then beginning to transform the whole intellectual life of Germany. The *res angustæ* compelled him prematurely to leave the university. A couple of years were spent at Drossen as assistant to his uncle, and for three years, 1790-93, he acted as tutor in the family of Count Dohna-Schlobitten. 1794-96 were occupied with pastoral duties at Landsberg-on-the-Warthe, a small retired town near Frankfort-on-the-Oder, but somewhat celebrated at the time for its cultivation and luxury. Here, in addition to composing his own, he translated Blair's Sermons. In 1796 he received through Sack's influence the post of chaplain to the Hospital of the Charité at Berlin, and entered on a wholly new world of interests.

In these years of retirement the intellectual character of the man had been gradually forming; and from the abundant letters through which we learn to know him, and from the records published long after his death of his progressive studies, we are able to gather with unusual clearness its main features, the nature of the influences that had affected it, and the prevailing tendency impressed upon it.

On Schleiermacher, as I need not say, very diverse and op-

posed judgments have been pronounced. The more strenuous followers of philosophy have deemed him too much of a theologian; the religious world has looked askance upon his philosophy. His earnest and eloquently expressed doctrine of pious feeling as the essential factor in all religion has commended itself to some as the truly conservative basis on which may be built a cultus, a system of religious observance, adequate to the needs of man and independent of all variations of dogmatic creed. To others he has seemed but a "man in a mask," whose ambiguous, vague, and emotional terminology secured success only because its nebulous obscurity allowed it to be employed indifferently either by the rigid adherent of the most antiquated dogma or by one to whom all dogmas meant the same.

Apart from all else, there is ground for this diversity of judgment in the remarkable combination of apparently contradictory features that entered into Schleiermacher's character. He united many-sided susceptibility with strongly pronounced individuality, deep and easily excited feeling for all the interests of humanity with penetrating force and analytical tendency of intellect, the capacity of eager enthusiastic absorption with cool reflective self-consciousness, quick restless activity with the quiet solid repose of a firm will. These personal features, rooted in the original disposition, were strengthened and brought into varied prominence by the circumstances of his career.

The early strain of Pietist feeling he never lost, and with it he retained the sense of its essential value as contrasted with the defined conceptions in which it might seek expression or support for itself. Even in his later years he called himself a 'Herrenhuter of a higher order,' nor did he ever throughout his career cease to think of his primary function in life as that of the theologian and preacher. What he drew from the literary and philosophical influences with

which he came successively into contact, with classical antiquity, with Spinozism, with the Kantian system, or what he gained by critical meditation on these, appeared to him to stand in no opposition to the essential content of that pious feeling in which consisted true religious theology. Sedulously, and with genuine good faith (and, it must be added, with no small measure of success), he strove to unite into one consistent body of principles the requirements of purified and elevated religious feeling, the realities of human religious history, and an intellectual scheme of things which seemed at the first glance to remove all those deep-going distinctions round which religion has ever revolved.

It would be impossible to develop in detail the mode in which these varied elements worked together in the formation of the intellectual character with which Schleiermacher entered on his public career. I note only as of special significance the attitude which then and later his views assumed towards the all-important Kantian philosophy. For in that philosophy was laid the ground-work of a new and comprehensive conception of man, which, while it negatively destroyed the barren rationalism of the Enlightenment, left on its positive side much to be done in the way of clearing up, systematising, and overcoming its own imperfections. The significance of any post-Kantian work is to be estimated according to the clearness with which it apprehends the general position of the Kantian doctrine, the particular difficulties inherent in it, and the extent to which it succeeds in overcoming these.

With much in the critical philosophy Schleiermacher had little or no sympathy. He was ready enough to accept the fundamental view that knowledge regarded as process is a combination of sense-perception and understanding, the one supplying the matter, the other the form, and that knowledge, regarded from the point of view of its content, is

limited to the orderly necessitated realm of sense-phenomena, which we call nature. On the whole, too, he was contented with the second main theorem that what the ideas of Reason contain, God, Freedom, and the Soul, are not *objects* of knowledge, but have significance only as characteristic and necessary forms of the spiritual life, the life of reflective self-consciousness. But he could neither remain satisfied, as many of the immediate followers of Kant did, with these two theorems left in that barren juxtaposition, nor with the further steps whereby Kant himself endeavoured to secure for them a more organic connexion with one another and with the ultimate fact, the character of Reason as consciousness of self in man. It appeared to him, and I think so far rightly, that, in these further efforts to bring the severed parts of this doctrine into vital unity, Kant only rendered more pronounced their abstract and irreconcilable character; and his objections addressed themselves to the ethical position in which Kant found fullest satisfaction. Influenced, perhaps, by his leanings towards Spinoza, Schleiermacher insisted on the wholly contradictory result that followed from the Kantian doctrine of Freedom. In the badly expressed notion of Freedom of Will, Kant, it is known, placed the very essence of self-consciousness, and with it of morality; but in so doing he had to oppose to one another with such marked antithesis the original and intelligible fact of freedom and the concrete realities of human conduct, that they seemed to lie in two wholly distinct realms of existence. The excessive formalism of his view, moreover, ran counter to another of Schleiermacher's most cherished thoughts—a thought which to him appeared not only reconcilable with the unity of things, but demanded by it—the inestimable significance of individuality. For in the Kantian analysis of action and the Good the individualising features had necessarily been referred to

the contingent external matter, and it was hard to assign to the requirements of the moral law any definite, any particular content. With this Schleiermacher could not be satisfied. To him the Good was generally the expression of the formative operation of the spiritual on the natural, and the highest good the completed result of that in the individual character—a result not to be attained in isolation, but embracing as an essential condition devotion to the common welfare.

In Berlin, Schleiermacher found wholly new conditions of life, adapted certainly to call forth and develop much in his many-sided character, calculated also to give undue prominence to what in it was of least objective worth. Berlin had long been the focus of the Enlightenment; but though it held aloof from the stirring efforts of the new classical school of poets, though even Goethe was but coldly regarded there, the new generation in the last decade of the century was breaking loose from the old bonds. In particular the younger members of the cultivated and wealthy social circles of the Jews, who had long sat at the feet of Mendelssohn and hailed him as their intellectual prophet, were now inspired by the ideas of a culture for which the Enlightenment had no formulæ. It was in these circles that Schleiermacher found his most sympathetic welcome; there he found the comprehension of his nature which he missed elsewhere; there he formed his friendship with Friedrich Schlegel, and gave himself up for a time to the restless turbulent activity of the Romantic school. The strain of sentiment in his character made it possible for him to judge all too favourably of such principle as there was in the wonderful compound called Romanticism, to find a perfect character in F. Schlegel, and to ignore the danger to which the want of objective basis exposes the life of impetuous feeling. It was a rude shock when the unhappy relations of Dorothea Veit to F. Schlegel

came to the inevitable termination ; but, true to an exaggerated friendship, and expressing likewise his large share of sympathy with the romantic view, he endangered his reputation by the Confidential Letters on Lucinde. It is to be said, however, that much as Schleiermacher leaned towards the sickly sentimentalism current in the society in which he moved, there were always in him elements antithetic to it. And in his personal career these led to increasing divergence and final separation from his quondam friend. It was with pain, depression, and a sense of broken energies that he left Berlin in 1802 for a country parsonage at Stolpe, in Pomerania.

His literary activity meanwhile had begun to yield fruit. The Addresses on Religion appeared in 1799; the Monologues in the following year; an elaborate criticism of ethical systems in 1803; and from 1804 onwards he was occupied with the great translation of Plato, a work which more than any other stimulated the interest of the modern world in ancient philosophy.

I pass rapidly over the few salient events of his after-life. In 1804 he was called to Halle as Professor of Theology. Returning to Berlin in 1807, he occupied himself busily in lecturing, preaching, and co-operating in the foundation of the new university, wherein he was the first Professor of Theology. With no personal liking for Fichte, he shared the warmth of his patriotism, was eager in the institution of the Tugendbund, and during the years of depression seems to have been much engaged on secret political embassies. From 1814 onwards to his death in 1834, as Professor and Secretary of the Academy of Sciences, he exercised a constant and multi-form activity. The only work he published was his *Christian Belief*, 1821-22, which, as supplementary to the *Reden*, gives a complete view of his philosophical and theological opinions.

It was impossible for Schleiermacher to accept the position in which theology seemed to have been left by the critical philosophy, as identical with or an ambiguous appendage to morality. Such a conception of it seemed to him not only to rest on a narrow philosophical basis, but to do no justice to the all-important character of the essential fact in all forms of religion, the religious feelings of man. This religious consciousness had the peculiarity that it connected itself with no one province of facts rather than another: it was all-embracing, and affected every part of human nature. A system which failed to do justice to this fundamental feature, or which found its ultimate conceptions out of harmony with it, thereby demonstrated its own incomplete and fragmentary character. Religion itself is no system of rationalised ideas; nor has it merely the function of aiding the moral impulse in man. It is separable from and independent of the philosophy which endeavours in pseudo-scientific fashion to embrace in the network of its notions the sum of reality: it is not to be deduced from or explained by any conceptions of the law of conduct. Its foundation lies neither in Reason nor in Will, but in Feeling, the most immediate, direct, simple experience of the human soul, that mode in which it becomes first and best aware of itself. Here lies the inner unity of life, the ultimate core of personality, the mirror in which the individual reflects the universe of which he is a part.

The primitive, absolute feeling of dependence, the expression of the finiteness of the individual, is more particularly the mark of the religious consciousness, which connects itself therefore with no one particular of experience, but with the universal life in things. Whoever feels the intimate union of his soul with the universal ground of things has the essence of Religion, with whatsoever notions he may clothe the reality to which he feels himself in relation.

The religious consciousness is at once the mode of appre-

hension of the divine in man and the direct operation of the divine nature in the finite soul. In every one there lies implicitly the capacity for such consciousness; in each it may be developed, and in the exchange of individual experiences, in the community of believers or Church, consists the objective organisation by which the religious life is strengthened and furthered.

Religions, as they have historically manifested themselves, stand in the relation to one another not of true and false, but of more or less complete. The term truth, indeed, has no application within the sphere of religion proper. It belongs to the rationalised system of ideas wherein the religious feeling may clothe itself, but which stands in no essential relation to it.

Although, according to Schleiermacher, Reason is not the organ of religion, and a man's religious feelings may be wholly independent of his speculative views; yet to complete the view of his theology it is requisite to add what follows from his criticism of the Kantian doctrine in respect to the nature of this universe of reality with which religious feeling is connected. The real ground of things he names, with Spinoza, God; and with Spinoza he identifies God with the infinite variety of His manifestations making up the world. It was the strength of conviction with which he held this conception of the unity of things that compelled him to reject the Kantian opposition of nature and freedom, and to insist on the unbroken continuity of connexion throughout the whole universe. With this Spinozism he combines the Leibnizian thought of an infinite scale of varied perfection in the forms of finite manifestation, a thought which in like manner helps to overcome the deep-rooted dualism in Kant's scheme of things.

It is easy to see where the weak point of Schleiermacher's exposition lies. With all admiration for the resolute way

in which he tries to work out his doctrine of Religion, it is impossible to remain satisfied either with its basis or with the method by which progress is effected from it. Feeling is, and will always remain, the obscure and ambiguous element in the inner life; and for satisfaction of the problems that experience forces on us we need, not the exercises that are to stimulate pious feeling, but the patient labour of reason that will clear up and systematise our notions.

Schleiermacher saw clearly enough the ultimate question that had come forward in the Kantian philosophy. He saw that what was needed was a more comprehensive view of human experience, such as should at once do justice to the results of the analysis of knowledge and to the permanent interest man takes in religion and morality. If we are to determine what these thoughts signify on which the human mind has always turned—the thoughts of God, and Immortality, and the Good—and to determine them in a way that shall be in harmony with our scientific knowledge of nature, some organic connexion must be established between the parts of our nature, which the Kantian system had seemed to tear asunder. Such organic connexion can never be given by feeling, which stands itself in need of interpretation, and lends itself with dangerous ease to all forms of explanation.

PART II.

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY

A.

GENERAL ANALYSIS.

CHAPTER I.

THE PROVINCE OF PSYCHOLOGY.

THE difficulties of psychology begin at the very outset in the attempt to define accurately the province or scope of the whole study. Naturally the first suggestion of a definition, that psychology is the science of mind or of the soul, must be dismissed as merely verbal. So general a definition does not suffice to distinguish psychology from other cognate studies, any one of which might claim in a sense to be the science of mind,—for example, the critical theory of knowledge, Epistemology. Moreover, the important term ‘mind,’ when taken in the substantive fashion, tends rather to introduce from the first into the treatment of psychology a special theory, the justification for which can be given only by psychology itself.

Even if we amend this preliminary definition, and, in accordance with more modern practice, describe psychology as the theory or science of the facts of the inner life or phenomena of consciousness, we have still to face the question, What is involved in and what is excluded from the

matter so selected for psychology, and what is the method of treating it which is specifically psychological? For it is evident that a fact of the inner life or a phenomenon of consciousness may be interpreted in a variety of ways, may be taken to signify more or less: for example, it is characteristic of one important line of reflexion in modern psychological theory that it insists on regarding each fact of the inner life or each phenomenon of consciousness as involving the antithesis between subject and object, and as involving that antithesis so intimately that in the absence of it the psychical fact or conscious phenomenon is held to be unintelligible.

Again, it is obvious that a psychological fact or phenomenon of consciousness may be regarded in a variety of ways, may be treated from more than one point of view. There is a familiar distinction—that between the psychological and the logical—which rests upon the difference referred to. It is possible, perhaps necessary, to regard the psychical fact as part of a larger natural process which comes about under natural conditions, and which may therefore be approached from the same objective point of view that is occupied in any scientific treatment of natural facts. On the other hand, the same phenomenon of consciousness may be regarded from the point of view of its content, and considered with respect to the kind of insight thereby derived concerning real processes conceived to be distinct from itself. Possibly this distinction may apply to some only of the phenomena of consciousness. Obviously it applies to those which constitute cognition or knowledge. Even if it does not hold good with respect to feeling and will, it requires to be taken into account in determining the general nature of the treatment which is specifically psychological.

At the same time, the term ‘phenomenon of consciousness’ seems to indicate a terminus in the process towards defining

or marking-off the field of psychology. It is impossible to get further, in the sense of expressing what is conveyed by the term 'consciousness,' or to reduce consciousness to something different from and simpler than itself. It may be possible to refer the appearance of what is called consciousness to conditions in the absence of which it is not found; and undoubtedly whatsoever is achieved in that direction must take its place as part, and a very important part, of any general account or science of the phenomena of consciousness. That is to say, even though we may acknowledge that the specific character of those facts with which psychology has to deal is an ultimate, we are not bound to the further assertion that the limits of psychological theory are co-terminous with those of consciousness. It is perhaps a prejudice on our part that we should invariably strive to abolish so far as possible qualitative distinctions, and should feel that our theoretical explanation is incomplete if we are not able to see analytically how a qualitative characteristic comes about from some combination of what is simpler, less qualitatively marked, than itself.

The term 'consciousness,' then, is that to which we have first to give our attention, trying to describe what is involved in it, with the exclusion, so far as possible, of hypothetical elements.

Now, undoubtedly, the simplest sense of the term 'consciousness' is that which identifies it with the total momentary state of the subject. All of which he is aware at any given moment is in one sense his consciousness; and we are certainly entitled to extend this definition of the term so as to include the total series of such momentary states. At the same time, it is evident that the very expressions we have employed raise the difficulties already referred to. In that description the terms have been employed—the 'subject,' and 'all of which he is aware.' Now, undoubtedly, from

the point of view of the developed mind, the latter term would include much that can in no sense be supposed to constitute part of the inner life of the individual subject himself. Any one describing that of which he is aware would and must employ terms of wholly objective significance. His perceptions, for example, would be described by him as ways of being aware of the existence and qualities of things; and, from one point of view, he would rightly say that the things perceived are that of which he is aware. It is obviously necessary, therefore, to make a distinction, and a distinction, moreover, of a twofold kind. On the one hand (and this is the popular mode of expressing it) a distinction must be drawn between the objective facts and that modification or change in the mode of existence of the subject which constitutes his perception of them—the distinction familiarly expressed as that between outer and inner. On the other hand, the same distinction must be expressed in a more subtle, but more satisfactory, fashion as holding good for the subject himself; for obviously the distinction between inner and outer is one for the subject, or in consciousness itself. The distinction, then, is that between the state of consciousness, the perception, for example, as a way in which the subject is immediately affected or modified, and the reference to something other than itself which is involved in that mode of consciousness.

Now such a distinction, undoubtedly familiar in the matured consciousness, can hardly be described in definite terms without suggesting the further question, whether the reference involved in it, and in the form in which it is there involved, is a primary or a derivative part of the total mental state. If we entertain any doubt with regard to the primariness of the implication, if we think there are grounds for asserting that the primitive condition of perceiving does not contain such reference, or at least not in that form, we may

obtain therefrom a hint as to the peculiarity of the psychological treatment of facts; for to that would belong (1) the consideration of phenomena of consciousness as primary or immediate experiences, and (2) the consideration of the way in which there comes to be added to the immediate experiences this secondary or mediate element of reference.

If it be legitimate to question the primariness of the reference to the outer world, which now appears to form part of that of which we are aware, it follows that it is equally possible to question the simplicity and primariness of that other implication introduced into the statement—namely, the subject. Undoubtedly the question is legitimate, if the subject be taken in the fashion in which it appears as a component of the developed phenomenon—perceiving, for example. It is quite impossible that the subject should be involved in a direct immediate experience which we cannot suppose to contain in it a reference to the outer object, in the same fashion as that in which it appears in mature experience. But it is possible—perhaps it is necessary—that even in the primary immediate experiences there should be contained that which serves as the basis for the later developed reference, on the one hand to the subject, on the other hand to the outer object.

From these immediate experiences, then, we seem to be entitled to exclude the antithesis of subject and object, at all events in the sense familiar to us, that which is for consciousness the counterpart of the popular distinction between inner and outer; whence again it would follow that psychology has for its material (1) the immediate experiences, and (2) the process by which, from their characteristics, there is developed the distinction between subject and object.

Now, all questions of the critical or epistemological kind proceed on the basis of this developed distinction between subject and object. They are all questions which concern

the supposed objective worth of connexions which are primarily in thought, or subjective. There is, therefore, a distinction of the most obvious kind between the psychological and the epistemological mode of treating the facts of consciousness. The one contemplates these facts as immediate experiences, in and through which there is developed that antithesis of subject and object, from the recognition of which the epistemological problem takes its start. In one sense, then, it might be said that neither in material nor in point of view are psychology and theory of knowledge identical.

On the whole, then, psychology has for its object the description and explanation of those immediate experiences whereby an individual self-conscious existence, and therewith reference to an outer objective world, become actual.

CHAPTER II.

PRESENTATIONISM, AND THE SUBJECT-REFERENCE.

THE first main problem in psychology is concerned with the general analysis of the inner life. In regard to this question there have been three important conceptions. The first regards the inner life, the field of consciousness, as the expression or manifestation of a number of distinct faculties or powers with which the subject is endowed. The second conception is represented, so far, by two very distinct treatments of the material, that of Herbart in Germany, and that of the Association School in England. It regards the whole of consciousness as the result of the varied combinations which come about among ultimate simple elements, of which elements naturally the typical example is to be found in the simple irreducible sensation. Carried to its full extent, this conception might fairly be called that of psychical atomism; for, on the whole, in its two fundamental features it presents a strong resemblance to the physical doctrine of atoms: in the first place, the elements are simple, and retain throughout their original character; and, in the second place, the combination which occurs among them is represented as being of the general nature called mechanical. A third main conception represents the life of consciousness as, taken generally, a continuous development, the varying forms of which are to be represented as the stages of the development itself. Of course, within this large conception there is room for great

difference of view as regards the nature of that which develops, and, more particularly, as regards the implications of the notion of development itself.

Of these three views, the first can hardly be said to possess significance for modern psychology. At its best it merely served to lay out, in a descriptive classificatory fashion, such knowledge of mind as is for the most part condensed in the ordinary terminology by which mental operations are designated. Even in its strictest fashion, that is, even if we accepted the general metaphysical position, that whatever actually occurs indicates the presence of a power which is called into exercise, it is evident that nothing is gained for explanation of the inner life by the assumption of faculties. The precondition for working out the hypothesis would evidently be the completion of just such an analysis and history of the mental life as constitute psychology itself.

The second conception may be connected with very different views, both of the ultimate elements themselves and of the conditions under which they come into existence. The first important treatment of the inner life from this point of view, that of Herbart, was undoubtedly hampered by the metaphysical presuppositions on which it was in large part based.¹ On metaphysical grounds Herbart chose to represent the soul as a simple nature, which, as real, had very much the characteristics of the old Eleatic notion of Being. The real, like that Greek representation of the existent, was simple, indestructible, and receptive of nothing into itself: it underwent, therefore, in one sense, no change. Yet, since apparent change required some explanation, it was necessary for Herbart to assume that, as a consequence of the variable relations in which each real—the soul, for example—stood to

¹ [Lehrbuch zur Psychologie, 1816; gegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neu und Mathematik, 1824-25.]

other reals, something did happen; and this something he chose to express as the self-maintenance of the real.¹ The soul then being (let us say, with less strictness of language) acted on, reacted; and its reactions were the ways in which it preserved its own inherent nature.

With this rather obscure metaphysic Herbart united another position redolent of the earlier Eleatic metaphysic: what has once occurred never ceases to exist. The reaction of the soul, its assertion or maintenance of itself, remains.

Now, with an appeal to experience which is only in part disguised, Herbart proceeded to treat the whole process of the mental life as the result of the way in which the soul reacts, and of the various ways in which the reactions, whether now occurring or due to the past, combine together. Consciousness is a total state resulting from and expressing a certain degree of intensity of any one of these reactions; and the total field of consciousness at any moment is determined in its character by the relations of degree of intensity obtaining among the simple elementary reactions possessed by the soul. It is easy to understand why, from this point of view, Herbart should lay the greatest stress on what are commonly called the Laws of Association. For, according to the ways in which the simple elements—presentations, he called them—resemble one another or differ from one another, according to the time-relations in which they have been given or received, presentations tend either to increase or to lower the degree of intensity of other presentations, and to aid or impede one another in preserving their original degree of intensity. This change of degree of intensity may be called, metaphorically, movement into or out of consciousness; and the general psychological problem is, therefore, to determine according to what laws the elements so combine in consciousness that their movements in or out thereof yield the concrete results directly

¹ [See above, vol. i. p. 302 ff.]

known to us. It is implied, then, in *Herbart's* view that all those more involved states of inner experience (judging, for example) in which there appear as components the self, its own ideas, and an object distinct therefrom to which the ideas refer—that all such states are to be explained as the result of the way in which the simple presentations have moved and are moving.

Again, in this treatment the simplest elements are naturally those in which most obviously there is implied what for the moment we shall call action upon the real, that is, the soul; and such, certainly, are the sense-presentations. Each distinct sense-presentation is an ultimate way in which the soul reacts or maintains itself. *Herbart* did not, therefore, place on the same level of priority with the sense-presentations those other factors which generally have been regarded as equally primitive. Feeling, for example, he explained as a secondary reaction depending on, and indicating, a certain state of conflict or harmony arising from the presence together in consciousness of the ultimate simple elements. In this it is implied that what are called bodily pains and pleasures must be regarded as sensations, and be distinguished from the feelings. It should also be noted, that, though feeling is in one sense described as secondary, it is nevertheless accepted as an ultimate factor; it is not a combination of presentations, but a new reaction.

In addition to these sense-presentations and feelings *Herbart* admits no original elements in consciousness. All the higher processes of intellect are deduced from the presentations, while willing finds an explanation by reference to a characteristic assigned to the sense-presentations, and, so to speak, inherent in them—that each strives to maintain itself in consciousness as well and as long as it can. Such striving is not indeed will, but is the ultimate fact which determines the development in the line of willing.

The Association psychology, as it has been called, proceeds on much the same lines as the Herbartian, but without its metaphysical basis and complications. It is peculiar to both that the higher products, the more concrete forms of mental life, should be regarded as mechanically resulting from the grouping together of elementary parts. Wherever the Association psychology acknowledges that, in these more concrete forms, there is more than, or something different from, a grouping of the elements, it departs from its own principle and makes appeal to some mode of explanation probably quite inconsistent with its own basis. That some such further appeal has always been found necessary is evident if we consider two typical problems: one belonging rather to the side of cognition, the apprehension of relations; the other belonging to the side of feeling, the special character of the emotions. In the latter case, indeed, the admission that some further explanation is needed has been openly made by the exponents of the Association view themselves. An emotion, fear or anger, for instance, may indeed be seen to involve the simpler factors—sensations, feelings, and ideas; but its peculiar character, its unity, is wholly inexplicable by a reference to the conjoint presence of these elementary parts. It is admitted that the combination of the elementary parts results in a whole, the character of which is totally distinct from that of its parts—a result which, as in the case of Herbart's view of the relation between sense-presentations and feelings, indicates that the mechanical mode of explanation has proved inadequate. Nor is anything really gained by using, as J. S. Mill does,¹ the term 'mental chemistry' to indicate the formation of a product which has a unique quality, and in which for the subject himself, or introspectively, it is impossible to discover the components.

¹ [System of Logic, B. V. c. iv. § 3, 10th ed., vol. i. p. 441.]

The term selected by Herbart for the simple components of mind, which we translate by 'presentation,' may be used as the basis for a general description of the whole theory. Dr Ward proposes to call the general conception 'Presentationism';¹ and he has written a criticism of the theory which is mainly designed to show that, from the point of view of Presentationism, no explanation is possible of what is most characteristic of mind—the antithesis between subject and object.

His treatment of this subject may with advantage be connected with the short analysis which, in his own *Psychology*,² he offers of the ultimate components of mind. Conscious experience is there regarded as generically involving "a subject (1) non-voluntarily attending to changes in the sensory continuum; (2) being in consequence either pleased or displeased; (3) by voluntary attention or 'innervation' producing changes in the motor continuum." The presentation of sensory objects and the presentation of motor objects correspond respectively to the first and third members of the division. There is no object and no presentation corresponding to the second.

The fundamental fact in this scheme is the antithesis between subject and object, which, in more definitely psychological terms, seems to imply an operation of some kind on the part of the subject, an operation directed upon what is either given to or produced by the subject, while that which is given or produced is called a presentation.

To this operation there appears to be assigned the title 'Attention': so that the whole scheme falls into the two sections—the subject, on the one hand, with its primary function of attention and with its secondary capacity of feeling; and, on the other hand, the object, which is

¹ [Modern Psychology, Mind, N.S., vol. ii. p. 54 ff.]

² [Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th ed., vol. xx. p. 44a.]

identified with presentation. In his article 'Modern Psychology,' Dr Ward seems mainly engaged in pointing out that Presentationism pure and simple makes the mistake of ignoring completely the primary function and position of the subject, and, further, that it must find itself entangled in almost hopeless difficulty as regards the secondary capacity of feeling: for feeling, according to the scheme, is not presented; a feeling is not a presentation; it is never an object; and, consequently, if mind be represented as composed wholly of presentations, as arising in and through the interaction or combination of presentations, no explanation is possible of that kind of self-apprehension which is involved in the consciousness of feeling.

Obviously, the divergence of view here must be connected with the special sense attached to the term 'presentation'; and, for my part, I cannot help thinking that nothing but confusion will arise from identifying 'presentation' with 'object.' It is impossible to avoid the consequence that follows from that identification. The presentation conceived as object at once acquires a quasi-substantive existence. No doubt no psychologist would care to describe sense-presentations as 'things'; but, if he calls them 'objects,' it will be difficult to avoid attaching to them the same characteristics by which we describe to ourselves the mode of existence of things; and, if we separate, as Dr Ward does, the primary function of the subject—his attention—from the presentations, it will be equally difficult to avoid assigning independent existence to each of these components. The presentation will tend to be conceived literally as given with all its characteristics to the function or faculty of attention, which, in its turn, must be represented as a wholly independent fact.

Is there, then, justification for the assumption that, in the primitive stage of consciousness, the qualitatively distinct

contents are apprehended as objects? Is it not possible that the characteristics which constitute the meaning of the term 'object' come to be assigned to these qualitatively distinct contents as a result of the developed knowledge in which an independent world of things is distinguished from and contrasted with the apprehending subject? If, indeed, we continue to represent these primitive contents of consciousness, as the Association psychology generally did, as individualised sense-presentations—a colour, a sound, and so on—we may feel ourselves compelled to attach to them something of objective significance. But, in that case, what shall we make of the equally simple directly given relations—coexistence and succession, for example—in and through which these presentations are given in consciousness? The Association psychology, in its strictest form, has always found the explanation of these relational elements a hopeless problem. Indeed, criticism of it has generally consisted in drawing attention to these; and the counter-theory has too often been rapidly developed by finding an explanation of them in some non-sensuous relating synthetic activity of the mind or ego or self.

These relations, if taken in the form in which they are originally presented, have at all events little or none of that claim to substantive existence which the sense-presentations appear to have; and I can conceive of no reason why they should be called specifically 'objects.' If, then, we admit that presentations are erroneously conceived as forming in their isolation one side of the primitive sensory consciousness, if, on the contrary, we insist that the primitive sensory consciousness, in order to exist at all, implies a related manifold of distinct contents, we may take the further step and infer that the objective character we commonly assign to sense-presentations is an after-growth.

From the same point of view, the question may be asked:

Is it legitimate to assume that the distinction, obvious enough in the mature consciousness, between sensory and motor objects on the one hand, and feelings on the other, obtains in the same fashion in the more primitive form of consciousness? in other words, Are we justified in denying to feelings the title 'presentations'?

Whoever maintains that feelings are not presented, that there is a distinction of kind between feeling and presentation, must of course, as Herbart did, distinguish between bodily pleasure or pain and pleasure or pain which results from some combination of presentations. Bodily pleasure and pain, it can hardly be doubted, may be presented. But, if bodily pleasures and pains are admitted as presentations, then, on the one hand, it must be acknowledged that the significance of the term 'object' as applied to presentations must be made most extensive: for unquestionably we do not give to the sensations of bodily pleasure or pain any shadow of that substantive existence which we undoubtedly give in varied degree to the ordinary sense-presentations, such as colour, sound, and the like; and, on the other hand, it becomes almost impossible to maintain a distinction in the way of knowing between these pleasures and pains and those which may be supposed to arise in consequence of changes among the presentations themselves. Certainly, the burden of proof that feelings cannot be presented rests on those who maintain that, owing to the way in which pleasures and pains are generated, they can never be presented, never be the objects of direct immediate experience. Not impossibly we shall find the clue to a solution of this question by considering the relation between consciousness and knowledge.

In Dr Ward's view that which specially characterises mind is the antithesis between subject and object. The fundamental term—presentation—is defined by reference to this antithesis. "A presentation," he says, "has a twofold relation; first,

directly to the subject, and secondly, to other presentations. By the first is meant the fact that the presentation is attended to, that the subject is more or less conscious of it: it is 'in his mind' or presented. As presented to a subject a presentation might with advantage be called an object, or perhaps a psychical object. . . . Ideas are objects; and the relation of objects to subjects—that whereby the one is object and the other subject—is presentation. . . . On the side of the subject [this] implies what, for want of a better word, may be called *attention*, extending the denotation of this term so as to include even what we ordinarily call inattention. . . . The inter-objective relations of presentations are those on which their second characteristic, that of revivability and associability, depends.”¹

Presentations then, briefly, are objects on which is exercised some form of mental activity, a certain quantum of which is necessary. Presentations, moreover, can be revived and associated. Within the region of mind they constitute the objective factor; and from them must be distinguished as heterogeneous whatsoever attaches only to the subject and his attitude towards presentations. Of this subjective factor there are at least two varieties, if, indeed, a third has not to be included: first, the activity of attending; secondly, the state or affection of being pleased or pained. To these possibly might have to be added something that is involved in that change of attitude of the subject prominent in voluntary movement or voluntary control of thought.

From this point of view, then, it becomes intelligible why Dr Ward should insist so resolutely on the difference of kind between feelings and presentations. They are indeed so defined by him as to be generically distinct. It is therefore implied in his view of their opposed nature that the features most generally characteristic of presentations—that they can

¹ [Art. Psychology, E. B., vol. xx, pp. 41a-42a.]

be attended to, revived, and associated—must be absent from feeling.

In order to test the view we shall ask: first, whether it is legitimate to refuse to feeling these general characteristics; and, secondly, whether the actual facts of inner experience justify the defined antithesis between presentations on the one hand and what is referred to the subject—attention and feeling—on the other.

(1) As regards the former point, the question is, no doubt, a subtle one. But, if the feeling of being pleased or pained is not presented to the subject, in what way is the subject aware of it? It cannot seriously be contended that it is only by inference from the effects which follow such change of affective state as constitutes feeling, that the subject is aware of feeling. If it must be admitted that in some way the subject is aware of feeling, how shall we define this particular attitude of *being aware*? Has it no content at all? Even if with Dr Ward, who recognises fully the force of this objection, we go the length of rejecting what is implied in the familiar term ‘feelings,’ even if with him we could hold that the facts are better expressed by saying, not that the subject has different feelings, but that he feels differently, nevertheless we could not exclude the simple ultimate difference of pleasurable and painful; and this is qualitative enough to render it necessary to admit that feeling has a content.

I am not even sure that we ought to speak so confidently of never having pleasure and pain as possible objects. Already the case of bodily pleasures and pains has suggested an exception; for even though these come to be connected with other sense-presentations, to be localised, yet it is legitimate to suppose that they had not originally such objective predicates, and it is tolerably certain that even now our attitude towards them exhibits a curious conflict or

struggle between the objective and the subjective reference. There are also other phenomena which seem to suggest an exception. Is it the fact that we never objectify pleasures and pains? Do we always remain true to this absolute distinction? Does not the primitive mind, whether in the savage or the child, assign feelings to external objects without hesitation, represent them to itself as pleased or pained? If so, it will be hard to reconcile this fact with the rigorous character of the distinction drawn. For, even if it be said that the explanation is that the primitive mind personifies the objects, makes them subjects, it is making them subjects for its own contemplation; they are objects to it, and it certainly imagines itself to be representing their inner states of pleasure and pain.

Again, are we justified in refusing to pleasure and pain that secondary characteristic—revivability and associability—which we allow to presentations? On what grounds is it to be said that we cannot remember a pleasure or pain? If it be insisted that, while we can revive a presentation, we cannot revive a feeling, that what simulates the revived feeling is the new state of feeling into which we are thrown by the revived presentation, it must be said that this view either confers an objectionable and dubious mode of independent existence on the presentation, or ignores what, without such theory, must be supposed to be the condition of revival. As regards the former alternative it will hardly be contended that, in literal fact, the presentation, as an object distinct from our having it, attending to it, or being aware of it, is recalled into existence.

But, if we exclude this wholly fanciful interpretation of revival, then it will be found hard to express the condition whereby what is called revival of the presentation comes about in any way which shall render impossible a similar revival of the feeling. There will always be differences in the form of

such revival according to the differences in the original characters of what is revived. But there seems no ground for supposing a difference of kind between that re-stimulation of the disposition left by a first experience, which constitutes the revival of the presentation, and a corresponding re-stimulation of the disposition, which we must suppose to have been in like manner due to the original pleasure-pain feeling.

It does not seem to me decisive to say that pleasures and pains are revived only in conjunction with what are called presentations. Were we to apply the principle involved in such an argument we should find that it cut at the root of revival even of presentations. No presentation is revived in isolation. Interdependence, therefore, constitutes no argument against the possibility of reviving feeling. No doubt there is a difficulty, but one, I think, mainly imaginary, in the term 'idea of a feeling.' It is imaginary, because it appears to result mainly from our habitual tendency to think in images, and to insist on a pictorial representation of what we are representing. But there seems no good ground for refusing to describe my representation of the pleasures and pains which another subject may experience under certain conditions, by the name 'idea of feeling.' If we do not, in this quasi-objective fashion, represent to ourselves the pleasures and pains of others, it is hard to understand how these experiences could signify anything for us at all. Even if we had first to realise the feelings in ourselves, we should have in the second place to transfer them to what is certainly objective to us—the inner life of the other subject.

(2) It is not uncommon to group or arrange the facts of mind in accordance with the principle implied in Dr Ward's view, that is, to make the distinction depend upon the different ways in which reference to the object is made.

On this ground Brentano bases his distinction of presentation from judgment with belief, and from feeling with wish or striving:¹ for in each the mode of reference to the object seems to be characteristic. I imagine that historically the whole view comes directly from the Kantian system, where the principle of varied reference to the object determines the threefold classification into cognition, feeling, and volition. It is a cardinal point in Kant's treatment that feeling is the subjective element; and his reason for this is, that by means of feeling we determine nothing as regards the constitution of the object.²

According to Kant the decisive criterion of the subjective is that it cannot form the basis of a predicate which we can regard as forming part of the object of cognition. Only by insisting on this criterion is it possible for Kant to make any such distinction as that which he draws between a sensation, such as sweetness, and feeling; and, obviously, the criterion depends on a very special and highly developed conception of what is meant by object. The object is invariably that which is represented by the subject as independent of his own mode of being, as possessing characteristics which can not be ascribed to the subject himself. Clearly any such conception lies wholly outside the domain of psychological analysis. It is not in that fashion that what the psychologist calls "presentations" can be defined as objects; and yet, without such definition, it is quite impossible to retain the absoluteness of the distinction between sense-presentations and feelings. We are entitled, I think, to insist that real injustice is done in psychological analysis by introducing as primitive and simple so highly developed and derivative a conception as that of object.

¹ [Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (1874), B. II. c. vi. §§ 2, 3.] ² Kritik der Urtheilskraft, introd. § 7; [tr. Bernard, pp. 29-30].

To introduce it involves as a consequence the representation of consciousness after a fashion familiar enough to us from our ordinary practical conception of the process of knowledge. We are compelled, that is, to depict the primitive simple condition of being conscious after the model supplied by our ordinary practical experience, that of a cognising subject, inner eye, or inner vision, which is directed upon objects wholly independent of it. It is doing Dr Ward's exposition no injustice to say that this representation is inseparable from his view of Attention. Attention plays with him the part which the inner organ of vision played in the earlier psychology of Locke and his school; and, if we give to 'attention' the latitude of significance which Dr Ward's use of the term demands, we must allow that its operations become wholly unintelligible. It is apprehended only through its effects. All that is otherwise in consciousness is distinguished from it; and its variations of intensity and direction become altogether unaccountable. When its meaning is extended so as to cover, in Dr Ward's own words, 'every shade of inattention,' it is wholly indistinguishable from consciousness, and we have nothing to which to appeal when explanation is sought for the obvious difference between inattention and that concentration which is ordinarily called attention. There can be no doubt that, under any circumstances, that ultimate nature which we, perhaps imperfectly, designate by the term 'being conscious' is never itself and in isolation a content of consciousness; it is never an object, because, rightly construed, it is never itself a separate existent. But attention, on the other hand, is a term which indicates a certain modification of contents of consciousness; and it may become an object of knowledge just in so far as the changes it implies are represented in connexion with the conditions under which they come about.

Attention and feeling are not by any means the only

portions of the inner life which, in the course of its development, are assigned to the subjective side. We must allow that, as matter of fact, every process of mind is thus assigned by the subject to himself, and takes its place, therefore, on the subjective side. If it be maintained that these processes are nothing but variations of attention, and that what occurs is merely a case of the reference of attention to the subject himself, the obvious reply is that we cannot sever the abstract modification of attention from what gives it concreteness and definiteness, namely, the varieties of content with which it is connected. In other words, as a matter of fact, what in this view are declared to be originally objects, do in the course of development find a place on the subjective side. My perception is just as definitely contrasted by me with the perceived thing, and assigned to the subjective side, as my attention can be. Evidently, therefore, it must be allowed that if there be the original distinction assumed between subjective and objective, it gets overlaid and modified by a later distinction which also claims for itself the designation of a distinction between subjective and objective. It is a fair inference, and the inference I should draw, that the assumed primitive distinction is really an illegitimate transference to the supposed original condition of the inner life of a distinction which has definite meaning only in its later form.

It may be urged that, if we thus reject or modify the supposed primitive distinction between attention-to-object and feeling, we incur the risk of ascribing to feeling, as many psychological theories have done, a certain cognitive significance. No doubt there is, and will always be, much ambiguity attaching to the term 'cognition'; and certainly many attempts to express in generalised terms the primitive all-embracing feature of consciousness have erred by giving exclusive prominence to the cognitive function.

But the objection would only have force on the assumption, which it is the very purpose of my criticism to reject, that among the facts of consciousness there are from the outset those which exhibit the essential features of cognition, pre-eminently the antithesis between subject and object. If a presentation were supposed from the very outset to be a typical example of cognition, involving in its nature the fundamental distinction which characterises cognition, then it would be fair to urge as against any, I do not say, identification of presentation and feeling, but approximation of the two, that feeling would thereby have assigned to it a character inconsistent with its nature,—that it would be treated as a cognition. But the argument is to the effect that cognition, in the sense defined, is not a primitive fact of consciousness, and that in so far as the general feature—awareness, consciousness, of a definite content—is concerned, there is no absolute difference between a sense-presentation and a sense-feeling. Neither the one nor the other is a cognition; and this may fairly be held in conjunction with the other position, that it is by reason of differences in the two, and in the conditions under which they appear in consciousness, that in the development of mind one becomes pre-eminently the objective factor, the other pre-eminently the subjective.

On the whole, then, the second main point of view, that the phenomena of mind are to be regarded as so many isolated contents which are grouped together, and by their grouping give rise to the more concrete operations familiar to us and designated in ordinary language by the name of the faculties, must be rejected. We cannot explain the development of mind on the hypothesis of these isolated contents. Nor is any help given by bringing in, as an additional factor, the subject assumed as present from the outset. In both cases the kind of mechanical combination

which is the only legitimate result is quite out of harmony with the actual facts of the development of mind.

We have to turn then to the third type of view, that which, with many variations, attempts to represent the mental life as a development, and its familiar forms, its concrete operations, as stages in that development.

CHAPTER III.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

THE third main point of view regards psychology as the attempt to trace the development of mind. The several types of mental process or state are in it regarded as constituting stages of the development of mind as a whole. It is impossible to deny that this general conception may be interpreted in fundamentally distinct ways; and it can be seen that the diversity of interpretation depends upon the difference of signification of the fundamental idea—development. Thus, the psychology which forms part of Hegel's philosophy is rightly described as a history of the development of spirit or mind; but, at the same time, such development is dominated by the conception that the course and end of the evolution are in some way fixed from the outset, that we can form a comprehensive idea of the final end, and that therefore our assignment to each psychical form of its special position or grade in the development is determined by the estimate we are able to form of the extent to which it contributes towards the realisation of the final end.

In such a view, moreover, it seems inevitable that what we may call the spring of advance should be interpreted—vaguely enough no doubt—as the tendency on the part of what is undeveloped to attain its full realisation. Taken on the whole, then, one cannot fail to recognise the fundamental identity between this conception of development in mind and that which

finds expression in the earlier Aristotelian doctrine. Nor can it be regarded as a merely accidental and unimportant opinion of Hegel, who may be taken to represent the idea of speculative development, that, in regard to all organic products of nature, development must never be understood to mean the real transformation of one simpler type into a more complex or higher. The scale of natural organisms is fixed and absolute. That is to say, the development contemplated applies solely to the individual specimen of each type, whose concrete history may be regarded, therefore, in thoroughly Aristotelian fashion, as the realisation of the idea of the type or genus.

Quite in accordance with this is the general maxim current among writers more or less of the Hegelian school, that the essential character of development is that nothing arises in it *de novo* which is not in some way preformed and anticipated from the beginning. If pressed for an explanation of what is to be understood by this term 'preformed' or 'anticipated,' the adherents of the view respond, so far as I can make out, with only the equally general and difficult terms 'implicit' and 'explicit.' Development in their view would be expressed most briefly as making explicit what is already implicit.

. The application in this fashion of the notion of development to mind is evidently dependent on a wider view concerning the real significance of the notion of End or purpose in nature; nor is it possible to avoid the discussion of this general idea if the conception of development is to be employed in the analysis of mind.

Now there seem possible only two views with respect to the validity of the notion of End in nature. One of these—a view which, with many modifications, finds expression throughout the whole history of human thinking—may fairly be called the 'transcendental': it insists on the absolute

validity of the notion of End, and it regards the concrete manifestations, as we call them, of purpose in nature as being veritably due to and produced by an operative efficient idea. Over against that there stands the view which to some extent finds expression in Kant, and which might be called the critical or empirical. According to it the phenomena which give rise in our reflexion on them to the conception of End have indeed their own peculiarities, may, indeed, be of so special a nature that our reflexion on them can only express itself through the notion of end or purpose; but at the same time, since it is possible not only to determine the exact nature of this notion of end, but also to see that thereby no explanation of the concrete phenomena is given, the notion itself remains merely of subjective validity: that is to say, is of service only for the generalising power, and only from the point of view, of the reflecting subject. Kant, however, wavers somewhat in respect to the nature of the idea of End, and seems at times inclined to allow it objective validity, if not in respect to the concrete of sense-experience, at least to the abstraction of the supersensible.

With regard to the first of these two views, the consideration of it does not at all depend on the solution of all possible questions that may be put with regard to the process of organic growth. It may be that we are unable to explain in what way the combination of special processes that constitutes the life of an organism comes about now, or has come about in the past. But it is always necessary to insist on that minimum demand which every hypothesis ought to satisfy, namely, that it should explain something; and to explain is certainly not to repeat as ground what is actually presented as effect or consequent.

If we press this demand upon any of the hypotheses in which the explanation of organic growth as realisation of an idea is expressed, we shall find that one and all fail to satisfy

it. Not only are such hypotheses devoid of all independent basis, not only are they obviously called forth merely to fill a gap in our explanations, but they do not really constitute an explanation: they merely repeat with much circumlocution the fact to be explained; and we are bound to ask, therefore,—it is a reasonable question—What is the origin of the idea which plays the fundamental part in the hypothesis? that is to say, Why is it that we should represent to ourselves as a possible explanation the manifestation in concrete form of a purpose or end? There seems little doubt as to the region of experience within which that conception takes its origin. It is our own practical experience. The notion of end has no other origin than the familiar experience of our own action, and pre-eminently, of our voluntary action. It is possible that, in like manner, the conception of end has no consistent application except within the limits of the said practical experience.

But if we adopt this, which is on the whole the empirical view of the conception of end or purpose, we must at the same time allow that what suggests the application of it beyond the limits within which it properly applies, must needs be found in certain peculiarities of the changes which there occur. It is these peculiarities which really form the most important element in the notion of development; for it is them that we seek to explain by the help of the notion of end or purpose. Now, these peculiarities appear to be the following:

(1) The series of changes in which development seems to be presented are all connected with a common unity or subject. They are not differences which are merely presented to the outside observer; they are differences which constitute the unity, the individuality, of that which is observed.

(2) Such changes exhibit a certain common form or law. In the first place, each subsequent change is conditioned, and its very character is modified, by what has preceded; and in the second place, the several changes as they proceed seem to constitute, to make real, a more complete, more highly differentiated, structure of the individual, the unity to which they belong.

(3) The whole course of the changes, while by no means unaffected by outside conditions, and, indeed, essentially dependent on them, is never explicable solely by reference to them. With respect to the subject developing we inevitably draw the distinction between external conditions and internal nature—an internal nature which expresses itself in the law already referred to, that each change remains as constituting a factor in all subsequent changes.

Now, these Laws of Change are merely descriptive laws. They imply nothing with regard to real causation,—with regard to the conditions which render it possible that they should be manifested. What kind of nature it is in which there can be retained the effect of a change whereby new modifications are affected, what in the long run determines the original stock of determined tendency with which the subject starts—on these points the descriptive laws say nothing. In all probability, indeed, it is because we are able only to describe the general features of development without determining the mechanism of the whole process, that we are so irresistibly inclined not only to apply to development the notion of end, but to imagine that thereby we are giving a final explanation.

In these descriptive laws, it will be observed, there is not included what received recognition in the transcendental view of end or purpose, namely, the doctrine that the final stage of realisation, the ultimate end, is known beforehand. This is not only unnecessary, but perhaps in all cases impos-

sible. Certainly, in the case of the human mind, it must be regarded as wholly beyond our compass. Not even the most daring of moral philosophers, I think, has ever ventured to do more than indicate in most abstract terms the general form of the final end.

If we apply this to the psychological problem we shall certainly be entitled to say that the mental life may be regarded as a development; for there assuredly, in more abundance than elsewhere, do we find the general features which are described in what we have called the Laws of Change in a developing subject. It may indeed be that any clearness of insight we possess into these general characters is based on our knowledge of mind rather than on our knowledge of the processes of life. Just as, in primitive experience, life was interpreted from the point of view of the conscious subject, and was taken to be identical with what that subject apprehended in himself, so, at a much later stage, the more elaborate idea of development may be applied by us to life and its processes only because we seem to discover there something analogous to what we are more directly and more copiously aware of in psychological observation. To apply the notion of development, therefore, to the mental life will not require us to assume that the notion of end or purpose has any objective validity. It will merely sum up for us the characteristic experience of a conscious and practical subject; and the notion of development will be employed without the assumption that we are in possession of the final idea, and consequently regard the inner life as developing only because we can trace in it approximations more or less marked to the final end.

And, finally, we shall by no means find it necessary to allow that the course of development is so predetermined that what are called relatively the external conditions play the part only of stimulating occasions calling forth into ex-

plicitness what is implicit. The external and the internal conditions are equally necessary, and may therefore be called equally important. That a new product shows traces of being modified by what is past ought not to be interpreted as signifying that the new fact is merely explicit manifestation of what is implicit. Perhaps in no region is the notion of implicit existence really justifiable: it is just the Aristotelian potentiality re-expressed. It is least of all justifiable in the region of consciousness, where, so to speak, everything is just as it appears.

The consideration of development in general has been directed to free that notion from entanglement with the thought of End or purpose, which has sometimes been identified with it, more often regarded as implied in it. No one would deny that, in point of fact, we do use the thought of end or purpose as a convenient key to explain the phenomena of development; but cautious thinkers, who have investigated more profoundly the idea of end in this application of it to the concrete, have always found themselves compelled to introduce a distinction which in fact transforms the notion — the distinction technically expressed as that between an external end and an immanent end. Where end or purpose is proximately exhibited in the action of a conscious being, in the relation between an ideal representation of something to be effected and the realisation of that idea, the end as related to the action whereby it is carried out may be said to be external. Now no such relation of externality can be assumed in those cases to which the thought of purpose is applied and which lie outside the region of conscious action. Not only must we resign in respect to living organisms the thought of external adaptation, but, even in respect to the vital processes themselves, it becomes impossible to interpret them according to the scheme furnished by practical activity. There are no grounds

for assuming that the sequence of changes in such processes is preceded by a representation on the part of the subject himself of the changes to come about. There is no possibility of understanding how, even if such representation were assumed, it should operate as a determining factor.

Accordingly, if the notion of end be still retained in application to the vital processes, it must be represented, in some way hard to determine, as not distinct from the process itself. The realisation and the end to be realised flow together. We can just name the total result as 'realised end' without introducing into our representation any thought of an antecedence of the end to its execution, or indeed of any difference between the two. But, when this modification is introduced, it appears to me that we have removed all that is specific to the category of end, and that, in taking the concrete fact, to the exclusion of the separation of its elements which is involved in the category of end, we have returned to the true point of view, and are summing up a characteristically distinct combination of empirical features.

If we apply to the mental life the thought of development, freed from its implication of an end or purpose which is there realised, we undoubtedly find within conscious experience itself abundant material for justifying the application to it of this general thought—development. Beyond doubt there is there a certain central unity which is modified through the various experiences which constitute the matter of its consciousness. The general character of the changes which take place in consciousness is certainly that of increasing definiteness of the central fact, the unity, through increasing variety of differences in it. Nor is it impossible to name definitely, though in general terms, the result which is reached through such development: it is the consciousness on the part of the individual subject of himself as in relation to the world of objects, of himself as an agent capable of carrying out in the

world of objects what is prefigured in his own representations of it.

Such consciousness, moreover, is undoubtedly exhibited to us in various stages of completeness. Even within the narrow range of our own personal experience we have the means of distinguishing more and less developed grades of it; and if, hypothetically, we extend the consideration of such development beyond the range of personal consciousness, we can find much, though indirect, material to supplement our representation of the developing unity and to substantiate the general representation we make of its nature.

In this life of consciousness the several distinct forms or modes are, moreover, dependent on one another in a regular order—in such fashion, indeed, that we are entitled to treat them as representing the successive stages of a determined development. It is not to be supposed that this general representation implies that each succeeding grade of consciousness abolishes what has preceded. The unity of the subject is sufficient to hold together (and, perhaps, without holding them together its development would be impossible) the elements that belong to several distinct stages of its history.

Moreover, the development is not to be regarded as, so to speak, the calling forth of new powers, new forms of operation. There is nothing in the most advanced, the most developed stage which is not generically the same as that which enters into the simplest form—a fact which, again, is probably intimately related to the foundation for the thought of development, that it is one and the same subject which is being modified.

Now this implies that what are called the higher operations of consciousness are not, in technical language, *formally* distinct from the lower, that the difference is one dependent on the *material*. And this consideration, again, enforces the

general aspect of development, as being a consequence of the effect produced by what is retained of past experience on what is newly given. For example, we are doubtless right in regarding the stage of perceptive consciousness in which the given sense-presentations of the moment are symbolic of generalised thoughts concerning an orderly connected system of external things, as being higher, more developed, than that in which the given sense-content summons up by association, as it is said, the definite images of some particular previous experience. In the former case there is undoubtedly no representation of definite particular facts, just as a word by no means suggests definite objects of past experience. Yet the two are generically identical. It is fundamentally the same process that is at work in both; and the former, the higher, only becomes possible by an advance from the lower, by the supply of additional materials assimilated and presenting a somewhat novel appearance as a consequence of such assimilation.

In the same way we are justified in regarding consciously voluntary action as a higher form of practical activity than impulse, that is, action under the immediate pressure of idea and feeling. Yet the two are generically alike. The higher does not involve the introduction of a new factor: in the lower there is involved what renders possible, by increase of such acts, the advance to the relatively higher. There are given in it the conditions which render possible the recognition of a distinction between the inner motive—the idea and feeling—as subjective, and the change, the activity, as an operation upon the objective. The highest form of voluntary determination is no more than a developed form of the simpler type, arising as a consequence of the enriched consciousness of self and the clearer discrimination between the orders of inner and outer experience.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PRIMARY FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

I. *General character of the content.*—If we take, then, as our working conception of the business of psychology, the notion of the development of the inner life, we are naturally and inevitably confronted with the first of the main problems of psychological science: What is the irreducible minimum of material constituting consciousness? Our conscious experience contains a multiplicity which we find it hard to name, and about which, indeed, we are always in some confusion, owing to the vagueness of the general terms by which we name its parts. If, as we assume, these highly differentiated processes or states of our inner experience are rightly regarded as developments from what is simpler but identical in kind, it would appear as though the method of approaching a solution of our first problem were necessarily the analytical.

Now analysis on the whole assumes that that which we propose to resolve into its elements is made up by the juxtaposition, the putting together, of the elements we distinguish. Such an interpretation, if rigorously insisted on, would be found to lead to a view of mind which we have already considered—the view which regards the composition of mind as but the putting together in certain general ways of elements definite from the first, and retaining throughout their definite nature. Such a conception is wholly

unworkable; it may be doubted whether it is without qualification applicable even in the region of mechanism, where it seems most appropriate. One might hazard the conjecture that it is altogether an offshoot of our abstract mode of representing space-relations; and even there, as past history has shown, the conception is not without its difficulties.

The problem defined above is substantially that which has always appeared in the treatment of mind as the classification or arrangement of the elementary forms of the psychical life. Naturally any attempt to describe these elementary forms is largely determined by the nature of the general conception we are applying to the mental life as a whole. If we proceed with the help of a notion familiar enough in the history of psychology—that the contents of the inner life are brought before us by some process of inner perception—we shall hardly escape the implications of the term: we shall tend to represent the inner life after the model of the world of objects which we suppose ourselves to apprehend through outer perception. On the whole such a tendency results in giving a quite illusory independence to the facts of mind, and throws into the background the really important feature—the mode of connexion among the facts thus isolated.

On the other hand, if we regard the content of mind, as that of or in which we are immediately aware as immediate experience of our own, and apply to it the general conception of development, we shall tend rather to define the distinguishable parts of the inner life as connected processes, events which occur, and the occurrence of which together and in succession constitutes the inner life. We shall thus, at the same time, and in consistency with what has already been attained, avoid the introduction into the description of consciousness of a supposed Self distinct from the processes, and having these processes for objects of its contemplation.

The difficulty which has always been pressed as regards this view—that it is impossible to represent the series of states of consciousness either as making up a self or as existing without a self—seems to me to arise altogether from the false objectification of what are called the ‘states of mind.’ If we represent them as objects, doubtless they seem to require a bond of connexion external to themselves. But, by so describing them, we ignore altogether their characteristic nature: we employ an external mark of their existence instead of being content to accept their inner nature, that which makes them what they are.

We may certainly assign a unity to the contents of consciousness without referring it to anything external to these contents themselves. Undoubtedly we have to admit as a general feature of what we are calling the processes of mind that, at any one moment of consciousness, the contents defining it, giving it a special character, are manifold. A plurality of related contents constitutes the unit of the concrete life of consciousness. If, then, we desire to determine in general terms what are the differences which we must suppose to be involved in what is genetically the primary state of consciousness, we have to proceed by analysing the more direct and involved experience which we possess, and by singling out such features of the total content as seem irreducible.

It is hopeless to attempt to avoid all that cannot be said to fall fairly within the scope of a description from within. Were it possible, it would be logically more consistent to ignore altogether what concerns the dependence of the mental life on conditions lying outside itself. That is to say, were we to select as topic of analysis sentient consciousness, it would be logically consistent to ignore all that we may otherwise imagine we know respecting the way in which the contents of that consciousness are determined by external conditions.

Making the attempt for the moment, and taking as our field for analysis immediate experience—experience in which the fundamental distinction of self and not self, inner and outer, with all its consequences, is not involved—we may endeavour to name the distinguishable features which seem to be necessarily implied in a consciousness that is at once one and many, a single moment with varied content.

In the first place, then, there seems to be involved in the content qualitative distinctness, differences of quality. On general grounds we can go no further than the quite general term—qualitative differences. What kind of qualitative differences may be presented we can only discover from special experience. A total state of consciousness in which qualitative difference is presented—so much at least we may assert to be the primitive condition of mind. But in this description it is implied that in some form at least, however indeterminate, what we name by the abstract term ‘relations’ is also involved. Certainly a single moment of consciousness does not correspond to the representation we make of the inner life. It is in one respect at least a continuous process. Such discontinuity as it seems to present is always reckoned from the point of view of an outer observer, and, whether rightly or wrongly ascribed to the mental life, is perfectly compatible with the continuity of the psychical process from within. This continuity from within implies, and is only possible through, the retention and revival into subsequent moments of consciousness of the contents of previous states. Such perpetuation is indeed the fundamental condition of any transformation of the contents of mind or any development thereof.

Can we then name from special experience the qualitatively distinct contents which appear in consciousness? and are they in any way affected by the consideration that consciousness is not, so to speak, a stationary theatre within which they

are presented, but is itself in constant movement and change?

It is only by inference from what is in our mature experience that we can hypothetically name the various qualitatively distinct contents, and our names invariably bear traces of the more matured experience to which they primarily refer. Thus when we include sensations, as they are called, among such qualitatively distinct contents, and place feelings alongside of them as equally primitive, though perhaps not equally independent, we almost inevitably introduce into our description something of the general distinction between objective and subjective which attaches to sensation and feeling in mature experience.

At the outset we are undoubtedly bound to include no more in our description than can be supposed to be present in the content as it is directly given. With just as much right, therefore, as we exclude from the content of a sensation-element all that may attach thereto by association, we should exclude from it all that concerns the more general connexion it may have with knowledge of the objective. Sensations and feelings cannot be primarily distinguished as relatively objective and subjective. Both have in common qualitative distinctness and variation of intensity. If, therefore, we are to enumerate the primitive contents, we must do so in the light of such qualitative differences as we can hypothetically determine.

For such a problem of special experience we have no other foundation to go upon than our matured knowledge of sensations, in accordance with which we proceed to enumerate a variety of types of content, making distinctions wherever it seems impossible to recognise specific elements of identity of character. It is, indeed, a question far from easy to answer, What constitutes the specific element of identity in each of these types of sense-experience—say,

in colour? It is, perhaps, even a harder problem which is raised when we ask whether there may not be a certain generic element of identity in all sense-contents.

It is a fair hypothesis, though not one which requires to be introduced into our psychological analysis, that such qualitative distinctions as we now find, and which appear irreducible, may be regarded as themselves products; and that therefore primitive consciousness, when that term is extended beyond the limits of the individual human mind, may present many fewer qualitative differences than we are now bound to enumerate as elementary components of the human mind. Some qualitative differences we must always include; but everything points in the direction of the hypothesis that the extremely marked differences we now discover in even the first stage of human consciousness are results.

Accordingly, an enumeration of kinds of qualitatively distinct contents, which we call sensations—not from any feature which they present, but because we connect their origin with stimulation of some part of the body—constitutes the first part of a description of primary consciousness. I say we call them sensations because we connect their origin with stimulation of some part of the organism. Evidently this criterion is wholly insufficient. There is not the smallest ground for supposing that other contents of mind, which we do not enumerate among sensations, are not connected with stimulation of the organism. In fact it is not this criterion which in practice we employ. We enumerate on the basis of a much less definite principle—that of the function which the contents have in the after-development of mind. We call those contents sensations which, as we discover from consideration of their later development, discharge the function of informing us of the qualities of what we call the objective world. No doubt, at first, the two principles were regarded

as having at least the same scope: the outer world meant the extra-organic world; and sensations were therefore described as those changes of consciousness which came about through stimulations that were extra-organic in their origin.

When we include among sensations those which arise from intra-organic stimulations, we are compelled to drop the one principle—the affection of the organism—and employ the other—that of giving data for the apprehension of the objective. The first principle would not allow us to distinguish between what is called an internal sensation and an idea or emotion. We make the distinction on the ground that the one kind of content serves to inform us of the existence and qualities of that which is objective—the body—while the other does not.

It follows, therefore, that our enumeration of the sense-contents must not be regarded as resting upon any clear well-defined feature of their own content—a consideration which will be found of some importance when we proceed to deal with another content of consciousness which is apparently primitive, namely, feeling.

II. *Feeling*.—From the point of view of the inner observer the components of primary consciousness can only be characterised by differences among the features or combination of features which they possess as directly given there. For this reason it seems impossible to regard as primitive and fundamental the distinction between what are ordinarily called sense-presentations and feelings, as though the first involved from the outset the mark of being apprehensions of objects, while the second were from the outset marked as states of the subject. Such a difference we must regard as derivative—dependent, therefore, on the features, or some combination of the features, which all the contents of consciousness offer in their primary appearance.

We should undoubtedly be entitled to accept as among these features any relation of dependence, if such be discoverable—any such relation, for example, as is implied in Herbart's view of feeling as a state arising out of and having reference to some conflict or harmony among given presentations. Now there does appear to be, in our developed experience, some kind of relation of this sort between feelings and the other components of consciousness. Extending this relation from the developed state to the primary consciousness, it has been supposed that feeling may be regarded as a secondary fact, conditioned by and (one might conjecture) dependent on the presence of other components in consciousness.

Against this undoubtedly there stands the fact of experience that bodily pain, if not bodily pleasure, seems quite primary in character, that its occurrence may indeed depend upon a physiological change, but does not seem to depend on the previous occurrence in consciousness of a definite sense-presentation. Whatever be the relation between bodily pain and pleasure and the more ideal forms of feeling, we are bound, from the psychological point of view, to regard them as varieties of the same kind; and if, therefore, at any one point of the series of feeling-experience, we can detect independence, we must, in opposition to the other theory, accept such independence as the fundamental mark, and consider the dependence, which undoubtedly is observable, as affecting the intensity and direction of the feeling-experience, which nevertheless possesses its own roots.

There can indeed be no doubt that even the dependence which we do observe is very far from being a simple relation. Wundt, whose theory of feeling is most obscure, seems at times to include, as one of the integral features of sense, the feeling-tone of the presentation, assigning to it, therefore, a place similar to that of quality, intensity, and

duration. But it is obvious that there is no simple relation between the content of a sense-presentation and the accompanying feeling. Normal or average relations there may be, and such relations are fairly intelligible; but it seems evident that the feeling-tone is not simply determined by any one feature, or by any special combination of the features, of the sense-presentation. Under different conditions the same presentation will yield the most diverse feeling-tones. The feelings, then, and by those at present we mean the pleasure-pain experiences, seem to be of independent nature; and, however intimate their connexion with the other components of consciousness, they seem capable of explanation only by reference to some independent process of an organic kind.

The question next arises, do the characteristics of pleasure-pain exhaust the qualitative distinctions we discover in feeling? To this question Wundt for two reasons seems to offer a negative answer. On the one hand he seems to think that the feeling-tone accompanying any content of consciousness that has itself distinctness must also be regarded as qualitatively distinct. The feeling-tone of a simple note, for example, he would insist, is qualitatively distinct from the feeling-tone of a harmony. But he has to admit in respect to this that we have no means of describing this qualitative difference; and a qualitative difference which is devoid of all definable character seems hardly worth retaining. The truth is probably that in describing these experiences we underestimate their complexity, and that more distinct factors are involved than are satisfactorily named in our generalised terms—the sense-presentation and the accompanying pleasure-pain. It is exceedingly improbable that any sense-presentation occurs without giving rise to a general alteration in the organic processes, which, yielding in its turn elements of sense and feeling, colours the

total result. In the realm of sense what occurs is probably very similar to what we find in the more developed region of ideas, where the total effect of any idea in its passage through consciousness is dependent largely on the vague ill-discriminated suggestions to which it gives occasion.

A second ground which Wundt advances for recognising more than pleasure-pain, concerns, I think, not so much the immediate experience ordinarily called feeling, as certain total effects due to the manner in which sensations and feelings pass through consciousness. "Every feeling," says Wundt, "in this passage through consciousness has a three-fold significance. First, it indicates a definite modification of the immediately present state; this, on the whole, coincides with the fundamental difference between pleasurable and painful. Secondly, it exercises a definite influence on the immediately subsequent condition; and this may be distinguished, according to its main directions, as stimulating or repressing. In the third place, it is in its own character determined by the immediately preceding condition; and this effect makes itself manifest, in the given feeling, in the forms of tension and relaxation."¹

I cannot admit that these second and third points indicate simple primary experiences which we are entitled to place on the same level with pleasure and pain. The descriptive terms applied to them are very general, and indicate not necessarily simple direct experiences, but the results of mediate comparison relative to, and conditioned by, direct sense-experiences. For example, there is no reason to doubt that, owing to the intimate correlation of the organic processes, an experience which is either pleasurable or painful may indirectly exercise an effect of the kind which we express by the generalised terms stimulative or repressive on

¹ Wundt, *Grundriss der Psychologie*, § 7, par. 9; [tr. Judd, *Outlines of Psychology* (1897), pp. 84-5.]

the processes which are called into action at the next moment of our conscious experience. In the developed stage, what corresponds to this is the change that takes place in what is called 'attention to an object' when it gives rise to pleasure. The effect is indirectly produced, and constitutes no new primitive experience requiring to be classed among the components of mind.

Pleasure and pain, then, stand out as the only distinguishable qualitative differences characterising the primary experience we call Feeling. Is it possible now, recognising these as primary, to indicate their source, and to give what may be called a scientific determination of their place in mind, comparable to what is given in the case of sense-presentations by reference to the stimulation of particular parts of the nervous system?

Theories of feeling have been of two types mainly. Of the first type the most important representative is the teleological, where on the whole the theory consists in a generalised statement of the conditions under which in our experience the difference in quality of pleasurable or painful makes its appearance. The second type of theory attempts to connect feeling in its characteristic difference with certain processes of the nervous system distinct from, though, it may be, closely related to, those underlying sense-presentation.

The teleological theory, in many of its forms, involves a reference to what lies outside of the immediately given facts of consciousness. According to this view, which has many modifications of statement, pleasure is the indication of the healthful working of the organism, pain of the reverse. We may reinforce such a general conception by connecting it with other general views respecting the development of organic life, as is done, for example, by Mr Herbert Spencer, who, insisting on the identification of a pleasurable feeling

with one we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there, and a painful feeling with the opposite, supports his doctrine by the consideration that an organism could not possibly live and develop if it consistently preferred the hurtful and avoided the beneficial.

However suggestive the phenomena of pleasure and pain may be of some kind of teleological connexion, they are not explained thereby. And it does not seem possible for us at present to determine so accurately the end of conscious existence, and the range of the two opposed terms, the beneficial and the hurtful, as to connect therewith in any general way the phenomena of pleasurable and painful feeling. Many psychologists have insisted that, though the reference to what lies outside of conscious experience, the beneficial or hurtful, should be avoided as unpsychological, yet that, within the range of consciousness, a generalisation somewhat similar in kind is attainable. In all cases, however, in which this generalisation has been attempted, there seems the same fundamental defect. What pleasure and pain are connected with can only be named in general terms which indicate relations. Thus, for example, according to Wundt,¹ feeling expresses as a whole the reaction of apperception on consciousness: apperception being that process whereby attention is directed upon the content offered. According as this apperceptive act is freely performed or impeded we have pleasure or pain. According to Dr Stout,² pleasure and pain are to be connected with the counter possibilities of psychical activity, the characteristic of which is always that it is directed towards an end. If the end is attained there is pleasure. If the activity is frustrated or impeded there is pain. According to another theory, to which Mr Bradley³ gives a qualified approval, pleasure

¹ [Cf. *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, i. 588, 4th ed.]

² [*Analytic Psychology*, ii. 270.]

³ [*Mind*, vol. xiii. (1888), p. 6 f.]

is to be connected with recognised expansion of the self, pain with recognised contraction or repression of the self.

In regard to all these theories the remark made by Dr Stout seems to me to hold good: "It must be admitted that our psychological theory of pleasure and pain is not so easily applicable to the pleasures and pains of sense as to those which involve ideal activity. It may even be said that it breaks down at this point; and that we have merely masked the failure by substituting physiology for psychology. The truth is that any purely psychological theory must, from the nature of the case, to a certain extent break down when it comes to deal with sense-pleasures and pains, because it cannot find here sufficient data for its verification. At the higher levels of mental life the psychical conditions of pleasure and pain are definitely ascertainable."¹

A more precise form of the theory which attempts to explain feeling from some general attitude of the workings of mind may be considered. This form of the theory connects pleasure with the unimpeded exercise of attention, and pain with any restriction, obstacle, or impediment to attention. Even if we could bring the whole mass of the more ideal feelings, feelings connected with complex representations, under this general rule—and to do so would require, I think, some straining—it must be admitted that the pleasure-pain feelings of the simpler sensuous order do not lend themselves at all to such interpretation. It is only in a very forced way that we can represent to ourselves a physical pain as being essentially nothing more than a felt impediment to our attention. Even if we distinguished, as some psychologists have done, between the physical pain as a sensation and the unpleasantness which follows from its presence in consciousness, we should still, I think, be left in doubt whether

¹ [Analytic Psychology, ii. 303.]

the latter can be resolved simply into the situation of impeded or frustrated attention.

Similarly, we find a difficulty in connecting pleasure and pain with expansion and repression of the self. There is, in all probability, an element of truth in this generalisation. As a matter of fact it is observable in the more definite complexes of feeling—the emotions. Where the element of pleasure has the upper hand, in the joyous emotions, there is an accompaniment of a purely physical kind which might serve as foundation for a later, rather confused representation of expansion of self. As a fact such emotions heighten the vital activity, and actually produce what may be called an increase of bulk.

On the whole it can hardly be thought that any one of these expressions for the general relation between feeling and some position, attitude, or set of the mental life is successful: either as bringing all the phenomena into line under one hypothesis, or as pointing to the real conditions on which the variation of feeling may be thought to depend.

We can hardly avoid the inference that in feeling we have a primary phenomenon of consciousness—a phenomenon, therefore, in all probability as directly connected with some specific physiological processes as sense-presentations are connected with stimulation of the sensory nerves. It would be unjust to dismiss any hypothesis of this kind on the ground that it was illegitimately attempting to reduce feeling to the level of sensation. I have already pointed to the ambiguity of the word 'sensation.'¹ All that is implied in the hypothesis is that the feelings, under whatever occasions they may be called forth, are directly dependent on organic changes, organic processes.

It must certainly be admitted that we do not find in the structure of the organism any apparatus so differentiated as

¹ [See above, p. 199 ff.]

the sensory nerves, to which we could look as the seat of the changes which underlie feeling. Even from the subjective side, when we consider the excessively diffused character of feeling, its poverty in qualitative differences, we might be ready to conjecture that the changes we are in search of are in like manner diffused and general in kind.

Now some peculiar features of physical pain hold out a certain clue for our research. Upon the occasions which give rise to the sensation of bodily pain, and varying with the intensity of that sensation, there are certain changes in the mechanism of circulation which are to a certain extent independent of the sensation itself. They are independent because, while under appropriate conditions (for instance, under anæsthetics), the sensation of pain may cease to appear, these physical effects still continue to manifest themselves. They are indicated by the changes of the pulse, and are undoubtedly, therefore, connected with alterations in the circulation of the blood. In all probability the action of the anæsthetic consists in, so to speak, inhibiting such changes of circulation, preventing them from being extended to the regions of the nervous system where stimulation gives rise to a change in consciousness.

It is therefore a fair *conjecture* that pain generally is connected with a certain change in the state of nutrition of the organs directly connected with sensation. There is no ground at all why we should suppose that such changes of nutrition can have no representation in consciousness. The thing is just as easy or as difficult to understand as that changes of a kind wholly unknown to us in the sensory nerves and connected central organs should be represented by sense-presentations and ideas. But it is certainly to be admitted that the hypothesis is one of extreme generality, and that it does little more than offer a feasible explanation of the broad differences in the total life of feeling.

It must also be confessed that the hypothesis in no way enables us to understand why it is that variation in one direction should have the qualitative effect of pleasurable feeling, and in the other, of painful feeling. But in this respect it stands on just the same level as the hypothesis we accept without question in respect to sensation: that one form of stimulation has as its response colour-presentations, another, sound-presentations, and so on.

The hypothesis would not of itself necessitate the conclusion that the only varieties of feeling-experience should be the pleasurable and painful. For it must be remembered that, in respect to these feeling-experiences, there is nothing but an analogy (if even an analogy) between their difference and the difference which we may describe as one of direction (of increase or decrease, for example, or of positive or negative) in the physical process. There is no ground for describing pain as a negative pleasure. It is only on grounds of inner experience that we can decide the question of fact: whether there are phenomena, otherwise resembling the pleasure-pain experience, which are nevertheless not distinguishably either pleasurable or painful.

The feelings, then, are to be regarded as primitive facts of the inner life, connected in the most varied way with every change that occurs in that inner life; and, beyond a doubt, this connexion may extend to the formal relations among these changes as well as to their relatively more material contents: that is, the differences which the flow or sequence of processes of sensation and idea may manifest may themselves give rise to modifications of feeling. If, then, we attempted to classify feelings—a difficult, almost an impossible, task—we should have to allow room for a group of feelings dependent on and conditioned by variations in the flow of processes, vital, sensuous, ideal. These might be

called the 'formal' feelings: they appear as of considerable importance through their connexion with one variety of changing or sequent experiences, that of movement. They seem to play a part of considerable importance in the development of the æsthetic sentiments. They have from the outset a freedom from the material content of sensations and ideas which gives them readily the general and impersonal character peculiar to the æsthetic sentiments.

The feelings are undoubtedly in very intimate relation to action: so much so indeed that Wundt has insisted that feeling is only conceivable as a mental state of a being endowed with will. More than once in the history of psychology it has been attempted to represent the feelings of pleasure and pain as arising only in the process of desiring or striving. Pleasure is said to be the result of the attainment of its end by an appetite or desire; pain, of failure: whence necessarily it follows that the striving appetite or desire must be represented as preceding the state of feeling.

Not only does such a theory fail to account for many of the most important varieties of feeling; but, taken as a whole, it unquestionably reverses the true relation of feeling and striving in the inner life. I do not mean that, as a matter of fact, in the history of each individual mind, a definite form of striving is always built up by degrees through the combination of feeling with action and sensation of some kind. We have every reason to allow that, in the formed individual mind as it now presents itself, there are established from the outset connexions between feeling and action of an articulated or organised kind: that is to say, in the formed mind a single experience combining sense and feeling may now initiate a co-ordinated series of movements, the arrangement of which is not due to experiences of the individual mind itself. But, on the other hand, the initial step is always the presence of some kind of feeling; and the active pheno-

mena of the type of striving or appetite have nothing in them to contradict our hypothesis that feelings are primary elements in consciousness.

Consequently, however intimate may be the connexion between feeling and activity, it is not one in which feeling can be either identified with activity or regarded as produced by it. If the relation be of the simple kind which these terms indicate, one would rather assign to feeling the generating function. Feeling calls forth, just as it controls and regulates, action. So far indeed as our experience goes, if we could suppose a consciousness in which there were no other elements than those distinguished from feeling as sensations, action would not make its appearance. For it must be remembered that the experience in later life in which an idea seems to initiate and control action, is complicated by the fact that the idea is itself the representation of an action, that it presupposes, therefore, the previous reality of action, and in this way only, in all probability, acquires its power of initiation and control.

.III. *Willing*.—The whole notion of action, as a feature of our conscious experience, is obscure and confused. "The notion of activity," says Wundt, "contains two factors. In the first place, activity implies a process or change in the given condition of an object, and, secondly, the reference of this change to some subject as its immediate cause. The subject may be proximately defined as the willing subject or self that wills; but this self that wills is in the concrete a particular idea with its own characteristic tone of feeling attaching to it. The feeling has from the outset as part of its own nature the tendency to pass into action. The essential elements of a voluntary action are therefore, in the first place, a feeling in which the tendency of the will is manifested; secondly, a change in presentations or ideas;

and, thirdly, the general idea of the dependence of this change upon the whole trend of consciousness. This last finds its principal expression in a feeling which partly precedes the decision of will, partly accompanies it.”¹

In this passage, Wundt substitutes for what is the first—it may be, the superficial—analysis of activity, which introduces the conception of the subject as that to which the change is referred, the more psychological description contained in the terms ‘dependence of the change upon the whole trend of consciousness.’ The motive obviously is the recognised impossibility of finding an explanation of any concrete psychical fact in the abstract subject. The subject, in order to have significance in the inner life, must possess some concrete character, some content; and this Wundt proposes to define by help of the term ‘the whole trend of consciousness.’

Even if the explanation in this form be on the right lines, as I think it is, the expression ‘whole trend of consciousness’ is far too vague and indeterminate to serve our purpose. For a more minute analysis we may turn to what is offered in the same author’s ‘*Outlines of Psychology*’; and there, on the whole, though the exposition is somewhat perturbed by relics of an older form of the doctrine, in which in some mysterious way a unique and ultimate activity of apperception was introduced, there is to be found the more acceptable interpretation psychologically of willing as a process. A process involves a number of factors; and, even if the way in which they are combined—which is the determining feature—may justly be called fundamental, it would nevertheless follow that we had no ground for regarding will as the name of a simple primary component of the mental life. Moreover, even if it were legitimate, by reason of the part which this

¹ [Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Thier-seele, lect. xv.; tr. Creighton and Titchener, pp. 230-4 (condensed).]

combination of psychical elements plays in every manifestation and development of mind—in the life of knowing, of sentiment, of movement—it must be regarded as a rather misleading expression when on that account the will is described in Wundt's terms as "the fundamental fact in which all other processes of mind have their root." To take a corresponding case, it might be legitimate to regard the complex constituting willing as the most decisive factor in the whole network of processes by which self is gradually defined in consciousness; and yet it would be a misleading expression to describe willing as the fundamental fact from which self-consciousness proceeds.

What, then, are the components of this process which is regarded as making up will? Feeling, undoubtedly, in the first place, connected with the entrance of new elements of presentative experience into consciousness. In the next place, somehow involved in the feelings which accompany and which in more developed consciousness may often precede the entrance of a new presentative fact, a certain movement or (when there is no external effect) a certain striving, the end of which, in the simplest form of will, is the reversal of the initiating state of feeling or its reinforcement.¹

In this analysis, the more easy of the two processes to follow out further is certainly that in which external movement finds a place. It is difficult to determine what is Wundt's final view with respect to the relation between this and the more refined form. As he expresses himself here, the external is regarded as the more original: the inner action of will, that which involves nothing beyond ideas and feelings, appears 'as the product of a more com-

¹ By adopting this analysis Wundt is driven to the probably unnecessary hypothesis that the origin of the simplest form of will is to be sought in feelings of pain which liberate motor reactions from which the contrasted pleasure-feeling may result.

plete intellectual development.'¹ On the other hand, a certain loophole for a reversal of this view of the relation is undoubtedly left by the kind of answer given to another and almost equally difficult question, How are we to explain the origin of the corporeal processes, the movements whereby the contrasted feeling is attained? If, for example, the answer to this question were of the kind which Wundt appears to give,² namely, that all movements, including those called automatic and reflex, must be regarded as having had originally, even if they do not now obviously possess, psychical antecedents, it might still be possible to maintain that the inner process of willing is the more fundamental.

Now, it must be observed in regard to this further question that our decision of it does not necessarily involve, as Wundt appears to think, the antithesis of a psychological and a physiological way of looking at mind and mental processes. Under either theory there fall to be considered, from the point of view of the psychologist, only those representations of movement effected which come into consciousness. But the former theory undoubtedly implies that the motor-sensations, presentations and representations, the memory of which forms a necessary link in all voluntary movement, are the consequences of motions which occur from whatsoever antecedent circumstances. Even were we driven to the supposition that the simplest of these movements required and had as its antecedent something psychical in nature, that antecedent must, in its own concrete character, be wholly distinct from the motor-sensations, presentations and representations, to which its consequences give rise.

The external movement involves, then, a factor which lies, to some extent, outside of the process of willing itself. The whole process, as it is initiated by a feeling,

¹ Grundriss, § 14, par. 1; tr. p. 184.

² Grundriss, § 14, par. 10; tr. p. 193-4.

is accompanied and terminated by feeling. Most of these feelings are described in a way hard to justify. They are called feelings of decision and conclusion, of doubt, of the resolution of doubt; but in addition to these there is also introduced the specific feeling of activity, which in external volition has its sense-substratum in "the internal sensations of touch accompanying the movement."¹

The will can only be represented as a process involving a number of distinct factors. In the more obvious case, where willing has a manifestation in movement, there may accompany the whole process the series of sensations initiated by the movement. But it appears quite unnecessary to include among such sensations any that require to be described by the special term 'activity' or 'effort'; for, as we have seen, the meaning of that term can never find expression in any single type of sensation. Activity must be regarded, if we use the technical term, as the object of a concept. It is, therefore, always the content of an experience which involves comparison. The direct sensation which we may legitimately assume, and which from its peculiar quality is no doubt easily translated into terms of activity, is that of tension—a purely muscular sensation. These sensations of tension, no doubt, are never experienced in isolation; they always form part of the connected series involved in movement, and more particularly in overcoming resistance. It is natural, therefore, almost inevitable, that in our developed experience the character of the whole process in which they are ingredients should be taken to constitute the content of a single sense-presentation.

But now, in the second place, whatever may be the nature of the detailed sensations which accompany the movement, it cannot be supposed that the primitive movements, those

¹ Grundriss, § 14, par. 7; tr. p. 189.

which correspond to the first germs of the voluntary process, are in any way prefigured: that in the impulse—a mere name for a feeling and sensation looked at as the first term of a process—the movement, whether on the one side as objective change or on the other side as a series of specific sensations, should be represented. Whatever theory we may entertain on the ultimate question as to the relation between movement and sensation in the organism, whether or not we assume that every movement there must be initiated by a sensation with its feeling, we must at all events allow that the movement in neither of its aspects is prefigured in the antecedent sense-impulse. It is only experience that can weld together in consciousness those familiar series of connected sense-impulse and movement which form the foundation for any acquisition of control over the movements of the body.

In the third place, we require to bear in mind, as one of the factors undoubtedly operative in the development of will, that, independently of anything that may be called 'movement of consciousness,' the changes in our experience proceed in such a fashion as to fall into tolerably regular series. Our mental life is a continuous process: new sense-presentations are constantly making their way in; and, owing to the fundamental attribute which is manifested in revivability, these new elements are constantly connected with representations that are revived. A constant formation of groups and series, of presentations and representations, is the mechanical side of the mental life—the 'psychical mechanism.'

In this mechanism a determining influence is exercised by the inner motives—the feelings which arise in conjunction with the given sense-presentations and their ideas. We must accept as an empirical fact the qualitative difference of the pleasurable and painful, and, equally so, the character of the effect which these severally produce on the stream of the

conscious life. There may be a kind of teleological explanation of these effects; but such explanation lies outside the bounds of psychological treatment. There the connexion between feeling and the changes it produces on the flow of consciousness must be accepted as ultimate empirical fact.

The kind of effects can only be determined from experience itself, although there may be—probably there is—a very definite correspondence between the effects and the organic processes that underlie them. Such effects, moreover, are primarily, and probably one ought to say ultimately, internal: that is to say, they concern directly the flow of conscious experience; and it is only thereby that the results produced, the definite lines of connexion, become of significance for the development of the mind as a whole. In this sense it would undoubtedly be true to say, as Wundt used to say,¹ that the inner process of will is the fundamental. The error is in describing by the term 'will' this kind of connexion which, after all, only forms a part, though an indispensable part, of the more complex fact to which alone the name 'will' is at all applicable.

Such inner effects are more familiar to us in the case of the process of attention than elsewhere. The presence of the pleasurable feeling intensifies what is connected therewith, gives it, therefore, a greater suggestive power, and tends to bring into consciousness the ideas of all experiences that have been conjoined with it. On the other hand, the feeling of pain, while undoubtedly as a first effect it gives prominence to the occasioning cause, tends to excite the ideas of the objects which are capable of producing the opposite kind of feeling, or at all events of removing that which is now present. In the primitive stage, no doubt, such suggested ideas are always the represen-

¹ [Cf. *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, 3rd ed., ii. 468.]

tations of the movements whereby, in the past, relief from the pain, or attainment of a neutralising pleasure, was attained.

The association with those representations that are suggestive of movements is doubtless of the same mechanical kind as appears in every case where a sense-impulse is followed by a movement. But, in so far as the movements are now connected with a definite series of representations—representations which are to a large extent the ideas of the sensations accompanying the movements—they begin to acquire greater definiteness and regularity, and also a more definite connexion with the impulse, the initiating sensation and feeling. Movements lose their original character, which is chaotic and unregulated, and begin to fall into regular groups and series. Of course in this development a large place—and a place that differs immensely in different organisms—must be allowed to the purely mechanical processes which go on in the growth of the animal body. We must, for example, reckon as one of our data the fact that each organism as we know it comes into existence with a kind of predetermined plan of its growth. The external influences, important as they are, do not explain the regular arrangement of this growth; they only render it possible; they may impede or facilitate it. In this growth, then, types of movement, that is to say, connected processes in the body itself, are involved; and these furnish for the psychical life closely connected series of sensations, which have not been put together artificially, so to speak, in the experience of the individual himself. Our voluntary control over movements is undoubtedly acquired, but it is acquired only up to a certain point. The execution of the movements which we control depends on a connexion of the bodily processes of which the subject has no knowledge, and with which, it may be said, he does not interfere.

The process of willing, or rather the process out of which willing emerges, is thus to be conceived as of gradual growth. We cannot assume that in its history there is anything corresponding to the meaning of the term 'will' until it is possible to connect the initiating circumstances—the feeling and sense-presentation—as subjective with the change produced: this change being regarded either as one which may be brought about by objective conditions, or as itself belonging to the objective world. The latter is undoubtedly the simpler case; for the objective world is at first defined in close relation to and dependence on our experience of movement. It is therefore in the process where the sense-impulse is followed by movement that the distinction between the impulse as subjective and the movement as an objective result becomes apparent: and this is the simplest type of willing. The total consciousness, the total state of mind which corresponds to the term 'willing,' is itself a complex: it is the representation of this objective change as following from a subjective motive. In the more subtle case the change produced lies completely within the inner life; but, within that inner life itself, there can be no doubt that we draw the same distinction between what is objective and what is subjective. A new sense-presentation, for example, is undoubtedly part of the inner life; but its occurrence there is at once accounted for by reference to objective conditions. The series of ideas in consciousness is part of the inner life; but, when the case is one of suggestion or association only, we always explain the sequence in thoroughly objective fashion: the psychical mechanism is in one way objective.

Inner process of will is that in which a subjective motive brings about a change in the flow of consciousness identical in kind with that which is produced by the psychical mechanism, that is, by independent or objective conditions.

What Wundt calls 'the feeling of activity' in such a case is not, I take it, a feeling at all, but the complex consciousness which embraces the terms of the process—the subjective motive and the effect of an objective kind produced; and it may be that, in the inner life, there is something strictly corresponding to the overcoming of resistance which intensifies the muscular sensations in outer movement.

B.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING.

CHAPTER I.

THINKING AS A MENTAL FACULTY.

I PURPOSE first clearing the ground by considering the view of the nature of thought which seems to follow naturally from the logical treatment of its characteristic forms—the notion, judgment, and reasoning. And here there are two varieties of interpretation which it is worth while following out separately: (1) that which commonly takes expression in the doctrine of faculties, familiar in the Scottish philosophy, and (2) a more refined expression of the same view, of which Lotze's doctrine may be taken as representative.

According to the former of these two interpretations, thought coexists with other activities of mind, having a separate function and a certain independence of action. No doubt this psychological proposition is connected with, and perhaps determined by, the obvious difference that distinguishes the products of thought, such as the notion and judgment, from the simpler materials of our knowledge—perceptions, ideas, and the combinations of these in what are called associations. The percept and the general notion

are broadly contrasted: they are the concrete exemplifications of the important difference between the particular and the universal. An association of ideas and a judgment are no less distinct from one another, and seem to represent the equally important difference between casual concomitance and objective connexion.

But, while contrasted, thought and these other activities or processes of mind are in a special relation to one another. The concept appears as a higher product resting on perceptions, which constitute the material for its formation; the judgment, though obviously distinct from an association of ideas, is yet, as a natural occurrence, in some way dependent on associations: for, unless the ideas connected in a special way in the judgment rose into consciousness together, the act of judgment would be impossible.

It is easy to proceed from this point to the perfectly definite view which receives official expression in the doctrine of Faculties, but which in fact seems to run through all our customary modes of reference to the structure of knowledge. 'Thinking' or 'thought' is used as a comprehensive term for a special activity of mind, which operates upon the materials furnished in isolated perceptions and ideas, and whose several products are the results of the several ways in which it thus operates on the matter submitted to it.

Some such view finds representation in most of the psychological doctrine of the Scottish school of philosophy, though in its latest exponent, Sir William Hamilton, it is curiously crossed by a view altogether incompatible with it. In his *Logic*, and in his definite classification of what he calls the intellectual powers, Hamilton is to be found adopting the familiar position that, perceptions being given, thought operates on them in the way of comparison, evolving in a graduated series (1) concepts, (2) judgments, (3) reasonings. Taken as a whole, moreover, his special doctrines in logic

rest on and imply this familiar psychological position. The same is true with respect to the best exposition of logic from Hamilton's point of view, that of Mansel.

In Mansel, however, as in Hamilton, though with somewhat different phraseology, we find a recognition of a certain function of mind so closely connected with thought as to require inclusion under the general term 'thinking,' although its nature is not identical with the procedure assigned expressly to thought. In dealing with the judgment Mansel proceeds on the ground that the terms of the judgment are concepts, and therefore general. But this statement is immediately confronted with the fact that there are thereby excluded certain types of predication which must be recognised as judgments, but in which, nevertheless, one of the elements at least is not a concept. The assertion, for example, of my own existence, an assertion which, for other reasons, both Mansel and Hamilton were inclined to regard as primitive or fundamental in the life of mind, cannot be resolved into a relation between two concepts. Mansel, therefore, was driven to distinguish between what he called the logical and the psychological judgment.¹

In a similar fashion Hamilton, who, in his *Lectures on Logic* and in his classification of the powers of mind, expounds thought as a process of elaboration operative on materials supplied to it, is to be found asserting in his *Lectures on Metaphysics* that, "so far from comparison or

¹ ["Every operation of thought is a judgment in the psychological sense of the term: but the psychological judgment must not be confounded with the logical. The former is the judgment of a relation between the conscious subject and the immediate object of consciousness: the latter is the judgment of a relation which two objects of thought bear to each other. . . . The logical judgment necessarily contains two concepts, and hence must be regarded as logically and chronologically posterior to the conception, which requires one only. The psychological judgment is coeval with the first act of consciousness, and is implied in every mental process, whether of intuition or of thought." —Mansel, *Prolegomena Logica* (1851), pp. 54, 55.]

judgment being a process always subsequent to the acquisition of knowledge through perception and self-consciousness, it is involved as a condition of the acquisitive process itself." Hamilton, therefore, goes on to maintain, "in opposition to the views hitherto promulgated in regard to comparison," "that this faculty is at work in every, the simplest, act of mind, and that from the primary affirmation of existence in an original act of consciousness to the judgment contained in the conclusion of an act of reasoning, every operation is only an evolution of the same elementary process,—that there is a difference in the complexity only, none in the nature, of the act."¹

Unfortunately, it cannot be maintained that Hamilton really carries out in his doctrine the highly important general view contained in these extracts; for Hamilton selects Comparison as indicating the nature of the fundamental act which is thus supposed to be involved in even the simplest process of knowing. "Comparison," he says, "is supposed in every, the simplest, act of knowledge"; and all the higher products, "our factitiously simple, our factitiously complex, our abstract, and our generalised notions," as also our judgments and reasonings, are all products of comparison.² But Comparison seems an altogether inappropriate term to express what Hamilton takes to be the simplest act of knowledge—the judgment, the primary affirmation of existence, which is either that of the non-ego or that of the ego. Even were we to grant that in the simplest act of knowledge there is the affirmation of existence of the non-ego or ego, it would be found difficult or impossible to accommodate that act to any definition of comparison. If, therefore, comparison name sufficiently well the process when exemplified in the more developed products—the notion, judgment, and reasoning—it must be said that we are not able with satisfaction to

¹ *Metaphysics*, ii. 278-9.

² *Metaphysics*, ii. 279.

carry back the definition of comparison there arrived at to the more simple, more primitive acts of mind, which also Hamilton calls 'judgments.' In fact, some such recognition of the difficulty or impossibility of identifying the two meanings of comparison seems to be involved in Mansel's distinction of logical and psychological judgments.

Comparison, then, if regarded as the general nature of what is exemplified in the familiar products—*notion, judgment, and reasoning*—cannot at the same time and in the same fashion constitute the peculiarity of the primitive operations, which are supposed to be more elementary and yet to be serially connected with these logical forms. Nor can it be thought that Hamilton is more successful in exhibiting the connexion which he assumes between these primitive acts of comparison and the logical products—the *notion, judgment, and reasoning*. He nowhere shows any recognition of the important psychological difficulties involved in the apparently simple process of classifying—seizing on common qualities, and taking these to represent a multiplicity of individual cases. He contents himself with the commonplace remark that classification is "determined by the necessities of the thinking subject."¹ Subjects being finite, and objects being relatively thereto infinite, it becomes necessary to effect a simplification; and this is rendered possible by the objective fact that things, though infinite in number, are not infinite in variety. Evidently at this stage the exposition is ready to slide into the familiar channel of the logical treatment of the products of thought, and has no vital relation to the view of a certain common process running through all the acts of knowledge.

This well-worn view itself deserves some special consideration. It is by no means peculiar to the psychological theory

¹ [Metaphysics, ii. 281.]

of faculties. It appears in systems which either reject or, at all events, do not proceed on the hypothesis of faculties, for example, in Leibniz and in Condillac. In Leibniz, or, rather, in the systematic philosophy which based itself on that of Leibniz, thought was regarded as having specifically the function of analysis. Some such statement is doubtless to be found in Leibniz himself. It is the natural consequence of the general position in his theory of knowledge that progress is the gradual clearing-up of what is obscure and indistinct. The earlier forms of knowledge contain latent all that may be evolved from them; and the relation between the less and more developed is simply that between the obscure and indistinct and the clear and distinct. It is not certain that Leibniz would have been contented to accept 'analysis' as a term adequate to describe the function of thinking. There are indications in him of a much more profound conception. But his followers undoubtedly proceeded on the view that the higher products in the development of knowledge were gained by making clear what is obscure in the lower, and that the process of clearing-up was analysis. Analysis might be aided by objective circumstances, as by repetition of the same amid diversity of surroundings; but the process, however aided, was regarded by the Leibnizian school as in its nature the breaking-up of what was originally given in such closeness of combination that understanding of it was rendered difficult or impossible. The concept, therefore, was selected as the typical product of thought, of which the judgment and reasoning were only more complex varieties; while the concept or notion itself was obviously for them only the percept, the obscurely apprehended individual, defined and distinguished, its parts held asunder, the original combination resolved or analysed. Just as in the lower forms of mind the separate perceptions seemed to have a kind of independence, so the

notion seemed naturally to follow from the analysis, the decomposition, of the relatively obscure and indistinct perception, and the judgment and reasoning appeared to rest on the notion as their foundation.

A very similar view, though proceeding from a very different fundamental position, and using different instruments for working out a general theory of thought, is to be found in the distinguished French follower of Locke—Condillac. Condillac accepts the general principle of Locke's theory of knowledge, according to which the materials of experience are the sense-ideas supplied to mind; and, like Locke, he, without further criticism, identifies each such given sense-impression with an act of knowledge. To have a sensation and to apprehend a sense-quality are for him as for Locke equivalent expressions. It was therefore but a consistent development of Locke's view regarding the operations of mind when Condillac proceeded to say, All thinking, all the so-called higher activities, are only 'transformations' of sensation.¹ After all, though Locke encumbers his statement with the superfluous apparatus of distinct powers of mind, he says in effect precisely what Condillac said later: for the powers of mind bring about only a transformation of the original data by compounding, separating, and comparing them.

Condillac thus evades the difficulties undoubtedly imposed on Locke by his needless assumption of distinct powers of mind; and, though he does not set forth his view very explicitly, he may be looked on as one of the first to regard the higher powers as results following from modifications of the lower fundamental process. The faculties, as he put it, are themselves acquired.

Now, in general character, the 'transformation' of sensation is analysis; and Condillac shows some interest in de-

¹ [*Traité des sensations* (1754), introd., Œuvres, iii. 14, 50.]

termining the psychological nature of this general process of analysis. Although his theory compels him to reject all activity of mind, yet in his own way, he recognises attention as the characteristic feature of analysis. Attention as conceived by him is a passively determined result synonymous really with the varying intensity of interest of the objects presented.

In both cases, whether in the view of Leibniz or in that of Condillac, it will be observed that no reference is made explicitly to the consideration that the simple datum, that upon which analysis is supposed to operate, is assumed to be of the nature of apprehension of an object. Thus Leibniz is ready to insist that what are called feelings, states of pleasure and pain, are in themselves confused apprehensions of those objective qualities which give rise to the states of feeling in us. Leibniz is so far carried away by his general theory that he actually maintains that our sense-apprehension of the colour green is a confused sense-apprehension of the two colours blue and yellow, and almost goes the length of saying that we do not properly perceive green until we apprehend the blue and yellow which are its components.

Accordingly, this fundamental aspect of the original datum being taken for granted, the question did not arise as specially requiring an answer, Whence do the logical products—the notion, judgment, reasoning—acquire their highly characteristic objective reference? It is not at all impossible that the complete answer to this problem will carry us to the conclusion that a determination of ‘objective’—though, no doubt, in a very incomplete and primitive sense—precedes the specially logical forms of thinking. Such an answer is, however, very different from the assumption that the initial sense-impressions are in themselves apprehensions of the objective. Yet it is quite clear that, without justification for this assumption, the whole theory of thought as

arising from perceptions by mere analysis is without foundation. Of course we are entitled to say that mere analysis may possibly increase the clearness and distinctness of the apprehension with which we begin; but it cannot give that apprehension a reference which it did not originally possess. We must therefore assume either that the initial percepts had this reference to objects in themselves, or that the function of thought is by no means purely analytic but essentially consists in giving to our apprehensions the characteristic reference to the objective.

Now this is in brief the modification of Leibniz's theory upon which Kant insisted. The first thing, as he insists, which thought does for sense-intuitions is not to make them clear and distinct, but to give them the all-important, indispensable, reference to an object. Without such reference sense-impressions do not constitute knowledge at all; and the reference itself can only be given to sense-impressions. By this is meant that thinking, in the Kantian view, is not creative of its contents, and that, although it does more than analyse what is given, it makes no addition to the given except what is involved in the reference to the object.

CHAPTER II.

LOTZE'S DOCTRINE OF THINKING.

LOTZE's doctrine may be regarded as an intermediate form between that of the Faculty-psychology and that of Kant. According to his view thinking is a specific activity of the soul, called forth not as sensations are, by immediate impression from without, but, possibly in a similar fashion, stimulated by the existence of such sensations in the mind. Thinking would thus represent the second, or perhaps the third, grade of reaction. External impressions call forth sensations; these call forth in their turn that characteristic activity of the soul whereby there is conferred upon the contents of sense the form of space; and, again, percepts serve as stimulations calling forth the still higher activity of thinking. Moreover, Lotze seems to incline to the view that, if the whole function of thinking be taken into account—its relating and comparing aspects, and likewise that reference to the objective which is fundamental to it and given by it—it will be found unnecessary to distinguish as Kant did between understanding and reason.

While the general aspect of Lotze's doctrine¹ seems thus fairly clear, he does not make equally distinct his view of the specific functions of thinking. So far as these specific functions are concerned, they seem to be : (1) the reference to the

¹ Cf. *Mikrokosmos*, 4th ed., i. 259 f. ; tr. Hamilton and Jones, i. 231 f.

objective; and this function, as is made plain by Lotze,¹ is exhibited at a stage of thinking which is even prior to the notion proper; (2) thinking especially as exemplified in the logical products; and this seems to have assigned to it the function of imposing on the given material a form which is derived not from the material but apparently from thinking itself.² Of these functions further consideration is required.

Lotze distinguishes the activity of thinking from the lower processes concerned in the development of knowledge, and interprets the distinction as indicating a fundamental difference of origin in the soul itself. Selecting the process of relating as illustrative of the peculiar activity of thought, he contrasts sharply the simultaneous or successive presence in consciousness of impressions or ideas with the consciousness of relations among these isolated facts. This contrast he interprets as signifying that, in the act of relating, a wholly new function of the soul is called into exercise. Just as the stimulations of the senses, and of the mechanism of the brain connected with the senses, serve to call forth that elementary function of the soul which yields sensations and their copies or representations, so sensations and ideas, by being present in consciousness, serve to stimulate or call into exercise a distinct function, that of thought.

Lotze offers us also a more general description of thought in its contrast with the stream of impressions and ideas, which is not at first sight identical with the function of relating; and the difference compels him to give a rather more detailed and more suggestive account of the mode in which thinking makes its appearance in consciousness. In the introduction to his *Logic*, the feature of thinking which serves to differentiate it from the stream of impressions and ideas is, briefly, that which appears in the contrast between

¹ Cf. *Logic*, B. I. c. i. §§ 1-19.

² Cf. *Mikrokosmos*, i. 261-4; tr. i. 233-5.

reason and fact. Impressions and ideas are given, given in combinations groups or series, which have for us simply the value of facts. Accompanying this mechanical nexus of given fact there is in knowledge the continuous exercise of the critical activity of thinking, the function of which is to seek for grounds or reasons.

Apparently Lotze is influenced by the broad distinction which the ancients fixed by the terms 'opinion' and 'science.' Knowledge strictly so-called implies a reference of what is immediately given to an order of connexion which, as contrasted with the given, may be called internal. Thinking, therefore, in all its modifications, is animated by the general idea of ground or reason—an idea the significance of which cannot be expressed in terms of merely given fact. Thus, for example, we discover the indication of thought in the Concept or notion when we contrast the represented rule, according to which the general type of the object is conceived, with the merely given character of the combination of marks in the isolated perceived case. A concept or notion is not merely the given perception analysed, with its parts made more distinct, or even with some of its parts omitted. A concept is a more complex fact of mind—the representation of the universal or rule determining the conjunction of marks which constitutes the essential character in the several individuals. Similarly in the Judgment, its peculiar form—the reference of the predicate to the subject as a quality to the thing possessing it, or the relation of dependence of events expressed in the hypothetical proposition—is that which differentiates the judgment as an act of thought from the mere complex idea of a number of marks or of a sequence. The same holds of the Syllogism: the mechanism of association and memory may produce in us expectations; but, as contrasted with these, reasonings contain always as their cardinal feature the thought of a ground which renders necessary the

consequence to which, doubtless with the aid of the mechanism of association, we proceed.

Two points in this account deserve special attention. In the first place, it is evidently assumed that the highly peculiar fundamental idea involved in thought—that of logical or inner ground, reason as contrasted with fact—requires for its explanation the special hypothesis of a distinct independent power of mind. In the second place, the consideration of the co-operation (and the gradually modified co-operation) of thinking and the mechanism of sense and association, renders necessary a more detailed account of the way in which the logical function of thinking asserts itself in the human soul. Lotze is fully alive to the fact that, if the contrasts are defined too sharply, it will be found impossible to explain their union in the total operation of knowing. It becomes necessary for him, therefore, to introduce some intermediaries between the merely given material of sense-association and the critical activity of thinking.

Perhaps it is in this way—though he is not very explicit on the point—that he would seek to unite the two rather divergent representations of thought: that which dwells exclusively on the notion of ground or reason, and that which identifies thinking with the act of relating. As I understand his exposition in the *Microcosmus*,¹ no fewer than three intermediate grades are introduced between the mechanism of impression and idea and the stage of thought. In each of these intermediate grades the essential factor is the unity of consciousness or of the conscious subject.

The first and lowest of these grades is called by him the mere identity of the perceiving subject, in which are gathered together impressions from different parts of the external world and from different times. This he says is the first necessary

¹ [*Mikrokosmus*, i. 257 ; tr. i. 229.]

condition for that act of relating which becomes possible later, but it is not the sufficient condition for the origination of that act.

I hail this with satisfaction. It is a recognition of what is fundamental in the development of the soul: namely, that a merely mechanical or vital identity of the subject, a union of its different experiences in one whole, necessarily precedes any mode of the more reflective unity to which alone the name self-consciousness is appropriate. On what this first vital identity of the subject depends Lotze does not further consider. Probably it is intimately connected with the bodily activities of the subject: that is to say, so far as its inner aspect is concerned, with the experiences of sense and feeling which are dependent on the exercise of such activities. It presupposes obviously a certain grade of mere mechanical reproduction or revival of past experiences. There seems nothing to contradict the assumption that such rudimentary unity of self is present in the experience of the lower animals.

A second form of the same unity of the subject Lotze recognises as connected not specially with the impressions of sense but with association and reproduction. Many facts would lead us to conjecture that the conditions for such a unity in the case of animal experience are very varied. It is possible that the degree of ability to retain together in consciousness a number of distinct ideas is the expression of this difference in the conditions referred to.

In the third form of this unity, Lotze, in a way peculiar to himself, recognises a fundamentally distinct process as concerned in the translation of sense-impressions into intuitions of space and time. He holds that, in order to account for the characteristic of extendedness which attaches to our sense-impressions, we must go beyond the impressions themselves. They are merely non-spatial, and almost

in a sense non-temporal, re-actions of the soul. The special form induced on them is therefore alien to their own character, and must be accounted for by some special function of the soul. The exercise of this function constitutes at the same time a new form of the unity of self. It is now the unity of a subject perceiving the extended and the temporal.

I do not think that Lotze anywhere manages to distinguish, with sufficient accuracy, the characteristics of this all-important space-and-time element in our apprehension. There are many features of the said element which we must regard as relatively reflective in character, as indicating, therefore, a development in the conscious subject that goes beyond the mere formation in perceptive experience of intuitions as contrasted with impressions. There is no reason for doubting, for example, that the characteristic differences of position and time are involved in the perceptions of animals. There is no reason to suppose that, in the same animal experience, there is anything corresponding to the reflective or logical predicates which we attach to space and time. Nay, it is doubtful whether, in the animal consciousness, there can be supposed to be anything corresponding to the comprehensive picture which we form of an indefinitely extended space, an indefinitely enduring time. These variously graded characteristics of space and time ought not to be ignored: they cannot be explained satisfactorily by a simple reference to a fundamental independent activity of the soul.

Only with the help of this graduated unity of consciousness which Lotze describes in his own way, but which we might fairly call the gradual development of self-consciousness, does he allow that thinking, in the full sense of the term, becomes possible; and even there, he proceeds to point out, the characteristic critical activity of thought again manifests itself only as the final step in a series of which the first members are very much simpler in nature.

Thought in general has been characterised by Lotze by reference to the specifically logical feature of ground or reason. Even the concept or notion, which less obviously than the other products of thought involves reference to ground or reason, is regarded by him as containing such a reference in the peculiar significance of the universal, which forms its distinctive feature. The concept, if we express it in somewhat lax psychological terms, is, according to Lotze, the representation of the universal law of interconnexion of the marks which determines the appearance of the manifold particulars likewise represented in the concept.

Evidently, then, the total act of thought which consists in having a concept or notion is psychologically a complex; and it would seem impossible to represent so complex a fact otherwise than as a gradually attained result. The peculiar significance of a universal law, the relation of the uniformly combined marks to the concrete individuals in which, so to speak, the law is manifested—these, psychologically, indicate a stage of human reflexion which cannot possibly be regarded as primitive. Concepts or notions so described must be held to become possible for the human mind only on the basis of some preliminary processes, only at a stage in which the unity of consciousness has acquired definiteness and specific character.

Possibly it was through recognition of this evidently complex character of the concept—which, in opposition to many logicians, he continued to regard as the first, the simplest, of the logical forms—that Lotze was led to attempt a descriptive or genetic account of certain pre-logical processes, essential for the formation of the concept, and explicitly stated to be manifestations of the activity of thinking. As manifestations of thinking, their nature cannot be explained through the conditions of the mechanism of sense-presentation and association. Lotze is certainly far

from clear as to the place these pre-logical processes of thinking occupy relatively to those other intermediate stages of development which, as we said, he inclines to introduce between the mere receptivity of perception and the first utterances of thought. We shall probably be doing no injustice to the theory if we regard them as subsequent to the last of these, the peculiar indefinable activity of the soul whereby sense-impressions are formed into intuitions with space-and-time characteristics.

The pre-logical processes of thinking, according to Lotze, fall into two grades, of which the second is itself a manifold: though the distinct processes named as belonging to it are so intimately conjoined that, for logical purposes, it is hardly necessary to separate them. It is difficult to make quite clear all that Lotze means in his description.

The general function of these pre-logical processes may be said to be to prepare the contents of given experience—impressions and associated ideas—for the later manipulation of the logical activity of thinking. Their first grade is said to consist in the formation of impressions into ideas, or, otherwise, the objectification of the subject.¹ ‘Objectification’ is certainly a term requiring further explanation, for ‘object’ has a variety of meanings in the analysis of knowledge. Some part of Lotze’s meaning evidently depends on the contrast implied to the subjective. A given impression, or its relic in consciousness, is primarily a subjective change in the individual consciousness. In so far as it retains this character it is, Lotze seems to say, wholly inappropriate as material for thinking. One might illustrate by contrasting the possibilities for thinking of two types of such subjective change—on the one hand what is called a sense-presentation, and on the other hand a sensuous feeling. But, evidently, such an illustration might be rejected by Lotze on the ground

¹ [Logic, B. I. c. i. §§ 1-8.]

that in respect to their given character and in respect to the necessity of some transformation before either can be made material for thought, they stand on the same level.

Apparently, then, Lotze desires to say that some alteration must take place whereby the purely subjective character of such presentations is removed, before there can come into operation any of the higher activities of thinking. The change consists in conferring upon the content of what, in itself, is a mere subjective individual change of consciousness, a fixity, a universality, which renders it, so to speak, an object.

The precise significance of this is a little cleared up by the statement that in fact such alteration of the subjective coincides with, perhaps consists in, the *naming* of the content experienced. The parts of speech indicate, he thinks, the very operation which consists in conferring on the merely subjective the all-important character of being an object. On this account, therefore, it will be seen that Lotze thinks himself justified in assigning to the term 'object' the very general significance which would hold good whether the object be a so-called real thing or quality or relation of things, or a state of mind, or (as becomes possible in developed intelligences) a complex of circumstances, conditions, or events. When the contents of our experience, which at first come into consciousness as merely subjective changes, are named, there is at once conferred on them an aspect of generality which renders possible in their regard the further operations of the logical activity of thinking.

Objectivity is thus in a way made, if not identical with, at all events akin to universality—a position for which there is much to be said. But universality is never a characteristic which is self-explaining. Moreover, the universal has such a variety of meanings, that whoever employs the term as characterising an aspect of experience is bound to specify in

what precisely its meaning consists. If we ask, In what consists the universality conferred by naming a content of experience? we should naturally be referred in the first instance, I imagine, to common consent. It can hardly be supposed that the individual mind effects the transformation of the originally fleeting subjective particular for its own ends. We, looking back on the results for the development of knowledge which follow from the application of names to the contents of experience, may express ourselves as though names came into existence for that purpose; but, in so doing, we fall into the common error of all such teleological explanations. The employment of names, then, cannot be regarded as coming about for the purpose of objectifying. Still less can it be supposed that such process of naming is due to the individual mind itself. But, if this be true, we are bound to say that the separation between the originally subjective fleeting particular change of individual consciousness and the objectivity given by names is a far wider separation than Lotze allows for, and must have been bridged over by many intermediaries of which he takes no account.

For the moment the expression has been allowed to pass that the original contents of experience are subjective fleeting individual changes in the consciousness of the individual subject; but I do not think that this truly expresses the character such contents would possess in the primitive mind. It is only from our reflective point of view that we discriminate between the subjective character of the changes in consciousness, and the objectivity of what is generally recognised and indicated by a common name. The primitive contents of experience may be fleeting and imperfect, serviceable only as stimulating to equally fleeting and imperfect acts; but, *for the individual mind*, they are not subjective in the sense required for Lotze's contrast. Following this

out, the question must be asked, Is it possible that the application of names, whereby doubtless fixity is obtained for the contents of experience, should precede and be independent of modifications in the stream of consciousness wherein are given the fundamental distinctions between self and the external real world? I can hardly suppose that Lotze would insist on the absolutely primitive character of this process of objectifying by names; for, apparently, he is willing to regard this pre-logical process as at all events posterior to the arrangement of the contents of experience in the form of intuitions of space and time. But contents of experience which have already undergone this transformation into space-and-time facts are no longer subjective in the sense of Lotze's contrast; and, further, such transformation into the picture of a space-and-time qualified world is possible only on the basis of the distinction between self and the external not-self.

It is possible, therefore, that we shall have to regard the universality, which comes about through or in conjunction with the employment of words, as resting and dependent on the prior and more elementary distinctions in consciousness, whereby, first of all, the objective begins to be defined in the narrower, more special, sense of the real external not-self. Further, it would appear to be indicated that, in the process of objectifying by the employment of names, we have not the manifestation of a simple unique power or activity; but that the achievement is to be regarded rather as the final result of a complex which is capable of more detailed psychological analysis. On such a view, nothing whatever would be altered with regard to the importance, the significance, of the achievement in all the higher developments of the mental life. From the psychological point of view, it must be regarded as the gravest error to suppose that the fundamental value of a result is dependent on the primitive

simple unique character of the process, act, or function of mind from which the result is supposed to follow. The results in the human mind which, taken collectively, constitute thinking are of no less significance for the total character of the human mind and its experience, if they are regarded as the complex products of more simple processes, than if they are supposed to be the manifestation of some original simple power.

Of the two pre-logical processes recognised by Lotze, the first—that already examined—is named Objectification. The second is itself a manifold. He does not seek to define too closely the chronological relation of the two. But he selects, as distinguishing them, and at the same time exhibiting their close connexion, the familiar antithesis between spontaneous activity and passively determined reception. The first process, he says, is one in which spontaneity is manifested: though a little reflexion convinces us that the exercise of such spontaneity is not absolutely without restriction. There is always something in the character of what is presented that determines the specific form of the active process exercised on it. The second process¹ is at least relatively passive and receptive. The whole process is further analysed into *position*, *distinction*, and *comparison*. ‘Position’ is a term indicating undoubtedly a very simple factor in thought, which we can illustrate best, perhaps, by saying that a given content of sense-perception can only be thought about in so far as it is attended to in such a way as to make it stand out from its surroundings. Obviously, such positing, giving a position or place in consciousness to a content, implies a differentiation of it, a discrimination of it, from what is also present, whether in the shape of immediate sense-impression or idea.

¹ [Logic, B. I. c. i. §§ 9-19.]

Lotze is desirous to insist both on the connexion between the two processes, positing and distinguishing, and on their essential difference. He is anxious to avoid the view which exaggerates the indispensable function of discrimination to the extent of assigning no significance at all to the positive elements in given experience.

Before proceeding to the third of the connected operations, we may ask at once whether there is any sufficient ground for distinguishing, as Lotze's exposition undoubtedly does, between these operations of positing and distinguishing and the material of experience given in the form of sense-impressions and ideas. Is there a fundamental opposition between these processes and what Lotze calls the mechanism of the soul? Are they processes which are requisite only for thinking, that is, for the admittedly higher type of conscious experience, or are they in some form implied even in what is designated the lower type of conscious experience—the mechanism of sense and idea? The only ground for assuming that they are so confined to thinking is that which seems to be involved in the very general proposition from which Lotze makes the transition to the third process, that of comparison. Lotze there, in order to justify a peculiar feature of his view of comparison, emphasises the general position that the world of directly presented experience, that is, the universe of sense-impression and idea, might without self-contradiction be conceived of as altogether destitute of grounds of comparison. It might, that is, consist of an aggregate of units each of which is different from every other.

This general position is sufficiently difficult to maintain in itself: for, certainly, it must be regarded as doubtful whether any conception can be formed of an aggregate in which the units are wholly unrelated. And it proceeds on an antithesis which we have no reason to accept as valid. It is meaning-

less unless we accept as fundamental the distinction between sense-impressions and ideas on the one hand and thinking on the other, or (which is the same antithesis expressed in more objective terms) unless we accept as radical the difference between experience and the mind itself. But such an antithesis can be accepted in neither form. To oppose mind to its experience is to isolate mind from the world of fact, to give it an external position from which all our ingenuity will never extricate it successfully. It is to ignore the consideration that we are not entitled, in philosophy generally, or in psychology in particular, to start with the conception of mind as a given, completed, self-existent fact. The contrary position is the truer one, that mind only comes into being in and through its experiences, that the experience which, as we say, 'it has,' might quite as legitimately be said to constitute the mind. And if we take the antithesis in its more subjective fashion, we cannot regard as possible experience a mental life which should veritably be an aggregate of wholly isolated units of sense-impression and idea. Nowhere in the actual living experience of mind do we come upon such units. The conception of them is evidently an abstraction. They emerge from our analysis of mind; but even that analysis ought not to be made responsible for the fictitious independence which our expressions confer on them.

For my part, then, I see no reason to admit the sharp antithesis between positing and distinguishing on the one hand and the mechanism of sense and idea on the other. The only concrete fact in our experience, in even the primitive stage of the mental life, is the *sense-apprehension which is in its own nature the being aware of a content*, and which, therefore, involves in itself what are here distinguished as three apparently independent facts: position, discrimination, and the given of sense or idea. It is only our analysis

which distinguishes these three aspects. It is misleading to describe the fact of sense-apprehension as a union of them.

The most important of the three connected processes in Lotze's view is the third—Comparison. Such comparison, although the term indicates rather specially an activity, is, however, so far at least as the pre-logical operation is concerned, to be regarded as mainly determined by the nature of the given material. Lotze is, at all events, perfectly clear in regard to this often-debated point. Thinking, in his view, does not create the relations which lie at the foundation of all developed knowledge of given fact. The elementary relations of degree, number, and extent are accepted by thought, not produced by it. In particular the relation, varying in degree, of identity and difference, as in fact given, makes itself manifest in the first generalities of our thinking experience; and the contrast between what Lotze here calls the 'first universal' and the concept serves to define the distinction between comparison in its pre-logical stage and the same function when concerned in the formation of the concept.

The Concept is a highly complex product of active thinking. Looked at as formed, the concept involves the representation of a general law of connexion among the determining characters of a number of individuals, and also the representation of individuals manifesting or exhibiting this uniform connexion with considerable variety of detail or of accompanying circumstance. Looked at in its formation, the concept presupposes the representation in a quite generalised form of these determining marks, presupposes also the distinction of thing and quality, and may be said always to depend on an active reflective treatment of concrete individuals in whom, amid variety of circumstance, the same kind of connexion of determining marks is to be discerned.

On the other hand, the primitive or 'first universal' ex-

hibits to us the generality of one represented quality, one characteristic which is, so to speak, the type of the many isolated cases in which it may be presented. Over against it the individual instances are not represented as concrete units. The distinction of thing from quality is wholly wanting. As regards its formation, the first universal cannot possibly arise by reflexion on individual cases and abstraction of the common element. Such first universals, of which the sense-qualities are the best examples, are presupposed in the more developed act of thinking by which the concept is formed. They are rather received than produced. Thinking in their regard is passive rather than active.

The name Comparison, it must be said, is not well chosen, for it implies just that which is regarded as wanting in the process here—a certain activity exercised by the subject on material supplied to it. It is true that Lotze has more than once expressed himself regarding this process of Comparison, even in this its pre-logical form, as though it did imply an active exercise on the part of the subject. In his 'Outlines of Psychology,' when he is contrasting the presence of impressions and ideas in consciousness with the apprehension of relations among them, he says explicitly that such apprehension of relations implies an activity that passes from one to the other of the related ideas, and becomes aware of the change which it undergoes in the transition.¹ It can hardly be held that this explicit statement is more than a metaphor used to emphasise the distinction between thinking and the isolated contents which form the mechanism of sense-impression and idea. The account given in the larger Logic qualifies that metaphorical description in a very important respect, though it still leaves very obscure the relation in which the isolated impressions and ideas stand

¹ [Grundzüge der Psychologie (1881), pt. i. c. 3, § 1.]

to the basis of comparison on which thought is supposed to turn. Lotze here throws the emphasis rather on the given character of these relations, interprets them not so much as products of an activity exercised, but rather as implicit connexions of which the mind somehow becomes aware on occasion of the occurrence together of sense-impressions and ideas in certain specific ways. Even with that qualification it seems to me doubtful whether we can accept his view of the nature of the process.

Consider, for example, the manifestation of it involved in the formation of what he calls the primitive or first universals. There, as we saw, a certain result is reached in consequence of our (we must call it) perception of a certain resemblance in quality among sense-impressions and their ideas. It is stated expressly that this first universal (which resembles, if it is not identical with, what psychologists call the generic image) is not reached by the processes of comparing individual cases, making abstraction of the points of difference, and retaining with greater distinctness and clearness the common factors. In what way, then, does it arise? Obviously there must be presupposed a certain number of what, relatively, are to be called individual or particular cases,—even though it be also maintained that these are not apprehended as individuals or particulars in all their detail of special circumstance. They are not individualised, so to speak. Such individualisation, indeed, is evidently regarded as the result of a subsequent process. The individual rather emerges from the first universal than precedes it. In what, then, does the process of forming the first universal consist? Is it to be regarded as a process supervening upon the given impressions? Is it not rather the merely natural development, the intensification under quite empirical conditions, of the very process through which the materials—the impressions and ideas themselves—are given in consciousness?

It is no doubt hard for us to represent the primitive operations of mind except in the form which is familiar in our developed experience, hard, therefore, to represent to ourselves either a succession or a coexistence of partially identical impressions which are divested of the discriminating marks so abundantly supplied in the more developed consciousness. The developed mind has the means, through its experience of space-and-time relations, of separating successive or coexisting impressions and of conferring on each of them an individuality. But, where the space-and-time relations are in the same condition of vagueness and indistinctness, such separation is by no means possible. We have rather to represent successive impressions of what, from the later point of view, we call one and the same type as coming about in the primitive consciousness in a form which is not quite that of a series of isolated units.

The vague whole of the contents of such primitive consciousness has at first but small differentiation by qualitatively distinct features; nor is there fully developed in it the very rudimentary distinction between impression and idea. The revived impression or idea, when first revived in the primitive consciousness, is by no means contrasted with, set over against, the impression which reproduces it. Accordingly, just as we must assume, for the mere presence at all of qualitative distinction in the primitive sense-consciousness, the function of discrimination, so we must allow that what happens, through repetition of sense-impressions belonging, as we say, to one type, is but the intensification of the very same function of discrimination involved in what is called the single impression. The repetition affords the means for a more easy and effective apprehension of what we incline to say has been implicit in the first impression. The first impression, by repetition of that which contains identical features, is, so to speak, analysed—a process, in-

deed, which we are entitled to call quite mechanical, in so far at least as the word implies only absence of any directed control from the side of the subject. This analysis, moreover, does two things: it strengthens the content, which embraces only the features of identity; and, at the same time it gives a certain additional prominence to the features of difference, enabling them, if further circumstances render a more complete individualising possible, to become the distinguishing marks of particular cases.¹

The process does not seem to me fundamentally different when the material provided for the formation of this first universal is coexistent. Only in that case the process has at once the additional aid towards the kind of analysis required that is furnished by the local marks of difference. It is a matter hard to determine, to what extent the primitive consciousness is capable of holding together as parts of the total complex, which always forms the content at any moment, a numerical variety of cases of one and the same general type. We are so accustomed to regard numerical plurality as in itself constituting a basis of discrimination that we overlook the highly complex conditions which, in the developed mind, give definiteness to that numerical variety. In the undeveloped consciousness plurality of co-existing similars is probably a possible apprehension only when the qualitative differences are sufficiently strong.

The first universal does not, on the whole, appear to indicate a new process which can be regarded as quite distinct from what is involved in the having sense-impressions and ideas as parts of a whole of apprehension. But, although Lotze does not extend the scope of these first universals directly beyond quality, it seems to me perfectly obvious

¹ It will depend altogether on whether the individualising of the material conditions—partly relating to the kind of object apprehended, partly conditions of space and time—separate cases comes about swiftly or slowly or not at all.

that they present themselves in just the same fashion in the case of the fundamental non-qualitative relations, those of number and extent. We cannot represent to ourselves the condition of the primitive consciousness, the first grade of apprehension, unless we introduce into the content apprehended those features of difference which lie at the foundation of all our developed notions of number and magnitude or extent. No doubt the first relations which are thus vaguely apprehended—those of plurality and its correlate the unit, those of coexistence and of the occupation of the field of consciousness in varied amount—are devoid of all the specific marks whereby they afterwards become of importance for scientific purposes. But this is true for the same reason that rendered the first universal of quality a mere generic image and not a concept or notion. There is no ground at all, therefore, for refusing to regard the developed relations of our later experience as resting upon first universals, themselves the vague apprehensions of elementary relations, which relations, again; are not superinduced upon the materials of consciousness but are involved in the most rudimentary fact of apprehension.

Hence, with regard in particular to the three connected operations which Lotze singles out—position, distinction, comparison—it seems to be the case that the isolation of them from the mechanism of sense-impression and idea is without due foundation: that such separation, in fact, is but a repetition of the old and wholly misleading abstraction of the form of apprehension from its matter. It is quite impossible to represent sense-impressions and ideas as forming facts of mind except in so far as there are also present just those very features of distinction and relation which Lotze seems to assign to a special, a higher, form of mental activity.

CHAPTER III.

THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE.

THE somewhat elaborate statement of Lotze's view renders unnecessary more than a passing reference to what is peculiar to the Kantian doctrine. Kant's doctrine is in the main unpsychological. Expressed in its sharpest fashion, it is that the function of thought is the reference of our perceptions and ideas to the object. In so formulating it, Kant had partly in view the previous interpretation of thought in the school of Leibniz, according to which the function of thought is the analysis of what is given in perceptions and ideas. In opposition to that view he throws exclusive emphasis on the function of thought not there recognised—the creation of the conception of an object at all. In this perhaps consists the only valuable contribution that his view makes to the psychology of thinking. For, if we exclude any reference to problems belonging to the theory of knowledge, we must understand Kant to say that it is through the activity of thought that there is established in our apprehension the all-important distinction between subjective and objective. Whether, then, we accept or reject the general philosophical implications of this view, we may at least approach it from the psychological side by asking whether it necessarily implies that the establishment of such a distinction is, so to speak, the utterance of a single, simple, unique activity in mind—the spontaneity of thought.

There is no doubt that Kant expresses himself as if that were so. No one contrasts more absolutely than Kant the passive determined character of sense-impressions and the active determining function of thought. But on this two things may be said: first, that so far as its philosophical consequences in the theory of knowledge are concerned, the peculiarly Kantian doctrine is quite independent of any psychological theory as to the nature of thinking and its relation to sense and ideas; and, in the second place, that no ingenuity can accommodate the interpretation of Kant's view, which he himself encourages, that thinking is a spontaneous active unique operation, with the facts of experience, and above all with the development of mind through its several stages from the primitive consciousness, in which the conception of object is almost wholly wanting, to the highest reach of scientific reflexion, where the object is really what is represented in the highly abstract conception of a real world of interconnected parts regulated by general laws. It is always hard to determine what Kant means by 'object.' The very obscurity is sufficient to show that the objectification of the perception and idea cannot possibly be the utterance of a single simple unique faculty or power in mind.

There are two points in Kant's view of thought which deserve particular attention. According to his view thought has the most intimate relation (1) to object or the objective order, and (2) to self-consciousness. Indeed, although we separate those two references for convenience, in Kant's view they are one and the same.

(1) As regards the former, it is in and through the function of thought that there comes about in our experience the all-important reference of representations—sense-perceptions or ideas—to the object. On this account Kant definitely opposes Leibniz's view of the relation between sense and understanding. What thinking does, he main-

tains, is not to clear up our more confused apprehensions of objects, but to give to our representation the reference to object at all. Thinking makes objects possible; and in respect, therefore, to what may be called its operation on the crude materials of representation, it is in nature not analytic but synthetic: it imposes on the materials a form of combination of a quite special kind, that which we express through the notion of the object.

It is true that, in this statement, it appears to be implied that sense *per se*, that is, the mere presence of sense-perceptions in consciousness, constitutes some kind of apprehension or knowledge. As Kant definitely rejects this implication, his opposition to Leibniz might of course be otherwise expressed, by saying that so far from sense being the confused apprehension of what is cleared up in understanding, it is not apprehension at all. In a similar fashion, when Kant so definitely rejects Leibniz's view that sense confusedly represents the purely logical relations which are clearly apprehended by understanding, insisting that sense, so to speak, has its own absolute character—that the relations of space and time there reached are final, not to be regarded as shadowy confused imitations of the purely logical—the same implication might be thought to exist: it might be thought that sense, according to Kant, constituted one kind of apprehension, whereas, according to him, sense *per se* is not apprehension at all.

We may admit the justice, so far, of Kant's criticism of Leibniz's view; in particular, we may accept the opinion that what is apprehended in sense-perception is in its own way final. But, nevertheless, it seems difficult, without an important qualification, to accept the Kantian view that the function of thinking is the introduction of this peculiar factor—the reference to the object. It is difficult, partly because one would hesitate to accept this function as an

ultimate, partly because there is no such simplicity about the notion of object as to render it at all probable that its introduction is the expression of a simple unique function of mind. Beyond a doubt, when the notion of object is taken as Kant himself takes it, our hesitation here rapidly changes to certainty. It is impossible to suppose that the highly developed representation which can be expressed only in the variety of forms unfolded in the categories, is the simple, psychologically first, utterance of an elementary function of mind. What Kant offers as the explicit notion of object may be a description of what thought achieves, and may have even special importance as a description of a necessary stage in the development of experience; it cannot be accepted as indicating the immediate proximate addition to the first incoherent movements of sense-perception. It may not have been Kant's intention that his critical analysis of the components of knowledge should be interpreted as giving at the same time a psychological history of the way in which knowledge comes about. But it is not possible to separate the two inquiries in the way in which he seems to have proceeded. No one can suppose that the first, the simplest, form in which the antithesis arises in consciousness between the subjective contents of mind and an object is that developed systematised representation which appears in Kant's analysis as the correlate and expression of understanding.

There is, therefore, as a result of the Kantian analysis of the developed representation of object, a further problem of the first significance psychologically. If that developed representation be not the first and simplest form in which the objective reference makes its appearance, in what relation does it stand to the simpler modes, and what consequences follow with respect to the supposed function of thought? It

is to be observed, as of considerable importance from the psychological point of view, that in Kant's exposition there is a connexion indicated, but not worked out, between object or objective order and generality. The objective order is the common standard over against which the transitory accidental representations of the individual mind are judged to be subjective. In fact Kant repeatedly, though without sufficiently detailed treatment of the problem implied, identifies 'objective' with 'necessary and universal'; and certainly, whatever else 'necessary and universal' may signify, they imply generality. It has been already pointed out that one of the difficulties in the comprehension of Kant's work is his identification of the function or process of understanding in its two lines of application. The categories are called by him notions, and put on the same level with the logical concept. The analytical function of thinking is viewed as having some identity of character with the far more important synthetic function.

Perhaps we shall find, in the more minute analysis of the simple manifestations of thinking, a clue to the connexion here indicated by Kant between the notions of 'objective' and 'universal' or 'general.' It is possible at the same time that the result of our analysis will be an important modification of the notion 'objective' as employed by Kant.

(2) In regard to the second point—self-consciousness—beyond a doubt Kant is naming correctly one important feature of thinking in our experience. Without that kind of combination or connexion in the contents of our experience which we summarily designate by the term 'thought,' self-consciousness would have no existence; but it is impossible to accept the notion 'self-consciousness' as either simple or primitive. From the psychological point of view, at all events, we are compelled to recognise a continuous gradation in the consciousness of self; and we

cannot regard that highly developed form of it, in which it is the correlate of the orderly systematic representation of a world of things in space and time, as being the first form in which it comes forward in our experience. It may be true that what we call thinking—a process which, as we may assume provisionally, presents itself in very different grades of development—is just the operation in and through which self-consciousness develops. But we are not justified in deriving the operation of thought from self-consciousness, still less from a form of self-consciousness which we cannot suppose to be present from the outset in the development of mind.

These remarks on the Kantian view illustrate what is really the greatest difficulty in the psychological analysis of thinking. The experience in which the manifestations of thinking are to be discovered is so various, that we can hardly suppose that a complete thoroughgoing insight into the nature of thought can be extracted from any one section of it. Moreover, the gradations of the experience from which we have to get our insight into thinking are not all of them, are not even many of them, within reach of psychological analysis. The regressive work which we have to undertake carries us inevitably to regions of the inner life which we have no direct means of inspecting. Much of it, therefore, is inferential, and we have no direct tests to apply to the inferences we make.

CHAPTER IV.

SURVEY OF DEVELOPED THINKING.

WITH this precaution as regards the method to be followed, we have now to ask what light is thrown on our problem by a survey of the developed functions of thinking. Such developed functions are manifested in certain distinctions which run through our mature experience, and in certain special products which form parts of that experience. Both require to be handled with care; for neither, according to our methodical principle, can be at once accepted as ultimate. They are to be utilised only as pointing to the earlier, more elementary, processes, from which they may have developed, and to which we may be able to trace them.

Of the distinctions, the most obvious is doubtless that which appeared in Lotze's treatment as the opposition between the psychical mechanism and the activity of thinking. Our ordinary experience seems abundantly to confirm some such contrast. We set on the one side the appearance in consciousness of sense-presentations coming from the objective world, and, in their coming, under no control, or, at best, a very indirect control, by us; likewise the haphazard unregulated flow of ideas, regulated no doubt by principles and explicable by reference to causes, but standing, so far, beyond our control, not dominated by reference to any end proposed by the subject himself. Over against these, we place the exercise of some activity of our own: the expres-

sion of ourselves or our own purposes wherein the train of ideas is dominated by some end, theoretical or practical, which was proposed by the subject himself, and in which the combining or separating of the materials appears as a process carried out upon them by the subject. Taken in the mass, our thinking appears (1) as a subjective activity, (2) as the expression of some purpose, and therefore as self-conscious, (3) as relating together the materials supplied by presentation and representation.

It cannot be supposed that, in this distinction, we are really naming fundamental and original oppositions of mental function. The smallest consideration suffices to convince us not only that the distinction is far from being so absolute as it appears in expression, but that, as it occurs in our experience, it is in itself fluctuating and variable. No one of the members of the oppositions it sums up is capable of being taken as simple and ultimate. (1) Subjective and objective, which we contrast with one another, evidently present themselves at different stages of experience in different aspects. (2) The purposes or ends which we seek to realise, and which give to our thinking its self-conscious aspect, are also variable, dependent on accidental circumstances. (3) The relating or combining and separating operation of thinking is evidently only possible if the material be adapted thereto; and the material, therefore, cannot be regarded as quite foreign, distinct in origin, and wholly opposed psychologically, to thinking itself.

In the same way, if we take into account the characteristic products of the activity of thinking—*notion, judgment, reasoning*—we shall be compelled to allow that the sharp differences which mark them off from one another, and from the other contents of mind in our mature experience, must needs be regarded as *results*, not as *primitive conditions*: that the variety in the range of each of them indicates that the

fully formed product is the last term of a development, and that its characteristics are not primitive, and can be taken only as indicating the original features from which the development started.

In reasoning, judgment, and notion there have long been recognised the special forms of mental process in which the activity of thinking is displayed. But the logical analysis of these products of thought, which generally determines the view we take of their natures, contemplates almost inevitably the most matured stage of their existence. Too little attention has been given to two points significant even for logic, namely: (1) the variety of graduated forms in which these products appear, and (2) the common basis which constitutes each of them a product of thinking. The tendency of logical treatment is on the whole to consider exclusively the most developed types, and to regard the three products as either independent of one another or as only in a kind of mechanical relation to one another.

There are thus two lines of consideration to be followed; and these converge towards a common result. In the first place we may seek to connect the developed with the primary stages in these several products of thinking; and secondly, by a consideration of the points they have in common, we may hope to discover what are either fundamental characteristics of thinking or the determining peculiarities which, in the mental life, give a definite impetus in one direction—the direction which we call summarily the development of thought. We take, then, in the first place, the attempt to analyse the more complex forms of the products of thought, and to connect them with their primary stages.

CHAPTER V.

ANALYSIS OF THINKING.

REASONING, the most involved of the three types of thought, is itself presented as exhibiting a variety of different forms. Logical analysis recognises not only the broad division between deductive and inductive reasoning, but also, within the scope of the former, a subdivision which for the moment we shall accept in the Kantian fashion as into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive reasoning. These are generally formulated in a way which corresponds to the highest range of thinking, with its definite discrimination of the universal or general from the special particular or individual.

In the Disjunctive Syllogism the fundamental proposition expresses an exhaustive enumeration of alternative possibilities. It rests therefore on an insight into the determining conditions of the subject, which can only be expressed in the most general fashion. Now, it is evident that, even if the insight here referred to constitutes a ground for recognising one specific type of reasoning, it ought not to be forgotten that such insight must itself be a derivative fact, reached gradually in mind by means of a series of approximations. If we can trace these approximations, they may give us a more complete knowledge of what is involved in the result. It may be perfectly true that, under the conditions of knowledge, the disjunctive proposition represents one fundamentally distinct form of our way of representing

real fact. That it should have a history, that it should gradually develop in our experience, stands in no contradiction to such recognition of its fundamental value. It is a complete mistake to suppose that the significance of a form of thinking in our experience, the importance of the part it plays in enabling us fully to represent reality, is dependent on the manner in which it comes to exist in our concrete thinking.

Evidently, the highest form of the disjunctive proposition will be found where most complete abstraction is made of all the material conditions which enter into the special subject to which it refers. But that this should be so indicates at once the nature of the antecedent and less developed forms of the same proposition. They may exhibit the same general characteristic as is displayed in the developed form, that is, they may proceed on the basis of enumeration of alternatives; but the alternatives enumerated will be determined by material conditions, and the exhaustiveness of the enumeration which is required will have a wider or narrower scope according to the kind of alternatives that are included. In this way, the developed disjunctive proposition does not seem to differ in kind from the much more elementary recognition of alternatives which is limited in scope by the conditions of immediate perception, and which contemplates little more than the alternations of Here and There, of Now and Then. If this is so, it is also reasonable to assume that the universality of the developed form is dependent on the possibility of making more and more abstraction of accompanying conditions; and that in turn is dependent on two correlative facts: first, increase of material experience, and secondly, greater ability to hold together and manipulate masses of ideas in consciousness. *

Further, even in its least developed form, the disjunctive judgment must be recognised by us as some-

what complex. It involves the fundamental distinction, whether logical or psychological, of subject and predicate; it postulates the ability to relate a given perceived subject to what is represented in idea; it involves, therefore, a certain recognition of the fundamental distinction between order of ideas and order of fact,—a recognition, moreover, of that distinction which cannot itself be called primitive. The conception of alternatives indicates unmistakably a certain advance from the primary stage of distinguishing between idea and fact. Again, there is obviously involved in the alternatives, however simple they may be, the element of generalisation. An alternative, however limited its scope, is representable only in a generalised fashion: the alternatives cannot themselves have the definiteness of the individual subject.

Take next the Hypothetical Judgment. Recent logicians have tended towards the discrimination of two forms of the hypothetical proposition, the basis of the hypothetical reasoning. They recognise, first, the more abstract type, that in which the members connected, antecedent and consequent, have not separate independence, do not constitute in isolation complete predications, where, therefore, the entire thought expressed in the hypothetical judgment is not so much a combination as a chemical mixture of antecedent and consequent. A second and less abstract type admits of a certain independence of antecedent and consequent. The assertion made is more of the nature of a statement respecting the conditions under which a certain fact or event comes about.

Even if the distinction here drawn were admitted, we should find that the more abstract type involved a complex representation of a connected interdependent whole, which in its nature so closely resembles the less developed thoughts of

less abstract connexions, that we could not overlook the fundamental identity of character between them. This connexion in idea between antecedent and consequent is not absolutely, but only relatively, distinct from the more concrete representation which we frame to ourselves of connexions—dependence of events in time, or relation of objects in space. Logicians have been in the habit of excluding from the range of the hypothetical proposition those forms of statement in which a connexion is asserted of a temporal kind—as ‘whenever A is then B is’—on the ground that logical connexion is independent of temporal qualification. But the independence so claimed is only relative. Even in the judgment which involves the temporal qualification there are present and operative the same functions of thinking which, carried to a higher range of abstraction, find expression in the purely logical judgment. Our view of what is involved in the hypothetical judgment becomes far more sound and fruitful when we take these less developed types into account than when we confine attention to the highly abstract variety called the logical.

In these lower types there is implied the representation of an orderly connexion, a uniformity of relation, both as regards time and as regards space. But this representation evidently implies that the subject thinking has reached the stage of being able to distinguish the transient momentary event from the relatively permanent order of nature, and this again indicates recognition, and a somewhat developed recognition, of the difference between order of subjective experience and order of objective fact. Moreover, as before, the element of generality is involved. The order of connected fact is never represented, can never be represented, in strictly individualised fashion.

The hypothetical judgment suggests, as can readily be seen, the rather interesting question, whether the undoubted com-

plexity it involves entitles us to regard it as, properly speaking, a type of judgment. Logicians more than once have raised the question as to the right of the hypothetical to be called a judgment. Consider the connexion asserted in it. It is impossible to suppose that the consequent is merely an application of analysis to the antecedent. There is always, therefore, the reference to a factor lying, one may say, outside of antecedent and consequent, and enabling the connexion to be asserted. But this is the characteristic of reasoning. The hypothetical judgment must therefore raise the further question, whether it is not in itself a simple type of the reasoning process, whether the act of asserting a connexion, such as is expressed in the hypothetical judgment, is not in its nature reasoning. No doubt there is implied in this question an assumption not yet justified, that judgment in its simplest form contains only the factors Subject and Predicate.

No distinction in regard to the Categorical Judgment is more familiar in logic than that between universal and particular. For our purpose the contrast would perhaps be better stated as that between universal and individual. Logically, these are placed side by side; and, for certain purposes, such treatment is adequate. From the psychological point of view, however, it is indispensable that we should recognise, and endeavour to account for, the all-important difference between the universal and individual judgments. We should not allow without discussion—as the logical treatment seems to allow—that the universal judgment is just an immediate expression of some power which we possess. At various points, indeed, even in the logical treatment of thought, the necessity for some such discussion becomes apparent. The theory of syllogism, for example, cannot be discussed without consideration of what is actually and in detail the representation which finds expression in the uni-

versal judgment. It is imperative there to inquire what it is that we think in the universal proposition, and perhaps hardly less necessary to raise the further, more metaphysical, question, With what justification do we represent what seems to be contained in the universal judgment?

The psychological treatment does not, in the first instance at least, necessitate the treatment of this second question. For its purpose, it is sufficient to describe fully what is the total attitude of mind involved in the universal judgment. It may be taken for granted that the total representation implied in formulating a universal judgment is complex. Whatever the judgment may be, it seems beyond question that our representation, which gives it body and substance, extends far beyond the limits of what can be immediately presented, and implies a combination of elements such as could not possibly be given in direct immediate fashion. It would no doubt be prejudging the metaphysical question to say, Therefore the universal judgment is always of the nature of an inference. Without going so far as this, it is sufficient—and it seems necessary—from the psychological point of view, to say, The universal judgment, however got, is always a complex product. It is impossible to suppose that, in human consciousness, immediate experience at once calls forth universal judgments. If this were applied directly to the logical treatment of judgment, it would carry with it the rather important consequence which the ordinary logical analysis overlooks, that what is called the quantity of judgment is not a primitive inherent mark but a derivative characteristic.

Of course it is here taken for granted that universal bears the definite meaning of 'holding good in all possible cases.' It is therefore implied that some distinction obtains between the universal which is expressed in such judgments, and such mere generality as may very well accompany prim-

itive judgments in which the element of distinction is at the minimum. The same difference, in fact, is implied here, as logicians have seen right to insist on, between the concept or developed logical notion and the general or generic representation. The logical notion always involves the relatively distinct representation of individual cases in which a common structure, element, law, or order is realised. Psychologically, then, in respect to the categorical judgment, as in respect to the others, we must contemplate a gradation in which there may be certain common elements, though possibly even the simplest form which we may succeed in disentangling will exhibit itself as being psychically a complex fact. The line of search which we at present pursue—that relating to quantity—would certainly seem to indicate, when followed out, that the simplest type of judgment will be that in which quantitative distinction is wholly wanting, such, for example, as the impersonal judgment in developed speech.

But another line of inquiry will carry us more directly to the heart of the problem. In the universal, beyond question, there is the conscious reference of our representation to real objective fact. Such objective order may be of one kind or another. It may be the order of external nature, or that of the inner life, or even a fictitious order based, however, on the experiences of the others, and inconceivable except in reference to them. This objective order is always recognisable as playing a part in whatsoever judgment we form. Further, it is to be noted that, when 'reference to objective order' is spoken of, the whole process is one of thought: it is a representation of objective order; and obviously the function of judging and the exercise of that function are wholly independent of any question as to the adequacy of this, that, or any representation of the objective order. 'Objective order' is our represented objective order, nothing more.

In such judgments, then, there is always some kind of combination, synthesis, or relation between representations of a more special character, and the representation of objective fact; and, commonly enough, the combination is expressed by means of the abstract term, 'reference of ideas to objective fact.' The special problem to which I allude concerns the nature of this reference. I approach this problem first by calling attention to the commonly accepted distinction between what is called an Idea and a Judgment. The distinction goes back to Aristotle, who points out that in the judgment there is always a combination or separation of terms signifying combination or separation in fact, and that the terms in isolation do not involve such reference to fact. The single representation or idea is thus distinguished from the same representation or idea when it is embodied in a judgment or assertion. No doubt we may readily accept some such distinction. Every one must admit a difference between the idea of an object *simpliciter* and the assertion that such an object exists, or even between the idea *simpliciter* and the idea when it forms the subject of an assertion.

Although the difference is clear enough in our mature experience, it does not therefore follow that it should with equal distinctness hold good at all stages of our mental development. Indeed it may be held that the separation of the idea—the abstraction which has been made in order to render it possible to contemplate it *simpliciter*—is the result of thinking, and that we are not therefore entitled to suppose that we start with such simple ideas, and then, whether by some addition to them or by manipulation of them, proceed to the judgment. It seems psychologically certain that the implicit reference to the objective order in the idea of an object is itself in need of explanation. We have no right to assume that our ideas are originally given to us as ideas of

objects, and then maintain that they are quite distinct from assertions with regard to objective fact.

In what, then, is it supposed that the distinction between such simple elements of the judgment and the judgment itself consists? Here the very thorough and excellent discussion of the question in Brentano's *Psychology*¹ may be taken as the basis for our consideration. Brentano holds that the difference between the simple idea representation or presentation and the judgment is fundamental and primordial. It is not explicable by reference to any difference in the content, nor by any qualitative difference in the apprehension of the idea concerned. The assertion (he argues) cannot be explained as a clearer or more distinct recognition of what is in the idea. It must then be explained as resting on a fundamental difference in the attitude of consciousness towards the content apprehended—a difference comparable to that between an idea and an idea which excites desire or aversion. In this latter case every one allows that a new fundamental and original element is added to the idea. Nothing in the intellectual characteristics of the idea explains the addition of desire or aversion. So in the case of judgment. A given content A is asserted: A is; the addition is not to be regarded as a new feature of A, which remains the same throughout, nor is it a clearer or more distinct apprehension of A; it must consist, then, in some distinctness of attitude of the thinking subject towards A; it is the expression of a unique, simple, primitive function of mind. Accordingly, from his point of view, Brentano recognises judging as one of the fundamental primitive components of consciousness. Presentations are given and are judged; and all judgment, moreover, as he regards it, is assertion of the existence or non-existence of what is given in presentation or idea.

¹ [Psychologie, B. II. c. vii. ; cf. above, p. 180.]

According to this view the function of judging is wholly and exclusively the addition to a given content of the reference to objective reality. The doubt one would entertain with respect to such an explanation concerns the justification for assuming, as it assumes, that objective reality in any fashion can be taken as a primitive element in the experience of the thinking subject. Evidently if it be primitive, it cannot be in form a detailed representation. The existence of A cannot consist in the position of A in any, however undeveloped, system of reality. We may find ourselves led to regard this function of judging, if primitive, as being of the inexplicable character of a feeling. And, indeed, not a few psychologists—Hume,¹ for example—have been found maintaining that the difference between an idea and an asserted reality is constituted by the presence of a peculiar feeling; some—for example, J. S. Mill,² as well as Hume—have named the inexplicable element ‘Belief.’

Brentano represents a long tradition in maintaining that the essential fact in thinking is the peculiar function of judgment, which is regarded as primitive simple and an addition made to perceptions or ideas. No one would doubt the difference between the simple presentation or idea and the judgment. But it is not equally clear that we are entitled to assume that such difference as now presents itself is in its own nature primitive and simple. It is equally doubtful whether, considering the nature of the supposed act of judging or asserting, we are entitled to regard it as a simple and primitive function of mind. It must certainly be regarded as surprising that, if the function of judging be simple and primordial, its exercise should vary with the conditions presented. For it can hardly be supposed that every perception or idea—these being assumed to be independent of the judging function—shall, simply as such, call

¹ [See above, vol. i. p. 144.]

² [See below, p. 272 n.]

forth the activity of that function. And, if the exercise of the function be in any way dependent on conditions, these can only lie in some characteristics of the perceptions or ideas judged about, and the process becomes a complex instead of a simple one.

Moreover, there is some ground for doubt regarding the description of the primitive judgment to which all others are on this view reduced. The existential judgment is not in itself so clear and unambiguous that we can without hesitation accept it as requiring no further explanation; for it is quite evident that the existence which enters into our various judgments is not always of the same kind. Existence, then, cannot be regarded as a simple unambiguous predicate. It demands a closer analysis to determine what is contained in the supposed assertion of existence. In all probability the ground for insisting on the primitive irreducible character of this asserted existence is the absolute distinction drawn between the contents of the judgment and the reference to objective fact which seems to stand alongside of them. For, if this distinction be made absolute—perhaps I ought to say, be misinterpreted—it is natural to conclude that any specification of the kind of existence must needs be in terms of some content or other which would therefore lie altogether outside of the assertion of existence.

It will be observed that this view to which we seem reduced is the fundamental conception at the root of all forms of Subjective Idealism. It is not necessary to adopt Subjective Idealism by accepting that foundation, for we may add to it, as is done in the theory here considered, the postulate that alongside of the contents there is given a simple irreducible assertion which carries us straightway to the objective. But, the more complete we make the distinction, the more startling and doubtful do we make the

postulate of this simple irreducible assertion of objective reality.

Besides, if we draw the distinction in this way, we are compelled to raise the further question, Whether we are justified in assuming that the analysis we can so readily make of our developed complex judgments—wherein, as we say, there are ideas connected *plus* some factor of belief or assertion—is an expression of the primitive components of the mental life within which judging and thinking manifest themselves.

We have as much reason for doubt with regard to this as with regard to the cognate distinction in language between the parts of speech and the sentence. In formed speech we make the analysis readily enough, and are all too prone to assume that in fact the sentence, which is the type of connected speech, is built up out of those components into which we now resolve it. But this is not so. No language is constructed out of original elements precisely corresponding to the separate words into which we may now analyse it. If any result of philological inquiry can be trusted, we are justified in assuming that, in the primitive components of speech, the familiar distinctions, by means of which we break up the developed sentence into its parts, were not present; that the unit of speech resembled far more closely the sentence than the part of the sentence, though in truth it was identical with neither. In a similar fashion we may insist, on psychological grounds, that the sharp distinction we make between the terms of a judgment and the assertion of objective reality is a derivative fact, and does not represent the primitive condition of the simpler mental life.

There is a great deal of abstraction involved in this apparently simple discrimination. It may be quite true that the distinction between a sensation and an idea is irre-

ducible, primordial, as Mill, for example, contends;¹ and, to all appearance, Brentano's theory was a development from that observation. But, undoubtedly, the distinction does not consist in this, that with the same content there is present in the one and wanting in the other, a simple inexplicable utterance of the function of judgment—an assertion of objective existence. If we do make the abstraction required in order to contemplate isolated sensations and ideas as facts of mind (and such abstraction may really give a very imperfect picture of the actual mental process), we may fairly recognise differences of a quite ultimate or primordial kind without describing them in terms of a really complex act.

To all appearance, then, our discussion now thrusts us back to what may certainly be regarded as a tolerably simple and early stage of consciousness—the apprehension of the objective. It seems to me impossible to form any psychological theory of the judgment except by regarding its several forms as based on the simplest consciousness of the objective in our experience, and as expressing, in their gradual development, the increasing width and richness of the total representation of objective fact which we find in that experience. I assume some such gradation in the range of our

¹ See J. S. Mill's edition of James Mill's *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, vol. i. pp. 412-3: "What, in short, is the difference to our minds between thinking of a reality, and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture. I confess that I can perceive no escape from the opinion that the distinction is ultimate and primordial. There is no more difficulty in holding it to be so, than in holding the difference between a sensation and an idea to be primordial. It seems almost another

aspect of the same difference." [P. 423: "I cannot help thinking, therefore, that there is in the remembrance of a real fact, as distinguished from that of a thought, an element which does not consist, as the author supposes, in a difference between the mere ideas which are present to the mind in the two cases. This element, howsoever we define it, constitutes Belief, and is the difference between Memory and Imagination. From whatever direction we approach, this difference seems to close our path."]

representation of reality, and I think it probable that we shall be able to make out a connexion between the more concrete forms of that representation and the more abstract—a connexion which will explain to us the ultimate relation, the tendency almost to flow into one another, of the two conceptions 'reality' and 'truth.'

I assume also what I think would readily be granted, that the whole development of this representation of reality is correlated with, and dependent on, the growth in the conscious subject of those experiences—sensations, ideas, and their combinations—wherein his mental life consists. It is to this side that the psychological analysis of thinking has to turn; and its first problem is to determine what combination of experiences in the inner life is required in order to give, in its primitive form, the distinction between subjective and objective. In the absence of such distinction no judgment can possibly have a place in consciousness; for the judgment, whatever else it may involve, has as its characteristic the reference to the objective. We have already seen that such reference is not to be taken as a simple unchangeable part of the judgment. The 'objective' referred to is a variable quantity; and we cannot and ought not to suppose that what we vaguely call the 'reference' remains entirely unaffected by this alteration in what it concerns.

No thinking then, so far at least as that is expressed in the recognised products of thought, is possible except on the basis of the fundamental discrimination in consciousness between the subjective and the objective. Now there can be no doubt that, so far as our human experience is concerned, the simplest form of that discrimination concerns solely the difference between sensuous perception and idea—a difference which is itself capable of resolution into a number of connected factors. Were we limited in our experiences to what are commonly called intellectual processes, it is doubtful

whether this distinction could ever make its appearance. Only because every change in our consciousness is accompanied by a varying amount of sensuous feeling and of impulse which is very different in the two contrasted cases (that of actual stimulation of the organs of sense and that of revived idea), is it possible for a first crude imperfect distinction to establish itself in mind between subjective and objective.¹

The objective order, in such primitive sensuous consciousness, does not extend beyond the occasions of actual sense-perception. A certain unity of the subjective consciousness is undoubtedly implied in the merely natural conditions which render possible even the simplest form of this distinction: for, at all events, there must be a coexistence in one and the same state of a number of distinct modifications of consciousness. We may conjecture rather than confidently name the conditions on which the establishment of a higher form of that primitive unity of mind depends. Apparently it depends much on the two circumstances: (1) the range of discriminated sense-perceptions, (2) the possibility of accurate and complete revival of these in idea. A consciousness possessing but few elements of sense-perception, and these but vaguely discriminated, reviving few of its original impressions, and that in an imperfect form, can hardly arrive, I do not say at a representation of continuity in time, but even at the basis for such a representation—the ability to hold together in one state of consciousness present perceptions and a number of revived ideas with their distinguishing circumstance. A unity of mind which involves a certain representation of continuous existence implies likewise, with

¹ Although, strictly speaking, our conception of mind hardly extends beyond the form in which such distinction is involved. [The statement in the text here should be supplemented by what is said elsewhere regarding the function of the space-element in the formation of the distinction between subjective and objective. See vol. i. pp. 238, 291 f.]

respect to the object, recognition therein of the primitive time-relation and also representation of the object as possessing continuity and unity of existence. Our sense-perceptions and ideas taken in isolation are ways in which we apprehend, directly or indirectly, this continuous permanent objective existence.

On the basis of even the simple distinction between the reality of what is apprehended immediately in sense-perception and the representative character of what is given in an idea, there would no doubt be possible a certain rudimentary form of judgment. Such rudimentary form is perhaps indicated wherever a portion of sentient experience is interpreted as a sign; for the interpretation of any given content as a sign implies (1) a certain power of holding, side by side and apart from one another, ideas and actual facts, and (2) a certain (I think one must call it) *sense of continuity*. No doubt it is hard, from our point of view, to express these implications without introducing into them the reflective elements which are now always present in our interpretation of a sign; but the admission of the implications seems to me inevitable. It is quite certain that, even where the mental development does not extend beyond the perceptive stage, as in the animal, it is possible for interpretation of signs to come about. In our human experience, however, another factor is introduced which modifies in a very important way the meaning of symbols or signs and the method of interpreting them.

The objective world, even with the restriction of its significance to that which is immediately presented to sense, is not for us merely the antithesis to our own individual inner life. Nay, perhaps the correlative term here introduced—the individual inner life—would never acquire a definite meaning except in and through that further factor to which I refer. The real world of perception is the com-

mon point of reference for the experiences of a number of similar percipient subjects.

It will always be a difficult, perhaps an impossible, problem for special psychology, to determine accurately the history of the steps whereby this all-important extension of meaning is given to the objective sense-perceived reality. In all probability such an addition depends on a number of distinct psychical processes, of some of which we have a tolerably clear conception. Even within the limits of the individual mind we can discover what the conditions are which render it possible to contrast the immediate sense-perception itself with the reality which is apprehended thereby. Evidently, for such a distinction, there is required a considerable coherence on the side of that complex of mental facts which makes up the unity of the percipient subject; and correlatively it is quite certain that there must coincide with these facts, perhaps as rendering them possible, a certain regularity of occurrence of the sense-presentations which are given to the subject.

But, even admitting these implications, we must acknowledge that there is much that is obscure, and perhaps hardly capable of completely satisfactory explanation, in the history of the process whereby the individual subject recognises a kind of existence generically identical with his own, ascribes to it the same kind of unity and identity as he finds in himself, and thereby places it in the same relation to perceived reality as that which is expressed in his own experience. The process once completed, a wholly new aspect of the perceived reality is disclosed, and what is called interpretation of signs acquires a new and larger significance. It is here, among these primitive acts of the forming intelligence, that we at the same time come upon that which has long been (and is probably destined long to be) a puzzle for human reflexion—the origin of speech or language.

We have no direct means of determining in what way the two processes so closely linked together worked into one another. Neither must be regarded as, so to speak, an instantaneous act. Even the simpler of them, the generation of the common consciousness of reality—a process which results in the highly important distinction in the inner life between the individual aspect of the subject's experiences and their general validity—must be conceived of by us, despite our present prejudices, as coming about gradually. Once established, and supported as it is throughout by the product of the other process, the formation of a common stock of signs with objective significance, the continuity of human social existence renders it altogether unnecessary, and even impossible, for the individual subject again to pass through in a recognisable fashion the series of steps by which the result was first reached. There is now, as it were, forced on the growing consciousness of each individual subject the very distinction which had slowly and painfully to be evolved in the earliest stages of the development of human consciousness.

The origin of speech or language no doubt constitutes a problem which can only be approached indirectly; and, unfortunately, there are few or no materials for testing the inferences by which alone we can offer an account of the process of that origination. At best, perhaps, the facts at our disposal enable us only to indicate what general types of conditions are involved in the first conscious use of signs as having objective significance. I here refer to the problem only because the consideration of it brings forcibly before us the inseparable connexion between 'objective' and 'general.' It has long been a commonplace that language, or the system of signs constituting a language, is general in significance. It is equally true to say that such signs have always ob-

jective significance; and, historically, it seems tolerably clear that 'objective' first signified the more limited range of what was immediately given in sense-perception. Now, such immediate data by no means involved at first the clear sharply-drawn distinctions which we make between outer and inner, between nature and mind. The primitive distinction, in and through which consciousness first arises, might very well be drawn in the absence of any such precise description of the contrasted facts as is now familiar to us. Accordingly, it ought not to surprise us that all the records of language tend to confirm the view that at first the description of objective facts, of what is offered in sense-perception, is given largely in terms which express the composite experience of the subject in his relation to the outer world.

Again, researches into the origin of language make tolerably clear to us the kind of generality which first attached to the signs or symbols. At first, the meaning of the sign was naturally determined on the basis of such direct experience as was possessed; that is to say, it was such features of what had to be symbolised as attracted attention, that were able to be assimilated, apprehended, by the primitive intelligence. Such hasty abstractions from the given, from what is presented in experience, doubtless based also on but a scanty survey of instances, have certainly a kind of generality; but it is the generality which comes from indeterminateness and want of precision. It is therefore compatible with two features which we can discover even among the terms of a developed language: on the one hand the same significance is thought to be apprehended in a great variety of really distinct facts of experience; and, on the other hand, what is really the same feature or character of given experience may present a variety of aspects each of which suggests, so to speak, another significance marked or symbolised by a sign. Thus we might suppose that the first

rudimentary signs in primitive language would have a fluctuating character in two ways: one and the same sign would stand for a great variety of experiences connected, it may be, by the loosest links of analogy; and one and the same fact, as we call it now, would be symbolised by a great variety of signs. This is exactly what, so far, the researches into the history of language make plain to us.

Taken roughly, these researches have yielded one psychologically all-important result. They show that, with respect to given types of language, it is possible to reduce their immense developed structure and composition to a certain number of significant signs which cannot be further explained. The development of a language is regarded as the history of the progress from a certain number of roots. Thus the discussion of the more primitive grades of the formation of a language concentrates on the question of the way in which these roots are to be understood and accounted for. It was not unnatural in the light of such a result that, with respect to roots, there should be revived in modern times most of the old theories respecting the origin of language; and, in particular, that these roots should have been taken to constitute the simple irreducible primitive stock of signs employed by the human mind under particular conditions—for social intercourse, communication of thought, signification of the objective. Equally natural was the assumption that in each root was somehow imbedded a definite significance, seeing that it was possible to find an explanation for the variety which the formed language displayed in its development from the root.

But it ought not to have escaped notice that any such assumption is wholly incompatible with the natural history of language: that nothing could be more unlikely, judging even from the records of development from the roots, than that these roots themselves should have had from the outset

a definite precise significance. Evidently the same circumstances, which in their after-history serve to explain the variations of meaning, cannot be supposed inoperative previously except on the violent assumption that the roots somehow sprang into existence with just that definite significance which we now think ourselves justified in assigning to them.

If, proceeding from these facts regarding language, we apply them to elucidate the psychological conditions under which the use of verbal signs may have originated, we are compelled, I think, to this general conclusion: The word first makes its appearance as a sign for a highly complex inner experience, a total attitude of the subject to the matters presented to him in perception. We must regard the word as having its locus in that grade of developing intelligence in which there becomes clear and distinct for the first time the objective meaning of perceived experience as the common field of action for a number of percipient subjects. Thus, not only is a considerable development of mind implied as precondition for the use of signs; but that development carries in it the distinction between the objective order of fact and the relatively subjective character of sense-perceptions and ideas. Moreover, it is a natural conclusion (and it is as fully confirmed as one can expect by the records of primitive language) that the first signs should be prevaillingly significant of the complex fact—the relation of the human subject to the objects of his experience. It need not surprise us, therefore, to discover that what may be called the fundamental grammatical categories are, in their first form, indicative of the practical relations of the agent to his surroundings. Primitive language is just as prevaillingly anthropomorphic as human thinking in general, or in any of its specific developments—mythology, for example, in which the same tendency is perhaps more easily seen.

The word or sign, then, carried with it from the outset

objective significance. • It had from the outset that very reference to an order distinct from the inner process of ideas and impressions which we have been regarding as pre-eminently the characteristic of thought. Moreover, even though words gradually come to have their significance more sharply determined, so that they name this or that portion of experience, and the putting them together in intelligent speech seems to be a process extraneous to them, yet in truth, in their first appearance, they are significant of a complex fact such as would find expression later by the developed instrument of the proposition or judgment. From all this it would appear that what we have been assuming as specially requiring consideration in respect to thought—its objective reference—is not in any way peculiar to thinking; that, therefore, the theory which finds most definite expression in the Kantian doctrine of knowledge—that through thought only is the object possible—is either erroneous or only a partial truth.

It is certainly to be admitted that the developed representation of an objective world, a structure regulated by general laws, and a common standard for the individual perceptions of all perceiving subjects—that this is possible only through and in the process of thinking. But it is not created by that process: it is in truth but one aspect, which we erroneously abstract, of the whole complex development whereby our experience is constituted, which itself rests on and starts from perception, and which is itself dependent on the material features of what is given to us in perception. When, therefore, Kant tells us that the understanding makes nature, at least in its formal aspect, that it is only through understanding and by its operation that the complex of our perceptive experience comes to have systematic connexion, we must regard him as so exaggerating a half-truth as to turn it into a philos-

optical error. It is undoubtedly true that our thinking *in its developed form* involves the representation of a scheme of universal laws in the concrete of perceptive experience. But it is, on the one hand, wholly impossible to effect the separation which Kant's view implies, between the formal and material elements of nature; and, on the other hand, we are bound to recognise that no shadow of this representation of nature as a systematic whole would appear in our consciousness except by gradual development from the simple primitive distinction between the sentient subject and an order of fact distinct from his perceiving and feeling, though devoid of the element of universal or general law. One may say, of course, that in that primitive distinction there is implicit what presents itself later in the clear outline of our thought of self and nature. But the development of what is implicit, even if we admit for the moment that ambiguous notion, is by no means to be regarded as dependent solely on the activity of some inner process: it is equally conditioned by the character of the matter presented in our perceptive experience.

Thus, in very general terms, we should regard Thinking as a name for either a set of processes of the inner life or a set of modifications of the content apprehended through that inner life, based upon the simpler facts of perception, and constituting, therefore, not an isolated faculty or power in mind but a higher grade of what is given in simpler fashion in the primitive distinction between self and not-self. If we call the thinking apprehension of things a form which our experience assumes, we must bear in mind that the form is not independent of the matter, that it is not even a form which is presented in all its completeness at a stroke: it is dependent on the matter of our experience, and comes forward in consciousness in a series of gradations whose progress we can trace to a certain extent.

CHAPTER VI.

PROBLEMS IN THE THEORY OF THINKING.

ON the basis of this very general view it seems possible to obtain a fairly sufficient answer to some of the main problems connected with the theory of thinking.

I. *Interrelation of the Products of Thinking.*—Let us take first the question regarding the relation to one another of the ‘products of thought’—the notion, judgment, and reasoning. Even when we recognise that notions form a series whose first members can by no means possess the complexity and abstractness of the more developed, it is apparent that even the first forms of what are called notions cannot be regarded as isolated facts of the inner life. A notion, it is true, like the word which expresses it, always embodies the reference to objective fact. Lotze is undoubtedly correct in laying stress on this function which words discharge: they are symbols, not of a content in the individual’s mind, but of what he takes himself to apprehend of objective fact in that content. A notion or word, therefore, is always, in its psychological application, indicative of a complete complex act on the part of the subject employing it. One way of expressing the meaning of a word, or of laying out the content of a notion, tends to disguise this, and to make us represent the notion or word as significant of something abstracted from its position in the complex of experience. Words no doubt do acquire this abstractness; but, at the outset, as

has been pointed out, they seem to be employed, not as names of things or qualities or relations, but as indications of the total complex fact—the attitude of the subject towards an object or event in his experience. Accordingly the view is correct that the notion, as it is regarded from the logical point of view, is an abstraction from the judgment; and perhaps one might say with equal truth that what, in logic, is described as the judgment is, in like fashion, an abstraction from the more complex fact which lies at the root of all employment of signs or words as indicating objective fact. What is here involved is a complex process which as much resembles reasoning as judgment; for in it there is implied the reference from a represented content to an objective order distinct from it, which is the very essence of reasoning.

We ought then, in strictness, to regard the so-called products of thought not as falling into a series of increasing complexity, the notion being the simple factor, the judgment and reasoning successively more complex combinations thereof, but as three developments from a common root, retaining throughout so much of similarity that it ought not to be surprising that in practice it is hard, almost impossible, to distinguish the one from the other. As we have seen, there are types of so-called judgments which, on closer inspection of the thought expressed in them, cannot be distinguished from reasonings. There are reasonings so simple, where the data so immediately combine to yield what is called the conclusion, that it is hard, sometimes almost impossible, to distinguish them from judgments. The characteristics of each product indicate the special conditions under which the general development is carried out.

II. *Objectivity and Universality.*—We have already noted

in Kant's view of thinking the analogy which he emphasised between the conception of object and the representation of a universal rule. According to his view, the object apprehended was, in its own nature, that which determined in a general or universal way the combination of presentations or sense-intuitions constituting the matter apprehended.

Now, though it does not seem possible to accept in its entirety the Kantian view of thought, yet there is much to be said in favour of the intimate relation here implied between objectivity and universality in our thought. Evidently whatever is universalised must have, in one sense, the aspect of objectivity. It is represented as at all events independent of the individual act of thinking, as common for all intelligences, as in some way, therefore, related to intelligence as such.

Equally evident is it that this highly abstract form of objectivity cannot in that way be involved in the simple recognition of the objective in perception. Nevertheless it points to the presence of a corresponding factor in perception. The object there, however concretely represented, has the two aspects (1) of being independent of and determining the immediate act of perceiving, and (2) of being common to all percipient minds. Generality, then, and, as we might call it, independence of the particular act of apprehending, — these two features are presented, in the first instance crudely no doubt, in perceptive consciousness. And their combination suggests the reflexion that there is not an opposition but only a difference of degree between the objectivity of fact, which we are in the habit of confining to perception, and the objectivity of truth, which we are in the habit of assigning specifically to thought. To relate these two in such a way as to regard them as so far identical in nature does not in any way imply that we are entitled to transfer

what is found to hold good of the one forthwith to the other. Any such transference must depend not on the formal identity of significance between the two, but on the material character or content which is apprehended in either case. Nevertheless the result to which we are led seems to be that, in the long run, in ultimate analysis, fact and truth coincide; and that, therefore, what we call the 'necessity of thought' will be found ultimately not to differ from but to be of like kind with the necessity of fact.

Still we have to consider more particularly what is involved in the undoubted divergence of our thinking activity from perception,—a divergence which is commonly, though inaccurately, expressed in the opposition between individual and universal. We can never disentangle this perplexing problem so long as we retain the imperfect representation of our mental life as consisting of isolated facts or atoms. If we represent to ourselves perceptions or sensations as individuals, we are necessarily led to represent the thought which relates to these, and is their generalisation, as though it resulted from some process performed upon the given units,—a process expressible only in metaphorical and wholly inappropriate terms.

But if we recognise that, in concrete reality, the inner life is always a complex process from which these units are pure abstractions of our own, then we may be able to see that the transition from the stage of perception to that of thinking consists in a re-arrangement of what is at first given, a re-arrangement that may involve even an increase of complexity. Thus the isolated perception, as we call it, is really in consciousness only as one part of a complex whole, involving relations as well as the related parts, and involving not merely the immediate impressions of sense but also revived ideas.

Moreover, that primary distinction which renders possible any further progress in mind, the distinction between self and not-self, implies an increased complexity of the total state of mind at any moment. The true unit, if we will employ that term, is always the entire sum of consciousness at any given moment, a sum of which we are able to say in general that, as mind develops, it becomes increasingly more complex; and we are equally entitled to say that, in the development of mind, as in development generally, this complexity involves a relatively greater independence of the parts which are originally fused with one another. Thus, while primitive consciousness involves but little discrimination between the parts related and the relations, it is the characteristic of developed mind that these should be clearly held apart from one another, and that thereby each should acquire a more definite form. The severing of the relations from the related parts by no means implies that we know each separately, and that each retains the form in which it was first presented: rather, it implies that, while each of these is apprehended more distinctly, the content of each is affected by every distinction that has enabled the separation to come about.

Now, we describe this process in general terms as though it came about by itself: actually, it comes about only in and through the supply of fresh material in consciousness; and it depends therefore on quite natural conditions. For example, little or no advance would be possible in any direction in a mental life in which little or no provision was made for the retention and revival of those presentations which have already occurred in consciousness. Putting the matter roughly, one may say that the grade of mind is expressed by the range, the span or compass, of consciousness at any moment. A mind which can hold but little together at any one moment is altogether incapable of

drawing the distinctions, and becoming aware of the relations, which make its experience a connected systematic whole.

In the case before us perceptive consciousness presents us with the rudimentary form of certain relations which are at first not distinguished, or distinguished but little, from the content of the given presentations. On the one hand we have the relations of space and time, on the other hand, the relations of identity and difference, unity and plurality; but these are not at first involved in the way naturally suggested by the abstract terms used. Now, thinking first makes its appearance in and through the separation of these relations from the related contents; and thus the first products of thought, themselves complex facts in mind, are the generalised representations of space-and-time relations and of such identities as are forced on attention in the given material of presentation.

Our thinking, then, is, in and through the recognition of these relations, a universalising or generalising of what is immediately given. There is, therefore, a certain continuous advance from the simple form of perception to the more developed structure of thought. This advance is, at each stage, dependent on the supply of concrete material; and it results, not only in the establishment of a connected system of thoughts, but in the transformation of perceptive consciousness. The generalising work of thought does not leave perception unaffected: the distinctions which enter into it become themselves generalised. Again, therefore, one must hesitate to accept as final the opposition commonly supposed to obtain between perceiving and thinking.

One aspect of that commonly accepted opposition may be considered for a moment. The content of thought, at all events in its developed fashion, is the representation of an order which is, so to speak, independent of time. Time indeed may be represented in the content: my thought,

for example, may be the representation of the uniform way in which events succeed one another; but, taken in itself as universal, the content seems independent of time. On the other hand, it is urged, perception is always dependent on time. But one might fairly ask, Is there not some confusion here? are we not comparing two totally different aspects of perception and thought? It is perfectly true that perception is dependent on the given sense-impression of the moment; equally true that it is the apprehension of what exists now: that is to say, the determination of present time is part of the total content apprehended in perception. But the act of thinking at any moment is just as obviously dependent on temporal conditions: the human mind at all events thinks at one time and not at another; and there may perfectly well be a temporal determination in the content that is apprehended in thought. If we compare the first feature (that perceiving is dependent on momentary conditions) with the second feature (that the content of thought may be the representation of a constant order), no doubt there appears to be a difference of kind. But such an opposition is quite inappropriate: the contrast is wrongly made; and, in truth, so far as apprehension is concerned, both perceiving and thinking present the aspect of being independent of time. There is, therefore, it appears to me, no fundamental opposition in respect to the element of time between perceiving and thinking.

III. *Thinking and Self-consciousness.*—With the development of thinking there goes naturally, inevitably, the development of other elements in the mental life. In particular we may notice the connexion which seems to hold between the development of thought and the development of self-consciousness. Any development of thought

—the gradual formation of an apprehended content which is related to, but different from, the momentarily given perceptions—depends on the possibility within consciousness of *distinguishing* sharply from one another the stream of ideas and the series of sense-perceptions. Nay, more, the same development depends on the possibility of *unifying* each opposed stream: the flow of ideas must have a certain unity as constituting, in part at least, the life of the subject; the order of perceptions must have a certain unity as the appearance, the manifestation, of the object. But this very development is both part of the process of thinking and indispensable to its further growth. Without such unification of the subject and of the object it would be impossible to discriminate with any clearness and distinctness the relations whereby the parts of our experience are connected together. A thinking mind, therefore, is a mind which is at the same time conscious of itself; and the activity of thinking comes to be pre-eminently a subjective process, the process whereby the mind lays hold of and interprets in its own terms what is given to it in experience.

Thus, while thinking retains throughout, as regards its content, the impress of objectivity (that which is thought is no product of the mind itself), it is, in its own exercise as a process, pre-eminently subjective; and, as it is applicable indifferently either to the given material of external perception or to the series of changes in the subject's own existence, it comes to acquire a position almost of opposition to the mechanism of sense-perception and association. It is a process conditioned by its own laws; and these again, as we shall see, are laws not capable of expression in terms of the natural occurrence of facts: they are not laws such as those of the sequence of mental states, but are dependent on the character of the content which is apprehended in thinking.

The term 'self-consciousness' will always have a certain ambiguity; and perhaps it must also be said that it is hardly possible for us to extend our consideration from the matured reflective form of self-consciousness to its primitive stages with complete satisfaction. It is only by indirect procedure that we can establish the general conclusion that the reflective form is developed from the more primitive, that the conception of self as distinct even from the stream of the inner life, is not given in, but rests upon, a more simple unity—that which we find first in the perceptive subject. Doubtless the ultimate basis of any unity of the self, and therefore of any reflective consciousness of self, is to be found in those conditions which render consciousness at all possible: especially the presence of distinct contents in one and the same state of apprehension. So far as we can judge from indirect evidence, beings capable of consciousness differ widely in respect of the possibility of such simultaneous apprehension of a manifold; and, undoubtedly, the further development towards a reflective consciousness of self depends mainly on the possibility of increasing the complex of distinct parts which may be brought together in one and the same state of consciousness. A conscious existence which retained in the form of idea but little of what had preceded in perception, which was dependent mainly or wholly on the momentary impression, and which re-acted to such impression with little more than a single confused content, would obviously involve little unity of the conscious subject, just as it would distinguish little between the single object and its variable conditions.

On the whole, therefore, from indirect considerations, one would infer that the reflective form of self-consciousness requires, as its natural basis, a considerable development of the more immediate distinction between the single continuous self of perceptive experience and its varying states
distinction which corresponds to, and is correlated with,

that between the world of real objects and its varying appearances.

If this be so, then evidently the possibility of abstracting the relations which connect together the parts of our conscious experience indicates at the same time a higher and more definite form of the unity of the Self, and, in like manner, implies a higher, more subtle, conception of that objective world with which self is correlated. It is, indeed, because no fresh distinction can be introduced into self-consciousness without there being simultaneously developed a change in our representation of the object, that it becomes so difficult—almost impossible—to contrast thinking and perceiving, or even to regard them as stages, the latter of which must precede the former. The very conditions which render possible the emergence of the more abstract activity constitute a modification of what has preceded. To the subject who has a reflective consciousness of himself the object no longer is, or can be, what it was for him in the stage of merely perceptive experience.

IV. *The Categories*.—Thus we should readily enough accord recognition to Kant's analysis of the abstract conception of the object as being in itself a statement of the conditions under which reflective consciousness of self is possible. But, at the same time, we should altogether dispute the justification for assuming that this analysis gives the simple ultimate conditions of experience in the largest sense. Moreover, the tendency of our method of treating thought and self-consciousness is towards a rejection of that exhaustiveness, finality, which Kant seemed to accord to his list of categories or conditions of experience.

It follows, moreover, from this mode of regarding the function of thinking, not only that there is exaggeration in the familiar Kantian expression that thinking constitutes the

object, but also that we should not establish, so definitely as Kant was inclined to do, the distinction between category and Idea, that therefore we should not accept, with such complete satisfaction as he did, the ultimate distinction of kind between constitutive and regulative principles of judgment. Difference enough there may be; but it will be of a kind to be determined by consideration of the part which each is capable of playing in the gradual development of our knowledge. It will not be expressed in the Kantian fashion as a difference between that which enters into the very structure of the object and that which indicates only a point of view from which the subject reflects upon the knowledge he obtains of the object. Probably, we shall not find it possible to amend the distinction by accepting, as the later Idealist speculation seems to have done, the equally objective character of the regulative principles. It is probably impossible, in any legitimate sense of the term 'object,' to regard these principles as constituting part of the very structure of the objective world. But the ground for denying the absoluteness of the distinction will be found in a modification of Kant's view as to the function of the constitutive principles. If we regard these, not as giving a final exhaustive statement of the structure of the object, but as indicating in abstract outline one grade of the experience of a thinking intelligence, then, without confusion of the provinces of what are in essence distinct, we may recognise in the regulative principles simply a higher development of what is already in the constitutive.

Thought, even when regarded in this imperfect manner from the psychological side, exhibits itself as pre-eminently the activity in which the subject is conscious of himself—a reflective consciousness. This reflective character is of course exhibited most clearly in the most developed form of the activity of thinking,—that in which we contrast with

one another the whole current of perceptive or immediate experience and the abstract general representation of a system, all the parts of which are connected, and which yet exhibits none of that contingency, that dependence on the empirical condition of time, which is peculiar to the current of perception. Such a representation of reality is certainly not the first product of thinking. But the abstraction which gets fullest expression in it—the abstraction from the condition of time—is to be detected in the very simplest acts of the thinking function.

It is natural and inevitable to contrast perception and thought as the concrete and abstract. But we must note what it is that at first constitutes the abstraction that is made: it is the abstraction of the immediate temporal conditions under which the perceived experience is given. Such abstraction might be said to begin, or at all events to have its natural basis, in the capacity for reviving in idea what has been immediately presented. No revived content ever brings with it the complete detail of temporal circumstance of the original occurrence. Of course, later, the abstraction here referred to is consciously made, made with distinct recognition of the opposition between the content that is severed from its temporal conditions and the actual occurrence in which such conditions are always involved; but the reflective abstraction depends on and becomes possible through the previous and unreflective abstraction.

This freedom from the condition of time is in itself dependent on, and is facilitated by, the given character of the immediately perceived facts. It is obvious enough that, for perceptive consciousness, for any recognition of a self as contrasted with the not-self, there are necessary (1) certain uniformities or constancies of occurrence among the given facts of experience, and (2) a certain identity of

character among the distinct parts of experience. In the absence of these, our conscious life, could it exist at all, would be limited to the immediate contents of each passing phase of experience. With them, it becomes possible to bring together the parts of our experience as related among themselves and to the common centre, the apprehending subject.

Moreover, such conditions facilitate the abstracting work of thought. The identity of character in the distinct parts of our perceptive experience, merely by attracting attention to itself, gives to the identical content a freedom from the conditions of its isolated appearances, which is the first grade of universality or generality.

In such an operation there are evidently displayed those correlated aspects of thought which have always been singled out. Thinking is at once analytic and synthetic: analytic, for it breaks up the mass of presented fact; and synthetic, for it brings together what is presented in isolation, in numerical difference. But the analytic work would be quite misconceived if it were represented, as is too often the case in logical expositions, as consisting in dropping off certain qualities from the complex whole of the object; and the synthetic function would be quite misconceived if it were represented, as is too often the case in expositions from the Kantian point of view, as the imposition on the given material of a form which is due to the inner activity itself. What is given at first is not a complex whole of distinct qualities, but the vague and indeterminate—in respect to which identity of character is more the result of inability to discriminate than the final stage of accurate distinction. And the synthesis does no more than raise the given material into that higher form of consciousness, which is so far independent of the temporal conditions of the given experience. It is not a new form which is imposed on the given material.

Kant dwells repeatedly on the difference between the abstract category of causality and the more concrete principle, that of the adaptation of nature—the material of experience—to the human mind.¹ This concrete principle we may legitimately translate into language perhaps more familiar to us, as the principle of the existence of definite uniformities in the material of perception. As regards the one, the abstract principle, his view is that it constitutes a necessary condition of experience for a self-conscious subject; with regard to the other, it is but a regulative principle: what it contains is contingent, even though in the elaboration of our knowledge we must proceed in its light.

Is this separation quite justifiable? Certainly, on the general ground that there is no sufficient justification for any such absolute distinction as Kant habitually draws between formal and material, we might call it in question: for it is certainly but one case of this more general distinction.

Again, our doubts might be excited by the difficulties that have been experienced, and the criticisms arising from them, in regard to Kant's attempted proof of the *a priori* character of the category of causality. Most critics have been disturbed by the apparent appeal made in that proof to empirical constancies of connexion in the perceived matter; and some—indeed, no less competent a judge than Dr Hutchison Stirling²—have maintained that, throughout the proof of the constitutive principles of judgment, Kant makes an appeal, illegitimate from his point of view, to given uniformities of character in the perceived material. Dr Stirling insists on the necessity that empirical matter should present what renders possible the application thereto, or the imposition thereon, of the pure form of intelligible conjunction—the category. He therefore maintains that,

¹ [See above, vol. i. p. 225 ff.]

² [Text-book to Kant, pp. 99 ff., 488 ff.; Mind, ix. 531 ff., x. 45 ff.]

with respect to causality in particular, Kant's answer to Hume is but in appearance successful, that it succeeds by tacitly assuming exactly that which Hume's criticism called in question.

Further, we might certainly entertain doubt with regard to the soundness of the distinction on the ground already familiar to us, that the abstract representation of the causal nexus as Kant conceives it, the representation of a serial determination of occurrences in time, is no primitive fact in human intelligence. All that we can gather with respect to the actual development of our thinking must be dismissed as of no significance if we are to accept, as lying at the foundation of any apprehension of objective order in time, the abstract representation of determined sequence. It is only to pay oneself with words to say that such abstract representation is *implicit* in even the simplest apprehension of objective order in time. No other term so often proves an obstacle to clear thinking as this term 'implicit.' But its only legitimate meaning in the development of thought is that, under due conditions, the first less elaborated view of what is given may be supplanted by a more complete, which would have been impossible without the first, and which is therefore naturally dependent on and conditioned by the first.

On all these grounds, then, we should be disposed to call in question the absolute distinction drawn between the abstract notion of causal nexus and the concrete representation of definite uniformities of conjunction among phenomena.

From the point of view which we occupy—that of developed intelligence—it certainly seems at first sight to be true that the uniformities of nature are in some respect contingent: most certainly they are not known by us beforehand, and, in so far, have unquestionably an aspect of contingency. But the mere consideration that what these

uniformities are is only gradually determined, suggests the further reflexion, that 'uniformity of nature' is a general notion which may have a very varied content, and that therefore, even if it be the case that, in one aspect of it, such uniformity has and must have a contingency relatively to our understanding, it may very well be that, in another aspect, uniformity in the concrete material of perceptive experience is a condition constitutive of our intelligence, involved in its genesis, and therefore, in some fashion, assumed at every stage in the development of that intelligence.

As an illustration of what is pointed to here as the variable content of the conception of uniformity, we may refer to the difficulties into which logical theory has always been drawn when it seeks to determine the justification for the procedure which constitutes reasoning. Criticism of the accepted syllogistic form leads at once to the admission that the general premisses on which the syllogism proceeds must themselves be substantiated; and, when recourse is had to another process called 'induction' as that whereby such proof is given, it is again found necessary to make an assumption corresponding in some way to that which raised difficulty in the case of the syllogism. Throughout, we seem confronted with the perplexity that proof involves general principles, and yet that such general principles cannot be accepted as prior data but require some account which will justify their acceptance. It is precisely the difficulty which finds a kind of partial solution, in the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, by the antithesis between the order of truth in itself and the order of our apprehension of truth. The ultimate basis, the first principles, are the intelligible essences, the determining notions; and perfectly satisfactory demonstration is possible only when thinking proceeds from these. But in actual fact, in the progress of *our* knowledge, we do not begin with these

intelligible essences, but make our way slowly towards them.

I call this a partial solution. For Aristotle does not manage to make distinct the procedure by which, in the relatively incomplete stage of insight, we effect an advance. Strictly interpreted, his view would signify that the advance did not take place by reasoning, but that, somehow, inspection of a sufficient number of particulars collected together enabled the ultimate truth, the determining notion, the uniformity, to make itself manifest.

There is a line of consideration which we are bound to follow in respect to this general problem. Analysis of perceptive consciousness, consideration of the simplest conditions under which, as we say, there is developed 'in mind'¹ recognition of the distinction between subject and object, shows us that among these conditions is constancy of connexion among parts of the empirical material there furnished. It is not sufficient to say, Were the parts of experience given in perfectly chaotic fashion so that no constancy of recurrence could be discerned, it would be impossible to think. We must go farther and say, Were such the nature of the given material of experience, there would be no subject of any such activities as enter into the mental life, neither a perceptive subject nor a thinking subject. It is not our thinking merely that would be discomfited if, in point of fact, perceptive material were wholly incoherent: perception itself would never spring into existence; there would never be the primary stage of the differentiation of subject from object.

If this be so, it ought in no way to surprise us that the constant in experience, uniformity as contrasted with variety, is never susceptible of perfect mediated or discursive proof: it is involved in the structure of our intelligence; and it

¹ More correctly expressed, the development is *of mind* not *in mind*.

appears at every stage in our thinking—though with very varied aspect and very variously elaborated—as that on which our thinking proceeds. It is in this sense, and in this sense only, that one would accept so far what Kant has to say in respect to these abstract categories of thought: that they render experience possible, and are therefore presupposed in every concrete or special fact of experience. But, from our point of view, these ultimate conditions are not abstract, but characteristics of the concrete material of experience, and are therefore capable of undergoing a transformation by increase of experience itself: a transformation in which the opposition is established, and becomes distinct for thought, between the abstract, the form of experience, and its matter.¹

V. *Thought and Reality*.—From the point of view here taken the problem often raised with respect to the relation of Thought to Reality must appear as of quite subordinate interest. It cannot for a moment be supposed that any view proceeding on such principles could identify thinking with the structure of reality. Rather, our view makes us regard thinking as one form in which reality is manifested—a form, moreover, limited to one special type of real existence, that of minds capable of becoming conscious of themselves, capable, therefore, of a certain development.

There is, however, another significance of this question respecting the relation of thought to reality which may seem still to retain its importance. The characteristic of the content of thought is no doubt generality or universality; and, it may be asked, To what extent is the structure of reality adequately apprehended? or, putting the question otherwise, Is there in reality, in the nature of the real, some-

¹ This is a derivative distinction. Form and matter are not, as Kant thinks, originally distinct.

thing which must always evade thought? In the Aristotelian metaphysic, for instance, there appears throughout a factor of this kind in the world of generation—namely, matter, the indeterminate substratum, that which is at least the condition without which plurality of individual forms is impossible. It must be noted, in respect to this feature of the Aristotelian doctrine, that it is an erroneous, though very common, exaggeration of what is there said, to represent the element of matter as that which constitutes the individual in opposition to the universal. Aristotle does not mean by 'individual' the numerical unit: he means that which is so completely determined that it constitutes a fact for knowledge or experience, a completely definite type of that which exists in the world of generation. Such a type is presented in the form of an unending series of numerically distinct units; but its individuality is not identical with numerical unity. It must therefore be said that Aristotle did not regard the presence of the material factor as constituting an absolute barrier to complete comprehension. It is indeed the burden of his continued criticism of the Platonic view that there the universal as such was taken to be the only intelligible, whereas from his point of view the intelligible is the universal individualised in concrete fashion. Whoever, indeed, retains, as Aristotle attempts to do, the genetic connexion between perceiving and intellect or understanding, cannot regard the universal aspect of thought as lying apart from the concrete, or hold that the latter is beyond the range of thought and unintelligible.

On this account, then, one cannot regard as constituting a ground for limiting the function of thought as the interpreter of reality, that distinction which presents itself throughout the actual procedure of thinking,—the distinction which in Mr Bradley's *Logic*¹ is fixed in the terms *That* and *What*.

¹ [*Principles of Logic*, pp. 4, 64.]

That our thinking is always the determination of something presented, that it takes, therefore, the discursive form in which the predicates are distinct from the subject, cannot be regarded as the indication of a final divorce between the subject and that which is apprehended as its nature in and by thought. It is just as necessary to recognise the unification involved in the process of thinking as to recognise the discrimination which is perhaps its more obvious external feature.

Wherefore it must be concluded that not by reason of anything either in the character of the process or in the general nature of its content does thought fall short of expressing the constitution of reality. If such falling-short is to be recognised, it must be on other grounds: not by reason of the formal character of thought, but in consequence of the concrete nature of what is apprehended in thought as expressing reality. Indeed, there is a contradiction in supposing that thought—which is but the methodised fashion of reaching self-consciousness, of defining, therefore, in their relation to one another the parts of reality within our experience, that is to say, ourselves and our surroundings—should by its own nature be incapable of solving problems which it must put to itself: even although, as a continuous process, it has still much to achieve.

Is it then to be understood that the development of thought, which is here referred to, enables us to express in a complete fashion the whole structure of reality? This question brings before us again, in another way, the fundamental difference in interpreting this difficult notion of Development.

VI. *The Notion of Development.*¹—In Hegel's view, as in that of Aristotle, development is but the unfolding of what

¹ [Cf. above, p. 185 ff.]

is already contained. Thus the system, the connected series of the notions which present themselves as developing from one another, must be regarded as already in some way contained in the absolute idea, and that again as being in some way contained in the Absolute Spirit which is the final and all-comprehensive reality.

In such a representation of development it is implied, negatively, that nothing new makes its appearance; and Hegel takes occasion, when referring to certain anticipations of the scientific theory of Evolution, to express himself definitely as opposed to any representation of natural types as being evolved, the higher from the lower. "All explanation of the higher by the lower, such as the naturalist theories attempt, is philosophically a *ὑστερον πρότερον*, a precise inversion of the true account. Development or progress is not the making of something out of nothing, but the unfolding or manifestation of that which in another aspect eternally is. When that which is being developed is itself a self-conscious subject, the end of its becoming must really exist not merely for, but in or as, a self-conscious subject."

Evidently so large a conception as that of development must apply not merely to the theoretical but to the practical side of human experience, must therefore be extended not only so as to include the theoretical views or generalised notions, whereby we make nature intelligible to ourselves, but also so as to take in all that falls within the practical culture of human nature. And yet the difficulties which the notion undoubtedly involves become insuperable when such extension of its application is made. It is perhaps only within the practical sphere that the notion of End has in truth any justification. At all events in that sphere it is the most significant, the fundamental, notion. Is it, then, possible to represent the gradual development in human consciousness of conceptions of an end as the manifestation

of what already is realised not only for, but in or as, a self-conscious subject? What is the realisation of an end in human practical experience? Is it anything other than a form of self-conscious activity, what Aristotle called *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*? and in what sense can it be supposed that this, which, as realisation, only exists in process, can exist as already realised?

No doubt we may be beguiled by the analogy of theoretical notions, and represent to ourselves the idea of the end which is to be realised as somehow existing; but that, we must note, is in no way the realisation of the end. Within the practical sphere realisation has but one meaning: it is an actual form of life, a mode of the concrete existence of a reflective subject. To use quite inadequate metaphors, it is not a state, a condition of rest, but a process, and cannot be conceived except as a process.

On the practical side, then, there undoubtedly presents itself to us a hopeless contradiction as emerging from this interpretation of development. Whatever significance the actual facts of the moral consciousness may have, however difficult it may be to understand that direction of effort towards the attainment of a result which is yet only in idea, the interpretation we give must not imply that in any sense or aspect the realisation already exists.

But, although the difficulty is more obvious on the practical side, it is not less involved in the theoretical. Our theoretical activities very closely resemble the practical: in them, too, the general feature is the effort to work out a complete representation, which itself changes its character with each step in our advance. If we try to represent to ourselves the content of that changing ideal as being already realised in a consciousness, we shall find the same difficulty of reconciling therewith the real character of our apprehension of truth: we shall find in fact that we are erroneously

taking as a characteristic of the apprehension of truth what is undoubtedly the characteristic of the non-existent content apprehended. For that content apprehended, not in its ideal completeness but in every grade, is non-temporal, merely because it is not itself an existent fact. We transfer this special characteristic of all apprehended content to truth conceived of as though it had objective existence, whether in the form of a thinking spirit or of that about which such spirit thinks.

The notion of development undoubtedly presents a special difficulty by reason of the fusion therein of the two opposites, Identity and Difference. But it is of no avail to attempt to regard the notion of development as constituted by the union of those two abstract categories. It is not identity and difference in general that constitute the determining features of the notion of development. Such combination is presented not solely in that which develops but in everything. When therefore we refer, in handling the notion of development, to the identical subject which in some way maintains its selfhood throughout the differences, our reference is really to a highly concrete and specialised form of the identical and different. The moment we realise this, and understand that the notion of development first presents itself in our reflexion from a consideration of highly concrete facts, we begin to understand one cause of the immense difficulty it presents. The concrete facts are but imperfectly known. The general type of arrangement among them, which we generalise into the notion of development, is presented in a great variety of concrete modes; and, as a matter of fact, we find considerable difficulty—a difficulty which, one may perhaps say, is yet unsolved—in determining the limits within which there is to be recognised substantial agreement in the peculiar type of arrangement we call development. At the one end of the scale stands humanity with all that we call its culture; at

the other end the lowest forms of organic life,—forms in regard to which the boundary line between organic and inorganic is certainly not yet definitely drawn.

It is from the appearances presented in the arrangement of such concrete forms of existence that we derive our notion of development; and it is not at all certain that we are not attempting an undue simplification in applying one and the same notion to all of them. The living individual, and perhaps specially the conscious subject, are the concrete forms which most clearly display that peculiar combination: interdependence of parts with a continued identity throughout changes, and with a constant reference from each developing individual to a similarly constituted antecedent form. It is these in particular which suggest to us the general marks constituting our notion of development. From them in particular is derived that curious and baffling conception of a pre-existing plan which is being slowly realised in each individual form. When we extend our survey, and take in the higher grades of concrete fact to which also we apply the notion of development, we soon find reason to doubt whether there is more than analogy between this case of development and that of the individual living organism or of the conscious subject. When, for instance, we apply the notion of development to this or that type of human culture, it may occur to us that it is not easy to find for this development the substantive basis of an individual subject such as is presented in the living being and in the individual mind; and, assuredly, when we reflect on the development of any such form of culture, we must find it difficult to apply there the complicated idea which we think ourselves justified in applying to the individual of a natural species: namely, that what happens is only the unfolding of an idea or plan which is somehow impressed on, and operative in the very structure of, that which develops.

Probably the doubt one might entertain in respect to these manifestations of development might be extended to the cases where the notion appears to have more substantive foundation. Yet, when we turn to the phenomena of organic life and of the life of mind, we must undoubtedly give full recognition to the very important fact that what we call the development is in all cases conditioned by and dependent on circumstances which must be taken to be external to the plan itself. Even if we assume that in the living being there is a pre-formed plan, and that therefore the course of the changes through which it passes is rightly described as the unfolding of that plan, we must acknowledge that the unfolding, if real, is dependent on external material, conditions which may or may not be furnished, and the supply of which can hardly be regarded as dependent on and contained in the plan itself.

No one would deny that, in those concrete arrangements which first impress on us the notion of development, there is something other than the mere laws of co-existence and sequence. But it is by no means necessary, nor is it indeed possible, to resort for explanation of them to a type of agency which finds no place in the mechanism of nature. We ought to remember that our statement of laws of co-existence and sequence is an abstraction, that the involved specialised arrangements constitute nature really, and that, when we sever from one another the abstract statement of physical laws and the generalised description of the special forms of organic life, the severance does not imply the co-existence of two realms of fact: physical nature, and organic life. The only real existence is the concrete whole of which what we call living beings are special forms.

VII. *The Positivist View of Thought.* — Perhaps it is at this point that one sees most clearly the deficiencies of the view which stands most definitely in opposition to

the idealist interpretation of nature — Positivism. As that view was expounded by Comte, exclusive stress was laid upon co-existence and sequence.¹ Knowledge, it was declared, was not only limited to phenomena—a perfectly void and empty statement—but, more particularly, it was limited to the enunciation of sequences and co-existences among phenomena. In this indeed Comte found what seemed to him the radical distinction between genuine, scientific, positive knowledge, and the pseudo, unscientific, metaphysical speculation about things. In his view human thinking in its progress naturally passed through the stage of metaphysical speculation, in which explanation was sought of the given, that is, the co-existent and sequent phenomena, by reference to abstract entities or powers not within the range of observation and experiment; and, after passing through this, it reached the positive stage, in which it rests content with the statement in generalised form of laws of co-existence and sequence.

Putting aside all that elsewhere might require to be said regarding this supposed advance in knowledge, notice must be drawn to Comte's insistence on co-existences and sequences. There are two things which compel us to reflect further upon the type of knowledge supposed thus to be exhaustively given. In the first place, the type of knowledge is extremely abstract; and, in the second place, it has of necessity more special, if not exclusive, application to what is presented in external perception: it does not seem to apply as readily to the highly important set of phenomena—the inner life and all the manifestation of human culture.

It is abstract. It is indeed peculiar to Comte's exposition of Positivism that he should have drawn from the first a very

¹ ["Seeing how vain is any research into causes, . . . our real business is to analyse accurately the circumstances of phenomena, and to connect them by the natural relations of succession and resemblance." — *Positive Philosophy*, tr. Martineau, i. 5; cf. ii. 515.]

sharp distinction between abstract and concrete. His classification of the sciences,¹ in which they are arranged in an order corresponding to the gradation of increasing complexity from Mathematics to Sociology, is a classification of the abstract sciences. Nowhere in his general treatment of scientific method does he accord sufficient recognition to the peculiarity of the concrete forms; and, particularly in his first treatment, he is emphatic as regards the unity and identity of method throughout the scale of the abstract sciences.

Now, it is never sufficient for knowledge, for real understanding, to be in possession only of the abstract laws of co-existence and sequence. Such laws form an indispensable part of explanation; but they can never dispense with the recognition of the highly special forms in which concrete fact displays to us what is expressed in these abstract laws. As Dr Chalmers used to put it, "There are in nature not only laws but collocations,"² and by the latter he meant the concrete forms.

Now in his later work, and owing, it is clear, to reflexion on the second point I mentioned—the less obvious application of his conception of general laws to the facts of human life mind and culture—Comte was led to a highly important distinction, and, in enunciating that, he introduced a very curious and interesting modification of the meaning of the word 'metaphysical.'

When he approached the treatment of Sociology he distinguished two methods by which the facts of human practical life may be considered—the one abstracting, isolating, individualising; the other concrete, synthetic, and organic.³ The individual man, however completely we may state the co-existent and sequent phenomena of his nature, is

¹ [Cf. *Positive Philosophy*, i. 25 ff.] ² [*System of Positive Polity*, E. T.,

³ [Cf. *Natural Theology*, B. II. cc. 1875, i. 343 ff.]
i., iii.]

not thereby completely explained. There must be taken into account that curious additional aspect of his life in which he forms part of a larger whole: part, moreover, in a way that cannot be expressed through the quantitative relations applicable to external facts. And what applies to man thus regarded as practical applies in the same way to the whole facts of the inner life. Thus it is that in Comte's later work—the Positive Politics—he offers an amended classification of the sciences, in which the grouping is broadly into (1) the Cosmological and (2) the Sociological, while Biology is given a fluctuating position between Cosmology and Sociology.¹

VIII. *Form and Matter*.—The general position which I have assumed throughout might be expressed in the technical language of philosophy as the impossibility of severing form and matter. So general a statement, no doubt, is applicable to many other subjects than thinking. In special reference to thought, however, it implies that, even in what we are able reflectively to distinguish as the general structure of thinking, contrasting it thereby with the particular applications of thought, it is not possible to understand its definite character except by taking into account the material of experience.

Such a general position is indeed one of the deductions that may be drawn from the Kantian work in philosophy. For, though Kant allows too much of the opposition between form and matter to remain in his system, though such residuum constitutes really the ambiguous, the baffling, element in his treatment of experience, yet in what he called Transcendental Logic, as opposed to purely Formal Logic, we have the first recognition that thought has a significance other than the purely formal. No doubt Kant did try in a half-hearted way to keep the categories of real knowledge in exclusive connexion with the thinking subject, and thereby

¹ [Cf. *System of Positive Polity*, i. 463, 473.]

to oppose them to the foreign matter which somehow fell into correlation with them. But, when we consider the actual character of these categories — their content — the impossibility of deducing them from a mere abstract self-consciousness becomes apparent. And, though Kant acknowledges only in his own peculiar fashion that the self-consciousness he is dealing with is concrete, though he prefers to describe its consciousness of unity and identity in time as rather an accident thrust upon it by the material of experience than essential in the pure notion of self-consciousness, yet it certainly appears that these categories — however general, however abstract, they may be — have meaning only as expressing the ways in which a real concrete subject attains consciousness of itself in the sensuous experience with its conditions of space and time. There is no ultimate justification for that constant antithesis which Kant brings forward between the pure generality of thought and the indeterminate particular of perception — an antithesis which, as we have seen, gives to his theory of knowledge its rather mechanical character.

Now, the general position from which thinking has been here regarded is no more than the legitimate development of what is contained in the Kantian work. Thinking in its developed structure is throughout determined by the concrete material of experience within which it makes its appearance. It follows from this that there cannot be, in the structure and generalised products of thought, that difference in kind which Kant establishes as between categories and Ideas. The difference, which may no doubt exist, among the thoughts which form the connected structure of our consciousness can express no more than a difference of content. It cannot be that in the one we find what is perfectly adapted to experience, while in the other we find that to which experience can never conform.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION.

IN conclusion, I purpose pointing out one special application of this general mode of regarding the nature of thought. The character of what we call a notion is not to be determined by a mere reference to that generality which it obtains through the natural conditions rendering abstraction possible. Generality of this crude kind is neither the exclusive mark of thought nor what gives notions their main value as ways of organising experience. A notion embodies the apprehended features of what is in the concrete presented in perceptive experience, inner and outer. As such perceptive experience is at first given in all its complication of detail, as the human mind is able only gradually to bring to bear on it notions by which it may be analysed and interpreted, so it is natural to assume that our first primary notions will contain but an inadequate representation of what truly determines the constant character of perceptive experience. Our first notions undoubtedly will be moulded upon the prominent, but not therefore the most important, features of perceptive experience. Among such first primary notions a type of fundamental importance is the *practical*. The relation between the concrete individual, as a source of changes in his surroundings, and the consequences which follow from his action, is so constant in our experience that it cannot be without effect in determining the thinking con-

...eration of things, the general representation we form of them.

Primitive thinking naturally represents concrete objects as having the same complex structure as the subject himself, and as giving rise to changes in the same way as the subject is aware of acting. Undoubtedly the primitive representation of a causal connexion is always anthropomorphic: the agency is conceived of as the action of some subject.

Moreover, in the action of such a subject it is easy to distinguish what may fairly be called the mechanical side from the relatively more subjective, that in which purpose or intention is prevailingly manifested. The mechanical side connects itself most closely with bodily effort; and the change produced is vaguely represented as the overcoming of resistance by muscular energy. The type of all action is for the primitive mind the initiation of movement by muscular effort; and even our most developed notions of action continue to carry with them much of this primitive representation.

On the other hand, distinct from that and more complex in character, is the representation of means and end, on the use of which experience soon imposes a limitation. Not indeed that, even in developed thinking, we are very clearly aware of the precise scope of such a representation; for we still continue to interpret to ourselves at least some processes of the external world by the help of the representation of purpose, of final end; and the all-embracing scope of this notion in our own personal practical life finds its counterpart in the continual tendency to represent after the same fashion the whole content of experience.

Now, in this set of primitive notions there is implied a representation of individual facts—individual, despite the multiplicity they involve—wholly distinct from that refined analytical conception of the isolated unit of event or fact

which is the product of a wide knowledge and of repeated experience. These individuals, living conscious beings, are taken as individual, and form indeed the final standard by which in developed thinking we test the claims of any part of experience to recognition as an individual. It is only by degrees that we come to admit as having a certain right to individuality what is merely distinguished from its surroundings by some qualitative peculiarity, or even by mere numerical difference.

Thus the natural history of our thinking pursues an order just the reverse of that which we would now put forward in the light of our developed experience. We now tend to think of the ultimate units of our experience, that which can be presented, let us say, in the indivisible moment of perception, as the individual; and it causes us some perplexity to understand the grounds on which we claim, and insist on, individuality for what is in itself or in one aspect a multiplicity, a combination of such units. But, in the natural order of thinking, it is the complex individual with which we start; and it is not therefore surprising that, in the earliest analysis of thinking—the Greek, and pre-eminently Aristotle's—the individual should mean the numerically distinct member of a natural class: a 'natural class' meaning always a highly complex concrete order of perceived existences.

The subjects in such natural order of thought are at first the more concrete; nor does our thinking consideration of things ever lose the impress which is exhibited with such clearness in its earlier stages. We still represent the concrete combinations by thoughts or notions, which are in themselves of a more definite, more organised, content than our representations of the isolated units presented in space and time. Even when, using the results of our developed knowledge, we explain to ourselves these concrete forms

as being in their own nature the complex result of what is expressed in the very abstract laws of the simpler components, we have still to recognise as the determining feature the special combination there presented. There is no real antithesis, no incompatibility, between the two ways in which we thus represent the concrete facts of experience. Their character as combinations plays so important a part in real experience that, even if we accept in its entirety the view that each portion of this concrete whole is capable of explanation by reference to the general laws of its simple components, we do not remove the necessity which the facts impose on us, of continuing to represent them in their concreteness.¹

The primitive notions are undoubtedly applied at first in directions where the content which we afterwards assign to them has no real application. It is only the abstractness, the lack of discrimination, which attaches to our primitive notions that enables us to overlook the discrepancies which increased knowledge forces on our attention. Thus, for example, the practical thought of causal agency as the production of change by a personal agent must be conceived only in the vaguest way, when it is applied to all the changes which enter into perceptive experience. No sooner do we become able to reflect on what is implied in such a notion than we find that a modification of it must be introduced if it is to apply to the orderly uniform succession of events in outer fact. But the notion itself, it must be remembered, has its general significance only as enabling the subject to put together his experience, to retain it in a coherent form in his consciousness. The extension or modi-

¹ Obviously, this consideration becomes of special importance when the concrete subject is the self-conscious individual. The combination has there a form so characteristic, so im-

portant as determining the series of events that follow from the subject, that it cannot possibly be dismissed as imperfect and transitional.

fication it undergoes does not in any way alter this implicit function of the notion; and, in respect to the category of Cause, the extension and modification it receives still continue to exhibit the same function: we represent the causal connexion as that order of change in outer events which enables each alteration to be regarded as the outcome of what has preceded. Fundamentally it is the same thought. And, if we gradually become able to advance further, and to say, with respect to the alteration in outer fact, that it consists in a certain quantitative amount of a special kind of change, and if thereby we determine as the explanatory cause a preceding quantitative amount of like kind of change, we are still proceeding in the light of the general function of every notion: that it enables us to keep together the parts of our experience as a coherent connected whole. The primitive mind and advanced scientific thought represent the same function, and with equal satisfaction to themselves.

Put in more technical form, this would signify that these primitive categories of practice gradually altered in content in and through the increase of perceptive experience and the power of analysing it into its more simple components. The development in the categories or general thoughts, and the alteration in the total representation of perceptive experience, go hand-in-hand. If our representations of the concrete and of its relations—space and time—are vague and indeterminate, equally vague will be the content of the generalised thoughts or categories which we apply.

Thus, then, it must be said that, in a sense, there is no ultimate criterion to which we can appeal as testing the worth of the general notions by the help of which we interpret our experience. Experience alone is the criterion. And, if it be allowed that in all our reasoning we proceed by applying general principles, we must remember that the process is by no means that of deducing from such general

principles what is already contained in them. Rather it is a constant process of testing, modifying, and, it may be, enriching the principles themselves. In this general conclusion it is implied that we cannot reconcile with the actual course of human thinking and experience that representation, which Aristotle was the first to give, of demonstration or reasoning as resting upon a definite set of first principles. Aristotle's conception of a number of principles, from which there could be completely deduced the properties of concrete things, represents, as it rests upon, a wholly erroneous conception of the real nature of development. It is applicable only to that conception of development which assumes that the nature of what develops precedes as a completed fact the attainment of its own end—a view which is characteristic not of Aristotle only, but of the Idealist philosophy in general.

THE END.

INDEX.

- Animals, the Cartesian view of, as automata, 32.
- Aristotle, affinity of the systems of Hegel and, 274; his partial solution of the antithesis between the order of truth and of our apprehension of truth, ii. 298; his view of development, 302; his doctrine of the individual, 303; his erroneous conception of development, 317.
- Arithmetic, its peculiar position in Hume's system, 139.
- Arnauld, Antoine, his criticisms of Malebranche, 55, 56; Leibniz's correspondence with, and its importance, 77 *et seq.*; the distinction between psychology and epistemology, ii. 49.
- Association psychology, inadequateness of the doctrine, ii. 171, 174.
- Attention, its function in the doctrine of presentationism, ii. 172; criticism of Dr Ward's view, 181.
- Attribute, difficulties attending the meaning of, in Spinoza's system, 61, 62.
- Belief, Hume's theory of, 135, 144.
- Berkeley, his position regarding Locke, 124; the correlation of mind and ideas, 125; presentations and representations, 126; analysis of perception, 128; apprehension of the external world, 129; apprehension of general laws of nature, 130; theory of reasoning, *ib.*; obscurity of his theory of knowledge, 131; the aim of knowledge practical, 132; comparison of his theological idealism with the Kantian theory, 250; relation of Lotze's and the Berkeleian theory, 325; his description of philosophy, ii. 4, 21.
- Berlin, the foundation of the University of, ii. 133, 134.
- Berti, Domenico, life of Bruno by, ii. 24.
- Böhme, Jacob, his influence on Schelling, 269.
- Bonar, Mr James, 'Philosophy and Political Economy' by, ii. 79.
- Bradley, Mr F. H., reference to 'Appearance and Reality' by, 353; his theory of feeling, ii. 206; criticism of his view regarding the intelligibility of reality, 301.
- Brentano, Prof. F., his distinction of presentation from judgment and feeling, ii. 180; on the distinction between idea and judgment, 268.
- Bruno, Giordano, supposed influence on Spinoza, i. 58; unflattering account by Pope Leo XIII., ii. 23; obscurity till recently surrounding him, 24; Gaspar Schoppe's remarkable letter, *ib. et seq.*; the *auto da fe*, 28, 43; early life, 30; his learning, 32; 'Il Candelajo' and its probable connexion with 'Love's Labour's Lost,' 33, 38, 39; his wanderings, 34; clerical proceedings against

- him, 35 ; his opinion of Calvinism, 36 ; the influence of Raymond Lully, 37 ; his visit to England, *ib. et seq.* ; friendship with Sir Philip Sidney and Fulke Greville, 38 ; intimacy with Florio, 39 ; Carew's indebtedness to Bruno, *ib.* ; his manifesto to the University of Oxford, 40 ; his betrayal by a pupil, 41 ; seven years imprisonment, 43 ; his philosophy a form of Naturalism, 44.
- Caird, Dr Edward, ii. 14.
- Carew, Thomas, his *Colum Britannicum*, borrowed from Bruno's 'Triumphant Beast,' ii. 39.
- Castelnau, Michel de, Bruno's connexion with, ii. 37.
- Categories, nature and deduction of the Kantian, 183 *et seq.* ; criticism of the Kantian categories, ii. 292 *et seq.*
- Causation, Hume's analysis of, 141 ; the Kantian doctrine, 317 ; fundamental representation of causation, *ib.* ; change and generalisation, 318 ; intelligibility of nature a relative conception, 319 ; the empirical doctrine, 320 ; criticism of Hume's view, 321 ; Lotze's analysis, *ib. et seq.* ; Lotze's and Berkeley's theories, 325 ; Kant and Hume on causal connexion, 326 ; space and time components of the content apprehended as causally connected, 328 ; meaning of 'unity of the objective world,' 329 ; causal connexion as constant order or type of process, 332 ; criticism of the Kantian view, *ib. et seq.* ; 'the identity of cause and effect,' 335 ; the generalisation expressed in 'force,' 336 ; causal connexion one of fact not of reason, 357.
- Chalmers, Dr Thomas, on the distinction between abstract and concrete, ii. 309.
- Change, the foundation of any representation of time, 301 ; does the nature of reality exclude change? 302 ; Herbart's view, *ib.*, 303 ; the Kantian doctrine, 305 ; the illegitimate distinction this theory involves, 308 ; no contradiction in the completed notion of change, 309 ; Lotze's account of the supposed contradiction, 310.
- Christie, Mr R. C., opinion of, on the authenticity of Schoppe's letter on Bruno, ii. 24.
- Clauberg, his view that the soul can direct movement, 42.
- Comte, Auguste, his limitation of knowledge to coexistences and sequences, ii. 308 ; his distinction between abstract and concrete, *ib.* ; his classification of the sciences, 309 ; his method of approaching sociology, *ib.*
- Condillac, his theory of psychology, ii. 228.
- Condorcet, his analysis of social inequalities, ii. 90.
- Consciousness, the method of determining the content of, ii. 195 *et seq.* ; distinguishable features in immediate experience, 198 *et seq.* ; qualitative differences in this content, *ib.* ; two criteria employed in distinguishing sensations, 200 ; distinction between sense-presentations and feelings derivative, 201 ; feelings, as pleasure-pain experiences, of independent nature, 203 ; Wundt's theory of feeling, *ib.* ; teleological theory of feeling, 205 ; theory connecting pleasure and pain with physiological processes, 208 ; formal feelings, 211 ; feeling and activity, *ib.*, 212 ; Wundt's analysis of voluntary action, *ib. et seq.* ; the factors involved in willing, 216 ; sensations involved in movement, *ib.* ; movement not prefigured in the antecedent sense-impulse, 217 ; the regular series in the changes of experience, *ib.* ; gradual growth of the process of willing, 220 ; the feeling of activity, 221.
- Cordemoy, as an originator of Occasionalism, 42.

- Descartes, his chief writings, 7; insistence on the excellence of mathematical demonstration, 8; characteristics of his method, 9; 'cogito ergo sum,' 11, 15; the *lumen naturale* and its axioms, 13; importance of the fifth axiom connecting idea and reality, 14; absolute and relative ideas, 15; the ontological argument for the existence of God, 16; the anthropological argument, 17; the veracity of God, 19; the origin of error, 20; Understanding and Will as passive and active, 21; the priority of Will, 23; God the only Absolute, 25; consciousness and extension, 27; the four divisions of philosophy, *ib.*; the Cartesian Physics, 28 *et seq.*; extension and extended substance, 29; his view of conservation, *ib.*; theory of space, 30; mechanical conception of nature, 32; animals as automata, *ib.*; the antinomy of the Cartesian Physics, 33; the Cartesian Psychology and Psychophysics, *ib. et seq.*; antithesis of idea and sensation, 34; their mode of operation in apprehension, 35; 'sensation' and 'image,' 36; consciousness and corporality not causally connected, 37; classification of ideas forming Understanding, *ib.*; explanation of ideas as innate, 38; the process of sense-perception, 39; approximation to the doctrine of Occasionalism, *ib.*; theory of the pineal gland, 42; lines of development of the Cartesian doctrine, 43; Leibniz's and Spinoza's ground of dissatisfaction with his system, 68; Leibniz's criticism of the Cartesian Physics, 75; Leibniz's view of the Cartesian theory of knowledge, 96; the Cartesian view of facts of mind, ii. 53, 61.
- Determinism, Leibniz's view of, 107; difficulty caused by, in Spinoza's system, *ib.*
- Development, psychology considered as the tracing of mental development, ii. 185 *et seq.*; the transcendental view of End, 186; the empirical conception of end, 188; the laws of development merely descriptive, 189; they exclude the notion of ultimate end, *ib.*; notion of implicit existence unjustifiable in region of consciousness, 191; the notion of development free from implication of end or purpose, 192; the Hegelian and Aristotelian conception of development as the unfolding of a content, 302; contradictoriness of this view both on the practical and theoretical side, 304; special difficulty in the notion of development due to the fusion of identity and difference, 305; different notions of development probably necessary for different forms of existence, 306; the mechanism of nature itself adequate for the notion of development, 307; misconception of the nature of development in Idealist philosophy, 317.
- Dewey, Professor, on the distinction between psychology and epistemology, ii. 48, 59.
- 'Enlightenment,' a degenerate form of Leibnizian rationalism, ii. 144; character of the doctrine, 145.
- Epistemology, its distinction from psychology, ii. 46 *et seq.*; recognition of this distinction in the Stoic and pre-Kantian theories, 49; ignoring of it by Locke, *ib.*; inadequacy of Kant's account of the distinction, 60; account of the Cartesian view, 61, 62; subjective and trans-subjective one act or process, 65.
- Evolution, Hegel's view of, ii. 303.
- Faculties, the doctrine of, without significance in modern psychology, ii. 168; Hamilton's and Mansel's theories of psychology, 223 *et seq.*
- Feeling, distinction of feeling and sense - presentation a derivative one, ii. 201; feelings, as pleasure-

- pain experiences, independent in nature, 203; Wundt's theory, *ib.*; the teleological theory of feeling, 205; Dr Stout's view of pleasure and pain, 206; Mr Bradley's, *ib.*; pleasure and pain as connected with the expansion and repression of self, 207; pleasure and pain as connected with physiological processes, 208; formal feelings, 211; feeling and activity, *ib.*, 212.
- Fichte, his insight into the want of unity in the Kantian system, 255; unity of consciousness the central fact in experience, 256; difference an absolute condition of self-consciousness, 257; cause of apparent artificiality of his system, *ib.*; the evolution of self-consciousness a development from within, 259; thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, *ib.*, 260; the absolute ego and the personal self, 260; speculation and life, *ib.*; the reality of the Non-Ego, 261; difficulty of reconciling finite self and the absolute, 263; relation to Schelling, 264, 265; his enthusiasm for the unification of Germany, *ii.* 119; suppression of his Reden, 122; significance of his Reden, 129, 131, 132; his single-hearted devotion to truth, 130.
- Fischer, Kuno, his interpretation of Spinoza's notion of attribute, 62.
- Florio, John, Bruno's intimacy with, *ii.* 39.
- Francke, August, influence on education in Germany, *ii.* 125.
- Frederick the Great, his interest in educational reform, *ii.* 125.
- Frederick William I., his interest in educational reforms in Germany, *ii.* 125.
- Frederick William II., his reversal of the policy of Frederick the Great, *ii.* 128.
- Frederick William III., his patronage of the Prussian Universities, *ii.* 129.
- French Revolution, its significance in modern political history, *ii.* 146.
- Freytag, Gustav, on the political indifference accompanying the literary renaissance in Germany, *ii.* 140.
- Frith, Miss I., Life of Bruno by, *ii.* 25.
- Galileo, importance of, in modern philosophy, 5, 29.
- Germany, the starting-point of the regeneration of Germany, *ii.* 119; Stein's conception for unification of the separate States, *ib.*; political and economical reform, 121; rise of a spirit of patriotism, *ib.*; efforts at political reform frustrated, 124; state of education in North Germany in the eighteenth century, 125; education and clerical opposition, 127; the policy of Frederick William III., 129; Fichte's Reden, and their significance, 131, 132; the founding of the University of Berlin, 134; W. von Humboldt's place in the history of Prussia, 136, 137; influence of her intellectual tradition on the modern history of Germany, 138; literary enthusiasm and political indifference, 140; effect of the Reformation in Germany, 142; Leibnizian rationalism and the Enlightenment, 144.
- Geulincx, Arnold, extension of Descartes' doctrine by, 42.
- Goethe, his indifference to current political events, *ii.* 140.
- Green, Mr T. H., on the distinction between the act and the content of apprehension, *ii.* 59; on the absolute moral end, 109; on moral obligation, 112.
- Greville, Fulke, Bruno's friendship with, *ii.* 38.
- Hamilton, Sir W., his psychological theory, *ii.* 223 *et seq.*
- Hardenberg, Karl, his part in the regeneration of Germany, *ii.* 123.

Harmony, Pre-established, Leibniz's theory of a, 92.

Hecker, J. J., his educational reforms in Germany, ii. 125.

Hegel, his criticism of Schelling's absolute ground, 269; his insistence on the historical character of mind, 273; 'absolute thinking,' *ib.*; his system the most perfect expression of idealism, 274; its affinity to that of Aristotle, *ib.*; system of abstract thoughts an organic whole, 275; nature of understanding, *ib.*; the Dialectic, 276; understanding subordinate to speculation, 277; his relation to Kant, 278; the dialectic and the principle of Contradiction, 279; self-consciousness the highest form of reality, 280; nature and mind, *ib.*; three divisions of the speculative view of reality, 281; importance of the notion of development, *ib.*; his explanation of the transition from essence to notion, 340; criticism of his philosophy of nature, ii. 12; his indifference to current political events, 140; his view of development, 302; of evolution, 303.

Herbart, criticism of his theory of change, 302 *et seq.*; the metaphysical basis of his psychology, ii. 168; his explanation of mental process, 169; Dr Ward's criticism of 'Presentationism,' 172.

Herder, his recognition of historical development, 272, 273.

Hospitals, their maintenance by the State, ii. 96.

Humboldt, Wilhelm von, his withdrawal from politics, ii. 123; share in founding Berlin University, 130, 134; his character and genius, *ib.*; his earlier career, 135; his intercourse with Wolf, Schiller, and Goethe, 136; his place in Prussian history, *ib. et seq.*

Hume, his position regarding Leibniz and Kant, 105; connexion with Locke, 133; difficulty at-

tending the dual significance of idea, 134, 146; impressions and ideas, 134; modes of having and of grouping ideas, 135; the element of belief, *ib.*; isolation of ideas, 136; treatment of mathematical propositions, 137; theory irreconcilable with his fundamental principles, 138; view as to arithmetic, 139; memory and reasoning, 140; causation (real dependence) and reasoning, 141; analysis of causation, *ib.*; analysis of reasoning, 142; nature of an inference, 143; no synthetic function in mind, *ib.*; necessity only subjective, 144; analysis of belief, *ib.*; reality only clusters of perceptions, 145; difficulty of the principle as applying to personal identity, 146; criticism of his theory of causation, 321; comparison of above with Kant's, 326; 'belief' as the difference between idea and judgment, ii. 269; Kant's inadequate answer to Hume regarding causality, 297.

Idea, the Cartesian antithesis between idea and sensation, 34; Descartes' classification of ideas as forming Understanding, 37; his view as to innate ideas, 38; significance of the term in the philosophy of Malebranche, 50, 53; Leibniz's position with regard to innate ideas, 96; conflicting senses of idea in Locke's Essay, 113; in Hume, 134.

Idealism, Subjective, criticism of the theory of, 233 *et seq.*; its fundamental principle, 283; Kant's relation to, *ib. et seq.*; main cause of its perplexities, 288.

Innate ideas, Descartes' conception of, 38; Leibniz's criticism of Locke, 96.

Judgment, the disjunctive judgment, ii. 260 *et seq.*; the hypothetical judgment, 262; the categorical judgment, 264; uni-

versal and individual judgments, *ib.*; distinction between idea and judgment, 268; Brentano's view, *ib.*; judgment based on the simplest consciousness of the objective, 272; this consciousness derived from the distinction between sensuous perceptions and ideas, 273; nature of the rudimentary judgment thence made possible, 275.

Kant, relation to Locke, 112, 123; relation to preceding systems, 147; the fundamental note of his system, 148; his view of the Leibnizian theory of space, 149 *et seq.*; 'incongruent counterparts,' 151; mathematical procedure not purely analytic, 153; 'Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World' marking a transition stage in his thinking, 155; comparison of this work with the Critique, 156 *et seq.*; phenomenon and noumenon, 157, 210; the *a priori* character of Space determined relatively to the Leibnizian theory, 158; rejection of Newton's theory, 159; definition of Critical Method, 165; confusion in his application of the method, 167; 'how are synthetic *a priori* propositions possible?' a needlessly limited question, 170; his failure to harmonise mind and reality, 172; the characteristics of *a priori* propositions, 173; transcendental knowledge, 174; threefold division of transcendental doctrine, *ib.*; the forms of sense, 176; their metaphysical exposition, *ib.*; space and time as forms of intuition, 178; their transcendental exposition, 179; definition of synthesis, *ib.*; 'real' and 'ideal' as applied to space and time, 180, 181; the Categories, 183; their justification, 185 *et seq.*; the function of understanding, 190; the Transcendental Schema, 192; the

Principles of Pure Understanding, 193, 194; axioms of intuition, *ib.*; anticipations of perception, 195; analogies of experience, 196; objective permanence, 198; objective succession and causality, 199; simultaneity or coexistence, 200; reciprocity, 201; postulates of empirical thought, 202; the function of reason, 206; ideas of reason, 208; the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, 211; the Antinomies, 213; the ideas of pure reason, 217; the ontological argument for the existence of God, 219; the regulative function of ideas of reason, 222; things-in-themselves, 223 *et seq.*; three ways of determining the realm of things-in-themselves, 226 *et seq.*; critical analysis of the notion, thing-in-itself, 230 *et seq.*; Subjective Idealism, 233 *et seq.*; critical analysis of the doctrine of Inner Sense, 240 *et seq.*; a fundamental error in Kant's analysis, 242; the meaning of *a priori*, 244 *et seq.*; the antithesis between mechanism and freedom, 247 *et seq.*; the final conception compared with Berkeley's idealism, 250; Hegel's relation to Kant, 278; his partial acceptance of Subjective Idealism, 283 *et seq.*; his inversion of the order of experience, 288; criticism of his theory of space, 292 *et seq.*; criticism of his theory of time, 305 *et seq.*; his doctrine of causation, 317; his causal theory compared with Hume's, 326; the Subjective Idealism in his system, 348; general criticism of Kant's system, ii. 13 *et seq.*; the distinction between psychology and epistemology, 46; meaning of facts of mind, 53; his conception of psychology and its difficulties, 54 *et seq.*; inadequacy of his distinction between psychology and epistemology, 60; his influence on psychology, 66; his general conception of it, 67; empirical

- character of psychology, 68 ; criticism of the Kantian psychology, 72 *et seq.* ; the notion of inner sense, 75 ; subjective colouring of Kant's terminology, 77 ; his criticism of Leibniz's theory of space, 99 ; the Kantian view of morality and absolute law, 102 *et seq.* ; his relation to Leibniz and Hume, 105 ; general historical significance of the Critical Philosophy, 146 ; his doctrine in the main unpsychological, 251 ; his view of the function of thought, *ib.* ; the distinction between subjective and objective due to the spontaneity of thought, *ib.* ; reasons against this view, 252 ; the objective reference of thought, *ib. et seq.* ; his criticism of Leibniz, 253 ; defects of this criticism, 254 ; relation of thought and self-consciousness, 255 ; criticism of the Kantian Categories, 292 *et seq.* ; the distinction between causality and uniformity, 296 ; the recognition in the Transcendental Logic that thought has other than a formal significance, 310.
- Kotzebue, August, murder of, ii. 122.
- Language, the origin of, ii. 277 ; psychological bearing of philosophical inquiry, 279.
- Latta, Professor, *The Monadology of Leibniz*, edited by, 88.
- Leibniz, salient facts in his life, 67 ; interest in mathematics, *ib.* ; his dissatisfaction with Cartesianism, 68 ; his meeting with Spinoza and its influence, *ib. et seq.* ; the influence of Plato, 69 ; his varied activity, 70 ; methods of approaching his philosophy, *ib.* ; the problem of individuation, 71, 72 ; the theory of numbers, 73 ; truths of reason and of experience, *ib.* ; real and nominal definitions, 74 ; his criticism of the Cartesian Physics, 75, 76 ; his correspondence with Arnauld, 77 *et seq.* ; evolution of his central idea of a single substance, 79 ; the concomitance of substances, 80 ; Arnauld's criticism of the doctrine, 81 ; the theory of 'expression,' 82 ; biological arguments, 86 ; general view of existence, 87 ; the *Monadology*, 88 ; extendedness a derivative aspect, 89 ; justification of describing his general view as Intellectualism, 90 ; unity and activity the characteristics of reality, *ib.* ; two incoherent conceptions in his philosophy, 91 ; the Pre-established Harmony, 92 ; the principle of development and the unity of the monad, 93 ; the psychical nature of the monad, 95 ; the origin of knowledge, 96 ; his position relative to Descartes and Locke, *ib.* ; identification of the grades of apprehension, 97 ; qualitative nature of monads, 98 ; nature of space and time, 99 ; criticism of this theory, *ib.* ; its influence on Kant, *ib.* ; his theory of matter compared with Mill's definition, 100 ; criticism of the principle 'Choice of the Best,' 101, 104 ; the initial argument of the *Monadology* a verbal triviality, 102 ; an irresolvable problem in his system, *ib. et seq.* ; truths of reason and of fact, 103 ; essence and existence, 104 ; 'prima possibilia,' 105 ; philosophical relation of Leibniz, Kant, and Hume, *ib.* ; the doctrine of Creation, 106 ; view of determinism, 107 ; his theory of optimism and its difficulties, *ib.* ; the three kinds of evil, 108 ; general estimate of his system, 109 ; criticism of Locke, 113 ; general result of his philosophy, 147, 148 ; Kant's attitude to the Leibnizian treatment of Space, 149 *et seq.* ; his connexion with the deism of the Enlightenment, ii. 144 ; the Leibnizian theory and psychology, 227.
- Leo XIII., his unflattering account of Giordano Bruno, ii. 23.

- Lessing, his recognition of historical development, 272.
- Locke, Leibniz's view of innate ideas, 96; analogy between the Essay and the Critical Philosophy, 111; the problem of the Essay; 112; Leibniz's criticism, 113; inconsistent meanings of 'idea,' *ib.*; the two sources of ideas, 114; meaning of sensation and reflection, 115; the operation of mind or ideas, 116; a novel interpretation of his theory, 117; conflict in the treatment of simple ideas, *ib.*; dual significance of 'idea' in his theory of knowledge, 118; ideal and real propositions, 119; account of reasoning, 121; relations between ideal contents apprehended without reference to reality, 122; Berkeley's connexion with Locke, 124; inconsistent treatment of mathematics, 137; general result of his philosophy, 147, 148; his ignoring the distinction between psychology and epistemology, *ii.* 49.
- Lotze, his explanation of apparent contradiction in the conception of time, 310; his analysis of causation, 321 *et seq.*; criticism of above, 324; his relation to Berkeley, 325; general estimate, *ii.* 12; general aspect of his psychological doctrine, 231; the specific functions of thinking, *ib. et seq.*; thinking distinguished from lower mental processes, 232; three intermediaries necessary between material of sense-association and thought, 234; (1) identity of the perceiving subject, *ib.*; (2) unity of the subject in association and reproduction, 235; (3) unity of the subject perceiving the extended and temporal, 236; his view of the concept, 237; the pre-logical processes of thinking, 238; the objectification of the subject, *ib.*; manifold character of the second pre-logical process, analysed into positing, distinguishing, and comparing, 242 *et seq.*; the pre-logical processes a misleading abstraction, 250.
- 'Love's Labour's Lost,' possible indebtedness of, to Bruno's 'Il Candelajo,' *ii.* 33, 38, 39.
- Lully, Raymond, Bruno's obligation to, *ii.* 37.
- Malebranche, his position as an exponent of Cartesianism, 43; classification of the modes of knowledge, 44; the idea of the infinite as underlying knowledge, 45; the apprehension of soul a product of feeling, not of idea, 46; all things known in God, and only through God, 47; 'intelligible extension,' 48; God neither 'res extensa' nor 'res cogitans,' 49; the four modes of apprehension, *ib.*; his conception of 'idea,' 50; imagination dependent on sense-perception, 51; his interpretation of sense-perception akin to Occasionalism, *ib.*; external nature an article only of faith, 52; ideas as distinguished from consciousness of 'modalities,' 53; antithesis of essence and existence, 54; criticisms of Arnauld, 55, 56; the distinction between psychology and epistemology, *ii.* 49.
- Mansel, Dean, his psychological theory, *ii.* 224.
- Mathematics, importance of, in seventeenth century philosophy, 4; the Cartesian view of mathematical demonstration, 8; Leibniz's interest in, 67; unsatisfactory treatment of, by Locke and Hume, 137.
- Mill, J. S., his definition of matter compared with Leibniz's, 100; his use of the term 'mental chemistry,' *ii.* 171; 'belief' as constituting the difference between idea and judgment, 269.
- Morality, difficulty in separating facts and hypotheses, *ii.* 98, 99; practical and speculative morality, 100; use of the term 'scientific' applied to the basis of morality,

- ib.*; the relation between morality and its basis, 101 *et seq.*; the Greek and the Kantian method of defining this, 102; absolute law and absolute end criticised, 103 *et seq.*; negative value of the utilitarian end, 107; modern ethical preference for absolute end, 108; formal character of end in naturalism, 109; the idealist view of end, *ib.*; 'self-realisation,' *ib.*; the feature of obligation in morality, 111 *et seq.*; the formation of ideals, 113; difficulty of constructing a theory of morality, 115; the only method of explaining morality, 116.
- Naturalism, misconceptions in its view of mind and nature, ii. 19; Bruno as a pioneer of, 44.
- Newton, his theory of Absolute Space compared with that of Descartes, 31; his theory of space compared with Leibniz's and Kant's, 99; Kant's view of his theory of space, 158.
- Nicolai, Friedrich, a representative of the 'Enlightenment,' ii. 145.
- Occasionalism, approximation to, in the Cartesian philosophy, 39, 40; Psycho-physical Parallelism and, 346, 353.
- Oxford, Giordano Bruno's visit to, ii. 40.
- Philosophy, its academical importance, ii. 3; Plato's description of, *ib.*; Bishop Berkeley's, 4; the uniformity of its problems, 5; its relation to experience, 8; its present transitional state, 10; knowledge of its historical background necessary for the understanding of any system, 11; recent increase of interest in psychology, 20; the intimate relation of its branches, 45; connexion of philosophy with the general problem of social life, 78 *et seq.*; dangers of false analogy illustrated from sociology, 80 *et seq.*; the value of negative criticism, 110; the psychological doctrine of the Scottish Philosophy, 222 *et seq.*
- Physics, the Cartesian system of, 28 *et seq.*; Leibniz's criticism of, 75.
- Pineal gland, the Cartesian view of the, 42.
- Plato, his description of philosophy, ii. 3.
- Positivism, exclusive stress laid by Comte on coexistences and sequences, ii. 308; Comte's distinction between abstract and concrete, *ib.*
- Presentationism, Dr Ward's criticism of, ii. 172; the identification of presentation and object, 173; presentations and feelings, 175, 176; Brentano's distinction of presentation from judgment and feeling, 180; general criticism of the theory, 183.
- Psychology, the Cartesian system of, 33 *et seq.*; recent increase of interest in, ii. 20; its distinction from epistemology, 46 *et seq.*; recognition of this distinction in the Stoic and pre-Kantian philosophy, 49; ignoring of it by Locke, *ib.*; psychology as the science of 'facts of mind,' 52; the Kantian and Cartesian views of 'facts of mind,' 53; Kant's conception of psychology, 54; criticism of it, 55, 56; Dr Ward's view of presentationism, 57; inadequacy of Kant's distinction between psychology and epistemology, 60; the Cartesian theory of the distinction, 61, 62; criticism of this view, *ib. et seq.*; subjective and trans-subjective one act or process, 65; Kant's influence on psychology, 66; his general conception of it, 67 *et seq.*; his rejection of a rational psychology, 68; criticism of the Kantian psychology, 72 *et seq.*; the notion of inner sense, 75; subjective colouring of Kant's terminology, 77; difficulties attending its defi-

nition, 161 *et seq.*; analysis of the term 'phenomenon of consciousness,' 163; twofold reference of the distinction between 'outer' and 'inner,' 164; the material of psychology, 165, 166; the doctrine of faculties without significance in modern psychology, 168; the doctrine of Herbart, *ib. et seq.*; the association psychology, 171; Dr Ward's criticism of 'presentationism,' 172 *et seq.*; presentation distinguished from attention and feeling, 177; distinguished from judgment and feeling, 180; general criticism of psychical atomism, 183; psychology as the tracing of the development of mind, 185 *et seq.*; difficulties attending the determination of the content of consciousness, 195 *et seq.*; analysis of immediate experience, 198 *et seq.*; qualitative differences in this content, *ib.*; feeling (q.v.), 201 *et seq.*; willing (q.v.), 212 *et seq.*; the psychological doctrine of the Scottish Philosophy, 223 *et seq.*; Sir William Hamilton's theory, *ib.*; Mansel's theory, 224; Leibnizian view, 227; Condillac's theory, 228; Lotze's doctrine of thinking, 231 *et seq.*; the Kantian doctrine, 251 *et seq.*; the various forms of reasoning, 260; the disjunctive judgment, *ib. et seq.*; the hypothetical judgment, 262; the categorical judgment, 264; distinction of universal and individual judgments, *ib.*; distinction between idea and judgment, 268; Brentano's view, *ib.*; any theory of judgment based on the simplest consciousness of the objective, 272; this consciousness is based on the distinction between sensuous perceptions and ideas, 273; nature of the rudimentary judgment thence possible, 275; the objective world conceived as standing in the same relation to other percipient subjects, *ib.*, 276; the origin of

language, 277; psychological bearing of this problem, 279; objectivity not the product of thought, 281; the inter-relation of the products of thought, 283; objectivity and universality, 284 *et seq.*; the transition from perception to thinking, 286, 288; thinking and self-consciousness, 289; thinking objective in content, subjective in process, 290; criticism of the Kantian categories, 292; thought both analytic and synthetic, 295; Kant's distinction between causality and uniformity of nature criticised, 296; the relation of thought and reality, 300; the notion of development, 302 *et seq.*; criticism of Positivism, 307 *et seq.*; form and matter, 310 *et seq.*; primitive and developed thinking not antithetical, 315.

Reality, Hegel's transition from the sphere of essence to the sphere of notion, 340; thought and, the relation of the mechanical to the psychical, 343; Lotze and the unity of self-consciousness, 344; the Occasionalist theory, 345 *et seq.*; Psycho-physical Parallelism, 346; Dr Stout's view, *ib.*; Kant and Subjective Idealism, 348; meaning of 'reality as a whole,' 350; mind and body qualitatively distinct parts of one system, *ib.*; Occasionalism, Parallelism, and the popular view regarding the relation of mind and body, 353; the assumption of the independence of mind, *ib.*, 354; experience of the mechanical the genuine character of inner life, 355; the distinction of content and reality involved in the simplest act of apprehension, 358; scientific research confirms the philosophical conception of the unity of existence, *ii.* 17; thinking as one form in which reality is manifested, 300; the complete intelligibility of

reality, 301; Aristotle's doctrine of the 'individual,' *ib.*

Schelling, his attitude to Fichte, 264, 265; independence of nature in the sum-total of reality, 265; analysis of the development of the philosophy of nature, 266; transcendental philosophy, *ib.*; theoretical, practical, and æsthetic consciousness, *ib.*; nature as a kingdom of ends, 267; the philosophy of identity, *ib.*; the identical basis of all differences, 268; Spinoza's influence, *ib.*; Hegel's criticisms, *ib.*; influence of Böhme, 269; positive and negative philosophy, *ib.*; his recognition of historical development, 271.

Schlegel, Friedrich, his relations with Schleiermacher, *ii.* 154.

Schleiermacher, representative of the culture of his time, *ii.* 147; early career, 148; his education, 149; diversity of opinion regarding him, 151; his relation to Kant, 152; friendship with F. Schlegel, 154; professor at Berlin, 155; his philosophy of religion, 156 *et seq.*; the weakness in his exposition, 157.

Schopenhauer, view of external perception, 285.

Schoppe, Gaspar, his remarkable letter respecting Bruno, *ii.* 24 *et seq.*

Scottish Philosophy, the psychological doctrine in the, *ii.* 222 *et seq.*

Sensation, criticism of the theory that it contains in itself the trans-subjective reference, 289.

Shakespeare, possible indebtedness of, to Bruno's 'Il Candelaio,' *ii.* 33, 38, 39.

Sidney, Sir Philip, Bruno's friendship with, *ii.* 33.

Smith, Mr N. D., 'Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy' by, 42.

Sociology, the dangers of applying to it analogies drawn from organic life, *ii.* 80 *et seq.*; of anal-

ogies drawn from the notion of individual development, 82 *et seq.*; meaning and scope of the social problem, 86; the nature and artificial aspects of social phenomena, 87 *et seq.*; general underestimation of social facts as historical, 90; Condorcet's analysis of social inequalities, *ib.*; modern false antithesis of cosmic and ethical order, 91; the two inquiries for sociology, 92; *a priori* schemes to be distrusted, 94; suggested maintenance of hospitals by the State, 96; Comte's method of approaching sociology, 309, 310.

Space, Descartes' and Newton's theories, 30, 31; Leibniz's theory, compared with Kant's and Newton's, 99; inadequate treatment by Locke and Hume, 137; Kant's attitude to the Leibnizian theory, 149 *et seq.*; to the Newtonian theory, 158; Kant's analysis, 177 *et seq.*; considered as the source of the distinction between subjective and objective, 291; the universal form of the objective, 293; criticism of the Kantian view, *ib. et seq.*; the perceptual and conceptual aspects of space, 296; apparent contradictions in our representations of space, 299.

Spencer, Mr Herbert, his 'Principles of Psychology' cited, 289; *ii.* 64; his theory of feeling, 205.

Spinoza, disputed sources of his system, 58; relation of ground and consequent the basis of his system, 59; distinction between understanding and imagination, 60; God as the supreme ground, *ib.*; the notion of Attribute, 61; difficulties attending this notion, 62; finite and infinite modes, 63; soul and body one and the same reality, 64; criticism of the incompleteness and inconsistency of Spinoza's fundamental notion of unity, 65, 66; his

- meeting with Leibniz and its influence on the latter, 68, 69; difficulty in his system regarding determinism, 107; his influence on Schelling, 268.
- Stein, Heinrich, his conception of the unification of Germany, ii. 119; his belief in educational reform, 129.
- Stein, Prof. L., on the genesis of Occasionalism, 42.
- Stirling, Dr Hutchison, criticism of Kant's category of causality, ii. 296.
- Stoics, recognition in their theory of the distinction between psychology and epistemology, ii. 49.
- Stout, Mr G. F., 'Manual of Psychology' by, quoted, 346, 347; his theory of feeling, ii. 206.
- Subjective Idealism, criticism of the theory of, 233 *et seq.*; Kant's relation to, 283 *et seq.*; its underlying principle, *ib.*; main cause of its perplexities, 288.
- Subjective and objective, critical analysis of the distinction, 283 *et seq.*; recognition of the subjective not prior to external perception, 287; space as the primitive source of the distinction, 291.
- Thought and reality, *see under* Reality.
- Time, any representation of time based on the notion of change, 301; the Kantian doctrine, 305 *et seq.*; criticism of the foregoing, 306 *et seq.*; differences in meaning of time-representation, 311; space elements in such representation, 312; not possible as a single perception, 313; the timelessness of reality, 314, 315.
- Vaihinger, Prof. H., 'Commentary on Kant' by, ii. 67, 74.
- Volkelt, Prof. J., on the opposition of process of consciousness and the trans-subjective, ii. 62.
- Ward, Dr James, his view of presentationism, ii. 57; general criticism of the theory, 172 *et seq.*
- Webb, T. E., 'The Intellectualism of Locke' by, 117.
- Weismann, August, anticipations of his biological theories in Leibniz, 87.
- Willing, Wundt's analysis of voluntary action, ii. 212 *et seq.*; the three factors involved in willing, 216; sensations accompanying movement, *ib.*; movement not prefigured in the antecedent sense-impulse, 217; the regular series exhibited in our changes of experience, *ib.*; willing a gradual growth, 220; the feeling of activity, 221.
- Wolf, F. A., his influence on German education, ii. 127.
- Wolff, C. W., his expulsion from Halle, ii. 127.
- Wöllner, J. C., his opposition to educational reform in Germany, ii. 128.
- Wundt, Prof. W., his analysis of voluntary action, ii. 202 *et seq.*; his theory of feeling, 203.
- Zedlitz, Baron von, his interest in educational reforms in Germany, ii. 125.

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